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THE REAL BORDERS

When we think of borders as barriers to immigration, we picture the
imaginary lines separating the United States from Canada and Mexico.
Perhaps we think of physical signs such as fences or border patrol checkpoints. But, there are other borders that have a much greater impact in determining who we accept and who we keep out. Congress, by enacting
substantive immigration law, defines our selective admission system.
These laws erect legal borders that reflect the policy choices Congress has
made about who may enter to work or to join family in the United States.
But beyond this initial border, the agencies that implement the immigration
laws have erected powerful process borders. These process borders, fostered by congressional neglect and strengthened by a lack of coordination
among the agencies, distort substantive immigration policy. Far too often,
the bureaucratic process borders control who immigrates. Process in any
legal system is important, 1 but it is of special concern in immigration law
with its opacity, frequent lack of published decisions, and culture shaped by
bureaucrats and non-lawyers. 2 In many situations, immigration adjudication is almost completely insulated from political oversight and judicial review.3

I. Scholars such as Jerry Mashaw have amply demonstrated, an adequate analysis of
administrative law process requires not only an examination of substantive legal provisions
and the agency procedures, but an assessment of the larger context within which they operate. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS 103 (1983) (stating different aspects which must be considered in analysis); see also Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65, 76-77 (1983) (providing discussion on rulemaking).
2. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATNE PROCESS 24 (Greenwood Press 1974)
(1938) (discussing role of administrative tribunals and importance of efficiency in administrative process); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN TiiE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 152-57 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (prepared for publication from 1958 tentative edition by
William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey) (focusing on lawyers and courts to define
fair adjudicatory policies). Lawyers are, of course, not the only people sensitive to the importance of fair process, but in other adjudicative systems, where lawyers and legally trained
judges dominate the operations, many essential process values are shared due to tradition,
jurisprudence, and the emphasis on process in legal education. See MICHAEL LIPSKY,
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF TiiE INDNIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 13-25
( 1980) (providing comparative discussion of process culture in other agencies).
3. One reason behind this insulation is that while many areas of administrative law
have low levels of judicial review, in immigration law, almost none of the decisions made
by the Department of State are subject to judicial review. See James A.R. Nafziger, Review
of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1, 26 {1991) {stating judicial review of consular discretion is limited). Many other challenges have faced the judicially created tradition of giving immigration statutes and decisions extraordinary deference as a re-
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In addition to these important concerns, immigration administration and
adjudication should be examined for special reasons. First, the immigration laws are designed not merely as a system that conveys benefits for
people permitted to enter and reside in the United States but, at the same
time, the law defines by omission those excluded from legal immigration.
In part, our "illegal immigration" problems result from the prospective immigrant's inability to understand and rely upon our legal immigration system.
Second, the immigration system affects millions of people, including
those admitted each year in either permanent or temporary categories, those
waiting because of quota backlogs, and, of course, those denied the right to
immigrate.4 Moreover, the system affects members of existing communities as much, if not more, than those hoping to enter because almost every
visa category involves an employer or family member acting as the noncitizen' s sponsor.5 The adjudication of immigration eligibility is one of the
flection of congressional and executive plenary power over immigration. For an overview
of the plenary power doctrine, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J.
545, 550-60 (1990) (providing overview of plenary power doctrine). See also Peter H.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14 (1984) (noting
U.S. Supreme Court has abstained from playing a significant role in immigration policy).
Further, most people never seek judicial review of Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) decisions, which concern business or family-based petitions. There are so
many different ways to obtain immigration benefits, for many people, the most economic
and productive strategy is to file in a different category or re-file the visa petition with additional supporting evidence. Many areas of administrative law are made visible by the active
participation of special interest groups and the participation of political actors. In one sense,
the group of people most affected by immigration law is unlike others impacted by administrative law for immigrants are not eligible to participate in our political process. See Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 15 MICH. L.
REV. 1092, 1100 (1977) (commenting on how right to vote is not extended to aliens); see
also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHJP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 571-93 (4th ed. 1998) (including a compilation of essays discussing alien suffrage
and political participation). Of course, other groups interested in obtaining immigration for
others or in limiting immigration may actively participate in the system, but these groups are
necessarily one step removed from much of the actual operation of the law. See id. at 581
(implying because native born citizens have the right to vote, they do not concern themselves with immigrant voting rights).
4. Currently the United States admits less than one million immigrants each year
while millions of others await agency adjudication of immigration related petitions. See infra Figure 1, p. 215; see also INS., 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 14-18, 48 (2000) [hereinafter 1998 INS YEARBOOK] (documenting 660,477 individuals were granted legal permanent status in 1998); Immigrant Visa Preference Numbers for September 2001, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1301, 1335 (2001) (demonstrating backlog and indicating which priority dates are current).
5. Congressional offices routinely assign staff to handle constituent inquiries con-
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most important governmental acts touching an individual's life. American
businesses expend substantial time and resources to secure work authorization for prospective immigrants. 6 The problems can be so complex and
overwhelming that participants feel lost in a procedural maze. The result is
a denial of a fundamental right: namely, to make an independent choice
where to live, work, and travel. 7
Finally, when the administrative process frustrates the existing substantive provisions, distrust in the law and the government grows. 8 Inadequate
reporting, inconsistent adjudication, prolonged delays, and bureaucratic
morass foster indifference. These same problems lead policy analysts to
extreme solutions, ranging from open borders to moratoria, or even a complete ban on new immigration.
While these bureaucratic process borders are pervasive throughout the
system, they have increased and dominate the immigration categories related to employment.9 More important. the disparity between what appears
ceming immigration matters, and many have full-time staff dedicated to this task. See Immigration Reorganization and Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 2528 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
87-90 (1999) (statement of Rep. Harold Rogers) (requesting congressional assistance for
refonn, more effective enforcement, and improvements in INS services), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/roge0729 .htm.
6. These costs are difficult to quantify; they may include internal expenses for preparation of visa petitions, attorneys fees, and advertising costs. See infra note I 03 and accompanying text (estimating expenses).
7. These are all essential components of human life, even if not yet rights fully protected by positive law. The focus of this Article is not to make a rights-based assessment of
the duties the U.S. government owes to individuals. Some of the aspects of the process may
be protected by treaty provisions, statutory mandates of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), or by the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1994)
(defining immigrant status and detennining immigrant eligibility); Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 {1994 & Supp. V 1999) (setting forth procedural safeguards).
Rather than build legal arguments, however, this Article addresses policy planners and
those responsible for implementing the law. Nevertheless, many of the problems documented here have and will give rise to litigation. See Jocelyn Y. Stewart, INS ls Sued Over
Delays in Processing Applications, L.A. TlMEs, Aug. 29, 2000, at A3 (discussing class action lawsuit filed by family members against INS for placing immigrants at risk of deportation by not processing their applications in a timely fashion). In rare cases, delay may even
lead to special relief. See, e.g., Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995) (vacating order denying suspension of deportation).
8. See, e.g., Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity
Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 16 N.C. L. REv. 151, 161-62 (1997) (noting incoherence or complexity may increase taxpayer distrust and make it more likely for people to
evade taxes).
9. There are three main categories of legal immigration: family-based, employmentbased, and humanitarian relief. See generally infra Part II.A.
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to be the substantive design and the actual operation of the law has grown
exponentiaHy. In 1998, despite high demand, the government issued fewer
than fifty-five percent of the authorized employment-based visas. In 1999,
the figure fell to thirty-eight percent of authorized employment-based visas.10 With the explosion of new technology, business mobility, and increased global trade, employment-based immigration has become an important part of many sectors of our economy.11 The immigration process is
so replete with procedural obstacles that employers and would-be immigrants are unable to predict when or if their petitions will be approved. The
10. See 1998 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 48 (providing data on numbers of immigrants admitted through employment petitions). In the FY 1998, only 77,476 employmentbased visas were issued out of the possible pool of 140,000. See id. In FY 1999 only
61,936 visas of 160,898 were issued. In FY 2000, the percentage increased to seventy-eight
percent or 111, 1065 of 142,299 authorized visas. See Interview with Charles Oppenheim,
Chief Immigrant Visa Control and Reporting Division, Department of State (July 17, 2001);
see also E-mail from Michael Hoefer, INS Statistics Division, to author (July 16, 2001) (on
file with author) (confirming as of July, 2001, the agency had not yet released this data for
FYs 1999 and 2000). The 1999 and 2000 numbers provided here do not include all INS
controlled adjudications; rather, they include only those that require visa numbers from the
Department of State. See infra Figure 1, p. 215 (illustrating gaps since 1992). The failure to
issue the visas was primarily due to the government's inability to process the applications.
See discussion infra Part II.C. In recent legislation, Congress authorized the reallocation of
130,000 unused employment-based visas. See American Competitiveness in the Twentyfirst Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 104, 114 Stat. 1251, 1252-53 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1184 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) (setting forth provision to reallocate visas). This
law also removes the per-country limit in instances where the overall applicant demand for
employment-based visas is less than the numbers available without regard to those limits.
This determination will be made quarterly, based on a comparison of the overall demand
versus the available numbers. "If the total number of [employment-based) visas ... exceeds
the number of qualified immigrants who may otherwise be issued such visas (during the
same period], the visas made available under that paragraph shall be issued without regard
to the numerical limitation ... during the remainder of the calendar quarter." INA
§ 202(a)(S)A, 8 U.S.C. § l 152(a)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Immigrant Visa
Preference Numbers for December 2000, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1625, 1648 (2000)
(providing current priority dates for employment-based visa applications); see generally
VISA BULL. (Dec. 2000), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin. As will
be discussed below, this type of solution is, unfortunately, purely reactive and does not prevent the process border distortions.
11.

See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCil.., THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC,

AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 2-12 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997)
(summarizing economic impacts of immigration); see also Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Educ. and the Wor/if(Jrce Comm., 106th Cong. 7-Jl Web. 17,
2000) (statement of Dr. Richard W. Judy, Director Hudson Institute's Center for Workforce
Development) (discussing worker dearth); Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations ofthe
House Educ. and the Worliforce Comm., 106th Cong. 12-15 (Feb. 17, 2000) (statement of
Dr. Henry J. Holzer, Urban Institute) (describing costs of worker shortages on employers
and the economy).
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uncertainty leaves businesses unable to plan efficiently and employees unable to change jobs. Worst of all, employees remain dependent, sometimes
for years, on the sponsoring employer's good will throughout the immigration process.
There are several sources of process obstacles. Under our current immigration system, both family and employment-based categories face multiyear processing delays. Three separate federal agencies may be involved in
adjudicating one immigrant petition. 12 These are the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the Department of Labor and the Department
of State. While the actual language of the Immigration Nationality Act
(INA) delegates to the Attorney General, Secretary of Labor, or Secretary
of State, the responsibility falls to three agencies. 13 The INS is a division
of the Department of Justice. 14 The Department of Labor has assigned immigration adjudication to the Employment and Training Administration,
Office of Workforce Security. 15 The Department of State places central
administrative authority in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, but the INA
guarantees each consular officer abroad has independent adjudicative
authority. 16 These agencies are guided by their own internal rules and are

12. It is hard to compare administrative agencies' structures, let alone how well they
function. While this Article analyzes three agencies (the Department of Labor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of State), another study systematically measured federal management performance of twenty agencies based on five criteria,
with the goal of prompting them to manage better. See ALAN K. CAMPBELL Pus. AFFAIRS
INST. OF SYRACUSE UNIV. MA.xWELL SCH. OF CmZENSHIP & Pus. AFFAIRS, FEDERAL GRADE
REPoR.T
1999
(1999)
[hereinafter
1999 GRADE REPoRT],
available at
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/gpp/Federal/fedreportl 999.htm; See also Anne Laurent,

Stacking Up: The Government Performance Project Rates Management at 15 Federal
Agencies, Gov'T EXECUTIVE, Feb. 1999, at 13 (outlining and discussing Project in detail).
The INS was given an overall grade of C-, while its high volume adjudication counterparts
scored as follows: Social Security Administration, A; Veterans Health Administration, B;
Internal Revenue Service, C. See id. at 14.
13. See INA § 212(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (describing
labor certification requirements for immigrant workers and involvement of Secretary of Labor, Secretary of State, and Attorney General); INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)
(stating aliens may be excluded for security reasons as determined by Attorney General);
INA§ 237(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1994) (outlining Attorney General's power to immediately deport aliens excluded from admission or entering in violation oflaw).
14. See DOJ Organization of the Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 0.105 (2001) (describing powers and responsibilities of the Commission of INS within Department of Justice).
.
15. See EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, ' OFFICE OF WORKFORCE
SEC., DMSION OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATION CHART, al
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign/org.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
16. See INA § 104(a)(I), 8 U.S.C. § I 104(a)(I) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating consular officers act independently in their duties and functions relating to granting or refusing
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given little direction from Congress. The lack of clear standards, complex
substantive and procedural rules, and redundancy in adjudication create
process obstacles, so significant to U.S. immigration law, that in many
cases the adjudication hurdles are more burdensome and restrictive than the
substantive law itself.
One of the roots of process obstacles is the ineffective structural delegation of authority among the agencies involved in the immigration process.
Multi-agency adjudication leads to redundant and unnecessarily fragmented
decisions. Furthermore, there is a lack of coordination between the agencies that creates problems when the requirements and policies of one conflict with those of another.'7 Jn turn, non-precedent agency decisions
sometimes contradict one another, leading to conflicting adjudication of
similar visa petitions. At times, these differences in interpreting the law
could lead participants to forum shop among agencies with parallel responsibilities in an effort to manipulate the adjudication process.
Another significant contributor to process obstacles is the opacity of
both the substantive and procedural requirements of immigration law. Immigration law creates multiple pathways to immigrant status. There are
currently more than nine separate employment related categories, several of
which contain subcategories, permitting a foreign worker to immigrate.
However, due to the complexity of the law and process delays, an individual rarely takes a direct path to immigration. Instead, most non-citizens 18
first use some of the nineteen non-immigrant or temporary visa categories
while completing the journey through the immigration process.
Delay not only frustrates the purpose of the immigration law, but at
times serves to negate it. 19 Some delays spring from horrific bureaucratic
of visas). There are other agencies, such as the Public Health Service, which sometimes
play a subordinate role in immigration adjudication. See INA § 232, 8 U.S.C. § 1222(b)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing upon arrival, aliens are examined by officers of the Public Health Service); see also INA§ 240(c)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(l)(b) (1994 & Supp.
V 1999) (establishing upon a medical certification an alien has a particular disease, illness,
or addiction, such alien will be found inadmissible).
17. See infra Part 11.C.3 (discussing conflict between Department of Labor and INS
requirements for the immigrant advanced degree category).
18. I have adopted the term "non-citizen" to refer to people who are called "aliens" in
the statutes and regulations. See INA§ l0l(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(3) (1994) (defining
alien as a person "not a citizen or national of the United States."). At other times, I use the
term "immigrant" to refer to people pursuing permanent residence in the United States to
avoid the pejorative associations of the word "alien." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5) (defining the
word "immigrant"); 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(20) (explaining the term "'lawfully admitted for
permanent residence"').
19. One might argue, however, that the process problems and delay are intended, as a
braking mechanism, to limit overall immigration. See infra Part III.B (discussing congressional responsibility).
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backlogs. For instance, Congress established employment-based immigration to immediately fill any position for which no qualified and willing
U.S. worker could be found. 20 However, it can take four years to complete
the immigration process. Despite high demand, process obstacles caused
fewer than sixty percent of the allocated employment-based immigrant visas to be actually issued.21 In other cases, particularly those that are age
and relationship sensitive, process controls so completely that the immigrant loses eligibility altogether. For example, a child turning twenty-one
years old before her family can complete the immigration process cannot
immigrate with her parents until a much later time. 22
Thus, the statutory provisions, regulations, and implementing forms and
instructions, as complex as they are, are only the map; they are a theoretical
depiction of the route one might take to immigrate. In reality, a person
wishing to determine her eligibility for immigration faces a gap between
what is theoretically possible and the reality of the adjudication process.
While a map shows the general distance between one place and another, it
cannot show the difficulty an individual encounters along the journey, or
whether the journey can be completed at all. The map is not the territory.23

20. See INA § 212(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating unskilled and skilled laborers are inadmissible unless there are not sufficient workers who are
able, willing, and qualified to fill these positions).
21. See infra Figure I, p. 215 (illustrating gap between authorized and issued visas).
22. The parents can petition for their adult, unmarried child, but the current backlog in
this category suggests a ten year wait before the family can be reunited. See INS Revocation of Approval of Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 205.l(a)(3)(i)(F) (2001) (stating if a child turns
twenty-one prior to immigrating with family, the son or daughter cannot accompany them
and family may file a petition on the son or daughter's behalf); Immigrant Visa Preference
Numbers for September 200I, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1301, 1335 (2001) (demonstrating
backlog and indicating priority dates for unmarried son or daughters of permanent residents); see also INA § 203(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(a)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)
(qualifying only the spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters of pennanent residents for visa petitions). If the child marries during the waiting period, she may only be
sponsored ifthe parents become U.S. citizens. See INA § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(a)(3)
(disqualifying married son or daughters of permanent residents). The quota delay in the
category for married children of citizens is also significant. As of August 2000, the applicant could expect a wait of six years or more. See Immigrant Visa Preference Numbers for
August 2000, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 937 (2000) (indicating Family-Based Third Preference).
23. See JONATHAN z. SMITII, MAP IS NOT TERRITORY: STIJDIES IN TIIE HISTORY OF
RELIGIONS 289-309 (1978) (quoting ALFRED KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO NON-ARISTOTELIAN SYSTEMS AND GENERAL SEMANTICS 750 (4th ed.
1988) (using map as a metaphor)); see also SAM D. GILL, STORYTRACKING: TEXTS, STORIES,
& HISTORIES IN CENTRAL AUSTRALIA 3 (1998) ("The academy exists because there is a
gaping chasm between the reality of our world and our understanding ofit.").
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Most
These process borders have received little scholarly attention.
immigration law analysis focuses on issues related to the first border: who
should be allowed to immigrate, who should be barred, and what is the
constitutional status of immigrants in various circumstances.25 When
scholars do address particular procedural obstacles to the attainment of
immigration goals, they seldom examine the intricacies of the bureaucratic
system that erected the obstacles in the first place.26 When scholars ignore

24. This may be partly due to the fact that these obstacles are more difficult to trace.
They are rarely revealed by reading judicial opinions, or by parsing statutes and regulations.
Moreover, as discussed in Part III, infra, the agencies involved make study difficult by failing to gather, publish, or otherwise allow access to data concerning much of their work.
The study of informal adjudication is inherently difficult, but the particular lack of transparency in the immigration adjudication process compounds the problems.
Despite the lapse of thirty years since Kenneth Culp Davis called upon law scholars to
pay more attention to decisionmaking role of administrative officials, this work has largely
been left to political scientists, sociologists, and historians. See KENNEm CULP DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY vii (1969) (discussing law and decisionmaking role of administrative officials). See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race,
Class, Identity, and "Passing": Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910, 25 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY l, 34-35 (2000) (examining decisionmaking by border officers enforcing
one aspect of Chinese exclusion laws and providing insights of continuing relevance); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
Cou.JM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing theoretical examination of administrative process).
25. The scholarship about immigration policy is growing in many disciplines. See,
e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND TiiE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 86-90 (1999) {examining immigration from an economic angle); see generally
SASK.IA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION {1996)
{discussing immigration from a sociological point of view); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS,
STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (1998) (discussing how immigrants have shaped American life and law).
26. There are some notable exceptions of articles that examine specific aspects of immigration process. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A "White Paper," 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667 (1997) (proposing alternatives and improvements to INS
detention policy); Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation For Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1655 (1997) (discussing
lack of legal representation for immigrants). There were several studies sponsored by the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). See, e.g., Diver, supra note 1;
Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Acfjudication: A Study of
the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1297, 1301 (1986) (developing criteria for selecting the proper administrative and judicial forums in which to review agency adjudication); David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Acfjudication: On Navigating the Coast ofBohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247 (1990) (examini.ng asylum decisions and providing
recommendations); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-ofStatus Adjudication: A Case Study
ofthe Informal Agency Process, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1974) (discussing standards to apply
in deciding whether to grant procedural protections to immigrants); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study
of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (1984) (analyzing due process in immigration functions performed by INS and Department of Justice); see also LINDA ZENGERLE,
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or gloss over the process, they render irrelevant much of their otherwise
thoughtful analysis of substantive immigration law and proposals for reform. In reality, these process borders, control or distort the substantive
policy. 27
Unfortunately, governmental studies are almost always flawed because
the studies focus on a single agency. 28 While serious critique of each
agency's operations is necessary, the failure to adequately address the interaction of the agencies' procedures reinforces the existing process borders
between the agencies. Reforms or process problems in one agency dramatically affect the operations of the others. More importantly, the experience of moving through the immigration process is made more chaotic by a
lack of coordination and control of the entire process.
I contend the sources of the process borders must be studied and understood so that the borders can be dismantled. This Article begins that study
and recommends several changes critical to fundamental procedural
change. The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the significance of process to the administration of immigration law and introduces
the sources of the bureaucratic borders. Part II maps the categories of legal
immigration and uses a detailed narrative to describe the interaction of the
three agencies that control immigration. The narrative also reveals the
strategies representative participants-an employer and an immigrantmust use to successfully navigate across the process borders. This
narrative demonstrates many of the systemic process failures. Part III
identifies three process values: integrity, efficiency, and transparency and
illustrates how several key sources of bureaucratic borders, independently
and in concert, diminish these qualities in immigration adjudication. Part
N uses the focus on administrative process to evaluate several radical
proposals for reform and proposes pragmatic incremental changes aimed at
ACUS, LABOR CERTIFICATION OF IMMIGRANT ALIENS, ACUS REP. No. 73-2 (1973). Congress did not renew the funding of the Administrative Conference in 1995. See Symposium,
Administrative Conference of the United States "ACUS," 30 ARJZ. ST. L.J. 19-162 (1998)
(providing a history and evaluation of ACUS).
27. In order to focus on what I call process borders, I have chosen to take the law's
substantive provisions at face value (i.e., as intending what they purport to do). Some may
view this approach as naive or otherwise flawed, theorizing that process is inseparable from
substance, and the attempt to separate them nonsensical. Since substantive immigration law
is the outcome of political compromise, one cannot improve the process without addressing
the politics, which produced the substantive provisions in the first place.
28. See, e.g., GAO, REP. GA0-01-488, IMMIGRATION BENEFITS: SEVERAL FACTORS
IMPEDE TIMELINESS OF APPLICATION PROCESSING (May 2001) [hereinafter GAO REPORT);
OFFICE OF AUDIT U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S FOREIGN LABOR
CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS: THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN AND NEEDS TO BE FIXED, REP. No. 0696-002-03-321 (May 22, 1996) (assessing Department of Labor's labor certification and labor condition application programs).
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reducing and breaking down the process borders.

II.

THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION PROCESS: MAP AND TERRITORY

A. Mapping Eligibility
No person simply immigrates to the United States. Only those who fit
into a specific statutory category qualify for permanent residence. The
1952 adoption of the INA29 divided immigration into three general categories. One is intended to reunite families, 30 another allows limited immigration based on employment relationships,31 and a third gives specific kinds
of humanitarian relief such as registry3 2 or political asylum. 33 The statutory
scheme maps who may immigrate, laying out only the broad substantive
and procedural contours.
Qualifying in any particular visa category is only part of the path, for
Congress has rationed and apportioned visas under strict quotas. One
group, immediate relatives,34 is exempt from a precise quota limitation.
Furthermore, family and employment-based visas are divided among a series of preferences or priorities. 35 Since 1992, when the current preferences
began operating, immigration in the family and employment based categories combined has ranged between approximately 661,000 and 952,000. 36
29. See INA 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1994).
30. See INA § 202(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 115l(b)(2)(A)(i) (stating immediate relatives are
aliens not subject to direct numerical limitations).
31. See INA§ 203, 8 U.S.C. § I 153(b) (establishing preference allocation of immigrant
visas for employee-based immigrants).
32. See INA§ 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (setting forth provisions oflegalization registry).
33. See INA§ 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (establishing asylum provisions).
34. See INA§ 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (describing family based immigrants). The statutory definition of "immediate relative" is narrow. It includes only the spouse, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens. See INA § 202(a)(l)-(2), 8 U.S.C. § l 15l(b)(2)(A)(i)
(1994) (excluding immediate relatives of U.S. citizens from immigrant visa limitations).
35. See INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. 1153(a) (allocating a minimum of 226,000 familysponsored immigrant visas). The greater the number of immediate relatives, the lower the
quota number permitted in the family-based category. Family-based immigrant quotas can
expand to a high of 480,000 per year. See INA§ 201(c), 8 U.S.C. § I 15l(c) (establishing
worldwide level of family-sponsored immigrants); see also id. § ll5l(d) (authorizing
140,000 employment-based immigrants). In addition to quotas for the total number of immigrants, until 2001, the law strictly limited immigration from any individual country to
seven percent of the total number of visas issued to avoid domination of any category by
nationals from a single country. In late 2000, Congress authorized an exemption from the
per country ceiling cap in any year in which all of the 140,000 employment-based visas
have not been issued. The significance of this exception is discussed in Part 11.C.3.
36. Total legal immigration, as indicated in Figure I, is larger due to other miscellaneous categories of immigration such as refugees, the 1986 legalization program, and the di-
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Figure 1: Totals of Annual Immigration
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The preference categories and quota allocations can be briefly summarized as a hierarchy where the "best and brightest" are given priority over
other immigrants and are frequently exempted from onerous requirements.
The first employment-based preference includes people of extraordinary
ability, outstanding academics and researchers, and multinational executives and managers. 37 The second preference contains persons with exceptional abilities or advanced degrees and normally requires a labor certification unless the employment of the non-citizen can be of demonstrated
38
benefit to the national interest. The third preference is for all other professionals and skilled workers who successfully obtain the labor certification and contains a limited subcategory, only 10,000 visas, of low-skilled
39
workers who have a labor certificate. The fourth preference is reserved
for certain special immigrants and religious workers and is generally ex40
empt from any labor market test. The fifth preference is available to investors with the ability to commit $500,000 to $1 million in businesses
versity lottery. The INS has reported immigration data for FY s 1988 through 1998, but as
of July 2000 has not released full data on FYs 1999 and 2000. See 1998 INS YEARBOOK,
supra note 4, at 17 (providing a table from 1988 through 1998 breaking down the number of
immigrants by category).
37. See INA § 203(b}, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(I) (noting preference allocation for employment-based immigrants).
38. See id. .§ I 153(b)(2) (describing skilled workers as having exceptional ability in
science, arts, or business).
39. See id. § I 153(b)(3)(B); see also Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193 (1997) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255 (Supp. V 1999)) (allocating 5,000 of these 10,000 visas temporarily for use in special relief programs for Central Americans).
40. See INA § 203(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(b)(4) (establishing availability of visas to
qualified special immigrants who have extraordinary ability with arts, sciences, education,
or athletics).
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generating at least ten new positions.41

.

F"12ure 2 Imm1uantV"1sa Allocaf ion
Visa Category

Description of Criteria

Limitation

Immediate
Relatives

Spouse, minor children, and
parents of U.S. citizens

Family First
Preference
Family Second
Preference

Adult Unmarried Sons and
Daughters of Citizens; (NLC)
Spouses and Children, and
Unmarried Sons and Daughters of Permanent Residents;
(NLC)

Family Third
Preference

Married Sons and Daughters
of Citizens; (NLC)

Family Fourth
Preference

Brothers and Sisters of Adult
Citizens; (NLC)

There is no quota limit on this
category. There is no labor
certification (NLC) required.
23,400 plus any numbers not required for fourth preference
114,200, plus the number (if any)
by which the worldwide family
preference level exceeds 226,000,
and any unused first preference
numbers
23,400, plus any numbers not required by first and second
preferences
65,000, plus any numbers not required by first three preferences

Employment
First
Preference

Employment
Second
Preference

The total number of immediate
relatives varies the family
preference limits
Priority Workers: (NLC)
a) extraordinary ability in the
arts, sciences, or business
b) outstanding researchers and
professors
c) multinational executives and
managers
Advance Degree Professionals
or
Exceptional Ability in the Arts
and Sciences
Labor Certification Required
or National Interest Waiver

Total: 226,000 floor
480,000 ceiling
28.6% of the worldwide level,
plus any numbers not required for
fourth and fifth preferences
[minimum 40,040]

28.6% of the worldwide level,
plus any numbers not required by
first preference [minimum 40,040]

41. See id.§ I 153(b)(5)(A)(ii-iii), (C)(i-ii) (stating eligibility of visas for new commercial enterprises); see also Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § l 16(a)(2), 111 Stat.
2467 (1997) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. V 1999)) (ending pilot program on September 30, 2000); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 610, 106 Stat. 1874 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § l 153 (Supp. V 1999)); S. REP. No. 102-918 (1992) (creating pilot investment
program authorizing special investments of$300,000).
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Employment
Third
Preference

Employment
Fourth
Preference
Employment
Fifth
Preference

Diversity
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Description of Criteria

Limitation

Skilled Workers, Professionals, and Other Workers
Labor Certification Required
or Schedule A Waiver
5,000 of the 10,000 for other
workers have been temporarily
allocated to other immigrants
due to special relieflegislation.
Religious Workers and Certain
Special Immigrants; {NLC)

28.6% of the worldwide level,
plus any numbers not required by
first and second preferences,
[minimum 40,040] not more than
10,000 of which to "Other
Workers."

Employment Creation; {NLC)
Millionaire Investors
not less than 3,000 of the total
are reserved for investors in a
targeted rural or
high-unemployment area, and
3,000 set aside for investors in
regional centers

7.1 % of the worldwide level,
[minimum 9, 940]

Lottery for low-admission
countries. Applicants must
have the equivalent of a U.S.
degree or two years of work
experience; {NLC).

7.1% of the worldwide level
[minimum 9,940]

Total: 140,000 min. spill down
from family preferences can
Increase this number
55,000 [This category was temporarily reduced by 5,000 due to
special relief for Central
Americans.]

The existence of the quota limits and preferences makes identifying the
appropriate category for a potential immigrant only part of reading the
map. The quota limitations and per country restrictions add a layer of
complexity that makes some categories undesirable if not illusory. For example, the lNA contains a category authorizing the immigration of brothers
and sisters of adult U.S. citizens. The statute authorizes 65,000 people in
this category each year .42 My current estimate of a date of visa availability
in this category is close to fifteen years. For people from the Philippines
the wait may exceed twenty-five years. 43
Calculating when an individual is eligible to immigrate under the substantive law is like looking at a map depicting an island only several miles
42. See INA § 203(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(4) (indicating qualified immigrant siblings must be at least twenty-one years old).
43. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing difficulty in predicting visa quota movement and
how no one can predict exact processing times, while estimates here are based on watching
the movement of visa categories over several years).
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out to sea. What you cannot see is that ferry service to the island is very
limited. The ferry may be slowed further depending upon the tides, current, and number of people on board. Unless you are willing to wait, you
simply cannot get there from here.
Individuals examining the immigration map usually evaluate both the
family-based and employment-based options. If the delay in the brother
and sister category means a fifteen year wait, the family and the immigrant
will naturally seek a more expeditious route. Other people simply lack the
qualifying family relationship and immediately tum to the employmentbased categories. This Article focuses on employment-related immigration, but similar or more egregious problems plague the family-based immigration cases.
B. Three Stops on Map to Employment-Based Immigration

To immigrate in the employment-based categories, an individual must
first secure permission from each of the three separate "sovereigns"
guarding the territory. 44 Congress authorized three federal agencies, the
INS, the Department of Labor, and the Department of State, to administer
the immigration system.45 Travelers through this territory find that at times
more than one agency controls the jurisdiction, and thus can limit their
ability to progress to the next stop on the journey. Congress's selection of
particular agencies reflects some of the complex po1icy goals of the INA.
The Department of Labor protects U.S. labor and provides expertise on labor conditions.46 The Department of State operates as a pre-screener of
immigrants before they reach our shores and also aids in the identification
of undesirable aliens based on the consular officer's understanding of the

44. See infra Part II.C (discussing national interest waiver of labor certification and
how the INA exempts a few categories from Department of Labor review).
45. See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (dividing agency action into rule
making and adjudication, but contemplating some adjudication can be conducted less formally with no statutory requirements for personal appearances or hearings). Much of the
adjudication examined in this Article is informal adjudication. The term "informal adjudication" describes such informal procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (describing rulemaking
process where interested persons participate in rulemaking). Almost all of the adjudications
discussed in this Article are made by agency officials reviewing forms and supporting written materials without any direct interaction with the applicant. See also Paul R. V erkuil, A
Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. R..Ev. 739, 739 n.1 (1976) (defining "informal adjudication[s]" as "administrative decisions that are not governed by statutory procedures, but which nevertheless affect an individual's rights ....").
46. See INA§ 212(a)(I4), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(5)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (granting Secretary of Labor authority to exclude unskilled and skilled laborers from entering the
United States).
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foreign country conditions.47 The INS identifies aliens entitJed to immigration benefits and removes those persons not authorized to reside in the
United States.48
The first stop requires a test of the labor market. Unless specifically exempted, such as the family-based categories, all immigrants, or, more specifically, their employers, must prove to the Department of Labor49 that
their employment will not harm U.S. working conditions or wages and,
more dramatically, will not displace U.S. workers. 50 This first stop on the
journey, the labor certification requirement, is often the most significant
hurdle to employment-based immigration.
After the labor certification is obtained, the employer must file an immigrant petition with the INS seeking classification in one of the five basic
employment preferences.51 This is the second stop toward employmentbased immigration. Qualification in a higher preference can be important
when worldwide demand indicates the quota or per country limitations
might be reached. The preference classification can mean the difference
between immediate qualification for immigration or a potential wait of
many years. 52
Finally, the third stop requires the immigrant to prove that she is eligible
47. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (listing grounds of inadmissibility).
48. See generally INA, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of8 U.S.C.) (defining existing immigration law as to admissibility and exclusion of
aliens); INS, INS MISSION, STRATEGIES AND PERFORMANCE, at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/
aboutins/insmission/index.htm (explaining INS's mission to administer immigration laws
involves variety of inter-related functions) (last modified Nov. 13, 200 l ).
49. Within the Department of Labor, the labor certification program has been assigned
to the Employment and Training Administration. Unless otherwise specified, the use of the
name Department of Labor refers to the Employment and Training Administration and its
reorgani:zation. See EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKFORCE
SECURITY, at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov (last visited Jan. 29, 2002) (noting in
Spring of 2000, the Secretary of Labor created a new division, the Office of Workforce Security, which has taken over management of labor certification program and other certifications required under the INA).
50. See INA § 212(a)(l4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(i)(II) (excluding employment of aliens who will adversely affect U.S. workers similarly employed); see also Bulk Farms, Inc.
v. Martin, 963 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding as law developed in this area, labor certification could not be obtained for self-employment because Department of Labor required a
bona fide test of labor market); Hall v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding
labor certification is appropriate only where the employer is not a sham corporation and is
separable from non-citi:c:en employee seeking a particular position).
51. See INA§ 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1994) (stating if employer believes non-citizen
qualifies for an exemption from a certification requirement, employer bypasses Department
of Labor procedures and applies directly to INS for immigrant preference classification).
52. See infra Part 11.C (discussing how erratic visa movement of recent years makes it
impossible to predict length of waiting period and it effects processing delays).
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to immigrate and not subject to any qualitative ground of inadmissibility
such as contagious disease, visa fraud or immigration violations, criminal
conduct, etc. 53 The third stop can take place at a U.S. consulate overseas or
at the INS through a procedure called "adjustment of status."54 Thus, an
individual immigrant may choose between the overseas immigrant processing or, if eligible, to complete the transition within the United States
through the adjustment of status process.

C. Navigating Through the Territory
Immigrating to the United States is much more than simply mapping the
routes of eligibility and diagramming the three stops at the federal agencies. Just as a two-dimensional map does not reveal the physical qualities
of the territory it depicts, it also fails to reflect the experience of the person
making the journey. In immigration law, process obstacles are the most
significant contributor to the huge differences between the design of the
map and the experience of journeying through the territory.55 The reality of
the process is far different from the idealized map. Although the immigration law authorizes at least 140,000 employment-based immigrants per
year, in most years, far fewer visas were actuaJly issued. 56
What explains the gap between visas authorized and visas granted? The
major contributors are the process obstacles blocking the way of legitimate
53. See INA§ 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (listing grounds for inadmissibility).
54. See INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (noting classes of aliens
who are ineligible to receive visas and are excluded from admission). The adjustment of
status procedure is not automatic and the criteria for eligibility to use the procedure are quite
complex. Basically, the procedure is usually restricted to immigrants who have not violated
their non-immigrant status and who have entered the United States lawfully, but many exceptions and additional limitations apply. Moreover, the INS retains the authority to deny
an adjustment in an exercise of discretion. See generally INA§ 245{a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a{a)
(1994) {describing visa processing for those abroad). There is no administrative appeal of
this denial; however; some individuals renew the application to adjust in removal proceedings and others reapply through the immigrant visa processing abroad.
55. It is possible that Congress or the implementing agencies made the "design" intentionally flawed and perhaps covertly meant to create the discussed process obstacles'. I recognize that some interested parties would not want to take steps to remedy the process obstacles if the result was greater immigration. However, I assume Congress intended the
system to at least preserve the number of visas authorized under our quota system, since increased immigration in this context could not exceed the authorized amount. In the fall of
2000, Congress passed legislation !1-Uthorizing the recapture of the unused employmentbased visas, which is more evidence of the thwarted policy. See infra Part 11.A-C (assuming
immigration law obstacles are unintended consequences of failure to pay adequate attention
to problem causing sources).
56. See supra Figure 1, p. 215 (discussing gap between issued and authorized employment-based immigrant visas).
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foreign workers seeking to immigrate to the United States. The failure of
the agencies involved to adjudicate visa petitions and to complete the immigration applications of individuals with approved petitions in a timely
fashion burdens the whole system. 57 The unused visas illustrate how process failures distort policy choices Congress made in adopting the INA. 58
To illustrate these territorial conditions and the factors contributing to
the gaps, I will present a hypothetical exploring how I, as an immigration
lawyer, might evaluate the route in a consultation with an employer and a
potential immigrant.59 I have intentionally selected the example of a "high
tech" employer seeking to hire an engineer from China with a masters degree in computer software engineering. Not only does this scenario repre-

57. Interviews with Stephen Fischel, Department of State Visa Office, over 1999,
2000, and 200 I. Frequently the Department of State Visa Bulletin reports the availability of
visas is impossible to predict because of the slowdown in INS processing. It is my contention that all three agencies contribute to the gap.
58. In one sense the employment-based visas were not missing, thus requiring the State
Department to reallocate these visas in the next fiscal year to the family-based immigrants.
See INA§ 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). However, in some years, the visas
were not recaptured because the amount of allowable family-based visas is limited. See id.
§ l 153(a)(2) (guaranteeing only minimum of 226,000 family-based visas). For example, in
1998, the employment-based visas were not recaptured because the 226,000 minimum was
the default rule. Therefore, it is inaccurate to say all unused employment-based visas are
added to family-based quota limits in the following year.
59. Before I became a full time law professor, I was a partner in the international law
firm of Bryan Cave. I represented business and individual clients in immigration matters for
over ten years. I have also based my advice on the comments and suggestions of several
current practicing lawyers: Stephen Yale-Loehr, Veronica Jeffers, Frances Berger, Alicia
DiBacco, and Luiza Muniz.
The narrative addresses a situation in which the client(s) are represented, resources are
available to pursue the process, and the participants are comparatively sophisticated. This
may be true with some frequency in the context of business immigration, but in other categories the large majority of those filing are unrepresented. Significant numbers of unsophisticated participants only increase the costs-particularly the social costs to the would-be
immigrant and her family-but also increase the irrationality and opacity of the system. In
those situations, the lengthy processing delays, the overall lack of predictability, and the impact of the adjudication to the individual or small business is even more important.
There are no hard statistics about the number of people who are unrepresented. I requested data from the business adjudications section of the INS. I suspected the agency had
this data because an attorney must file a notice of appearance (Form G-28) with each visa
petition or application. My request went unanswered. Cf. Taylor, supra note 26, at 1665
n.60 (fmding little statistical documentation estimating number of attorneys appearing in
deportation and exclusion proceedings, and indicating best evidence suggested attorneys
represented less than twenty percent of all people appearing before the immigration court).·
One person I interviewed recalls the Regional Director of an INS Service Center reported
that less than twenty percent of all petitions and applications received at the Service Center
were represented by attorneys.
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sent one of the most common categories of immigrant, it should also represent a fairly non-controversial example. Even those calling for drastic reductions in immigration to the United States usually exempt foreign workers with strong academic credentials. 60 Moreover, this scenario does not
present any of the complications, such as self-employment or nontraditional education, which typically frustrate an expeditious route to employment based immigration. Congress meant to facilitate the entry of people
like this engineer. By examining this hypothetical we can see whether the
immigration law is working as it was designed.
"Computer Software Inc" (CSI), 61 a large corporation located in Northern California, is a leading designer of software for business applications.
The company has more than five hundred employees, is publicly traded,
and has been in business for more than ten years. Last year, CSI recruited
at the major engineering schools in the United States. It interviewed candidates with master's degrees and offered a position to a top student from Cal
Tech, Mae Cheng. She is a national of the People's Republic of China.62
She will complete her master's degree in electrical engineering in June and
wishes to immediately begin her employment with CSI. CSI selected Ms.
Cheng both because of her strong academic performance, and because she
worked on a pioneering programming language. This language will likely
become one of the linchpins to a new line of software products developed
byCSI.
Ms. Cheng is legally in the United States on an F-1 student visa. 63 Her

60. See, e.g., BORJAS, supra note 25 (recommending restricting immigration to highly
skilled employees); Rep. Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking
the Right Reasons, 28 Sr. MARY'S L.J. 883 (1997) (recommending reduction of employment-based immigration and elimination of unskilled categories).
See generally
DEMETRIOUS G. PAPADEMETRIOU & STEPHEN YALE-LoEHR, BALANCING INTERESTS:
RETHINKING U.S. SELECTION OF SKILLED IMMIGRANTS 144-64 (1996) (recommending elimination of"other worker" employment-based category having less than two years experience
in job field).
·
61. This is a fictional corporation, but closely resembles any number of major employers who regularly use the employment-based immigration system. Some of the high-tech
firms who have testified to Congress about their need for foreign labor include: Microsoft,
Sun Microsystems, Intel, and Cisco Systems. See, e.g., Statement of Heidi Wilson, Corporate Immigration Manager, Sun Microsystems, Congressional Field Hearing on the INS
(Feb. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Congressional Field Hearing] (discussing business processing
concerns with INS), available at http://www.shusterman.com/wilson.htrnl.
62. Mae Cheng is a fictional person, however, she represents one of the 12,337 Asians
who immigrated in the employment-based second preference category in FY 1997. See U.S.
INS, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 35
(1999) (hereinafter 1997 INS YEARBOOK] (indicating number of immigrants admitted by
region of birth and type and class of admission in FY 1997).
63. All of the non-immigrant visa categories are known by an alphabetical shorthand
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non-immigrant visa status is typical of millions of other foreign persons
within the United States. In 1999, there were approximately 514,723 foreign students studying in the United States.64 Student visa status allows
full-time students to work following graduation to gain "practical training,"
usually a period of twelve months. 65 Provided Ms. Cheng meets all of the
regulatory criteria, she should be able to receive permission from the INS
to work for twelve months following her graduation. At the time of her
interview with CSI, the company recruiter asked her if she was authorized
to work in the United States on a permanent basis.66 Ms. Cheng explained
she would have a period of practical training, but to continue her employment in the United States, CSI would have to sponsor her for a "green
card.''67

1. First Stop-The Labor Certification Process
CSI has hired other foreign nationals and has a sophisticated Human Resource coordinator, Margaret Jones,68 who is very experienced in immigration law. Although the Human Resources Department and in-house counsel supervise routine matters and often prepare visa petitions, it is company
policy to consult with outside immigration counsel to develop the strategy
which refers to the subsection of the INA which defines the non-immigrant category. See
INA § 101(a)(l5)(F), 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(15)(F) (1994) (creating visa for study in United
States provided student maintains a permanent residence abroad).
64. See NAFSA: Ass'N OF INT'L EDUC., IMPORTANT DATA ON INTERNATIONAL
EDUCATION EXCHANGE To AND FROM 1llE UNITED STATES (2000), at http:/f
www.nafsa.org/contentJPublicPolicy/DataonlntemationalEducation/FactSheet.htm (detailing
numerous statistics concerning international students in the United States).
65. See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(t)(10) (2001) (setting forth complex regulations defining eligibility and length of practical training); see also supra Part
IV.B.4 (discussing significant amount of attention Congress has devoted to this visa category which has, at times, been a focus of intense INS scrutiny).
66. It would be a potential violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to ask if
Ms. Cheng is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. See INA § 274B, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(b)(a) (1994) (forbidding employers from discriminating against other classes of noncitizens authorized to remain in the United States such as refugees and asylees). Sophisticated employers have formulated the question as permanent work authorization to identify
candidates who are foreign students. This formulation is not necessarily appropriate for all
companies and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has said that a
pattern of refusing employment to nationals of a specific country, even if they are not
authorized to work within the United States, may constitute national origin discrimination,
whic~ is also prohibited by Title VII.
67. "Green card" is a slang term for status as a lawful permanent resident The actual
card is no longer green. See Form I-551.
68. Margaret Jones is also a fictional character. She represents many sophisticated users of the immigration system. She is named after Margie Jones, an immigration specialist
at Intel Corporation and one of the people interviewed for this Article.
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in each new case.

a. Initial Strategy-Utilizing Non-immigrant and Immigrant Visas
CSI can sponsor Ms. Cheng for an immigrant visa, but only after the
Department of Labor certifies that CSI successfully established the lack of
available and qualified U.S. workers. Ms. Cheng's period of practical
training, based on her former student status, would most likely be exhausted before the completion of the immigration procedures. It is because
of this delay that the best course of action is to obtain an H-1 B visa.
The H-lB is a temporary visa status reserved for persons working in
specialty occupations. These are professions that normally require no less
than a baccalaureate degree in a field related to the occupation. The H-lB
status enables Ms. Cheng to work for the company for an initial period of
three to six years. 69 Although the mutual goal of employer and employee is
to obtain permanent residence in the United States for Ms. Cheng, unless
CSI is willing to wait several years to hire Ms. Cheng, she will need a more
flexible temporary status giving her work authorization while the immigration process continues.
The H-lB work authorization will allow her to work for CSI while the
permanent process is on-going. While in H-IB status, however, Ms. Cheng
is dependent upon CSI for work authorization and legal status. If she discontinues working for CSI, even if she does not accept other employment,
her status is terminated. Furthermore, it is possible that the permanent
residence application process would not be complete before the six years of
H-lB status expires. At such time, Ms. Cheng may be forced to take a
leave of absence or relocate to a CSI office abroad. Any continuation of
employment without authorization could have serious consequences for

69. See INA§ 214(g)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (limiting H-IB
workers to six consecutive years). Usually, a sophisticated foreign student will then ask
why give up the time granted on her practical training and wonder why the attorney is recommending an immediate H-IB petition. Since 1997, immigration attorneys have routinely
recommended filing the H-IB as early as the regulations allow because the H-IB category
has been oversubscribed. The H- IB change of status may be filed while the noncitizen is
still a student or during practical training. By late spring of each year, there are no new petitions until the fiscal year begins anew on October l. See INA§ 214(g)(IXA)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ I 184(g)(l)(A)(i) (restricting H-IB category to 65,000 new positions in 1999); American
Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681 (codified at 8 U.S.C. l 182(a) (Supp. V 1999)) (expanding this limit temporarily in
1998 to 115,000). To ensure that an H-lB will be available, foreign students have often had
to forgo some of the time allocated pursuant to practical training to ensure H-1 B status. See
Interview with Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Prances Berger, New York,
New York (Aug. 15, 2000).
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both her and CSI. 70
This strategy of developing a parallel path to keep the individual in temporary or non-immigrant status while pursuing the immigrant petition is essential to journeying through this territory. Participants in the system naturally seek ways to minimize delays, cost, and uncertainty. The frustrations
of the permanent system have led to widespread reliance on non-immigrant
visas as a method of bringing and retaining foreign workers in the United
States.
The adjudicating agencies are unhappy with the dual-track strategy, believing it borders on fraud. 71 Some agency procedures specifically require
that a non-immigrant visa petitioner disclose if they are simultaneously
pursuing an immigrant visa. The substantive requirements are silent on this
process.72 The adjudicating agencies, however, view such a filing as inconsistent with the required temporary intent when the applicant has previously filed an immigrant petition.
The consequences of the dual strategy are increased work for the agencies adjudicating the non-immigrant petitions and a distortion of the employer/employee relationship. Almost all of the non-immigrant work categories require the employer to sponsor the foreign worker. Thus, as we see
in the above example, the worker becomes dependent on the sponsoring
70. See INA § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (containing exclusions from immigrating if individual has remained unlawfully in the United States). A person who accrued
less than a year but more than 180 days of "unlawful presence" can be banned for three
years and unlawful presence over one year can result in a ten year bar. These bars are only
triggered if an individual departs the United States and seeks to reenter. Unfortunately, although these bars were enacted in 1996, the INS has yet to issue regulations defining "unlawful presence." See also INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § l324a(a) (1994) (making employers
subject to civil and even criminal penalties for continuing to employ an individual who is no
longer authorized to work in the United States).
71. Several officials told me they believed the statutory exemption from maintaining
temporary intent was a mistake and inappropriately blurred the line between immigrant and
nonimmigrant status. In interviews, many government officials referred to the dual intent as
"fraud." See generally David Lazarus, A Question ofFraud: Silicon Valley Pushes for More
Foreign Workers Despite Federal Probes, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21, 2000, at Al (discussing
agency concerns about fraud in non-immigrant eligibility).
72. See, e.g., INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (2001) (stating employers using H-1 B petitions do not have to show they have a temporary need for the worker
unlike other non-immigrant categories where the employer bears the burden of establishing
need for foreign worker is not long term). Further, the INA specifically recognizes that nonimmigrants in this category and the intra-company transferees categories (L-1) may have
dual intent-the intent to pursue permanent resident and non-immigrant status simultaneously. See also INA § 214(b), 8 U.S.C. § l 184(b) (declaring guidelines for admission of
non-immigrants, including presumption of status); 2 CHARLES GoRDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE§ 20.06[3] (2001) (discussing "dual intent" principle for aliens enter·
ing temporarily).
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employer to complete the immigration process. In 1990, Congress formalized the six-year cap on H-lB non-immigrant status. 73 Congress hoped that
by putting a time limit on the H-lB, employers would become less reliant
on foreign labor. Shorter visas also discourage long-term guest workers.
Guest worker programs are problematic because of the dependence of the
worker on the benevolence of the sponsor and because these workers are
not necessarily entitled to become permanent residents. 74
Congress created other problems, however, by capping the length of
many non-immigrant stays and requiring non-immigrant visas be issued in
short periods such as eighteen to thirty-six months. 75 The shorter approval
dates mean employers and workers must file renewals or extensions if
available. In tum, processing the renewals increases the agency adjudication workload and expense. Employers and employees are forced to proceed almost immediately to the immigrant-visa track because they fear running out of non-immigrant work authorization before completing the
immigration process. 76 If the permanent process was not so bogged down
in slow multiple layers of adjudication, it might be possible to truly limit
non-immigrant categories to a short period. However, limiting the duration
of temporary visas without ensuring the efficient operation of the permanent process is unfair to the participants in the system.

b. Department ofLabor Adjudication
Before the company can sponsor Ms. Cheng for permanent resi73. Prior to this time, the INS had limited the visa duration by regulation alone. Many
other non-immigrant categories contain no statutory caps, but the agencies begin to question
the temporary nature of the status when stays extend beyond five or six years. See GORDON
ET AL., supra note 72, at§ 20.06[3] (discussing non-immigrant intent).
74. See Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains
From the Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371, 395408 (1998) (discussing implications toward international trade of restrictive immigration
laws in the United States, specifically employment-based and family-based immigration
Jaws); Marjorie E. Powell, Note, Resolving the Problem of Undocumented Workers in
American Society: A Model Guest Worker Statute, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 297 (1984)
(discussing problems associated with guestworker programs); see also T. Alexander Alienikoff, The Green Card Solution, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 20, 1999, at 34-36 (arguing guest
workers are few due to a plentiful supply of undocumented workers).
75. It is difficult to generalize about the non-immigrant categories because the rules
differ for each one. See, e.g., INA§ 214(a), 8 U.S.C. § l 184(a) (establishing time limits for
admission into the United States for non-immigrants). Where Congress has not specified
the exact length of time, the INS and Department of State either adopted regulations regarding the time periods or made ad hoc, case-by-case determinations.
76. In 1999, Sun Microsystems testified that it might have to fire one hundred employees who had reached the end of their authorized stay before the agencies completed the immigrant related adjudications. See Congressional Field Hearing, supra note 61.
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dence, CSI must prove to the Department of Labor that there are no qualified U.S. workers willing to accept the position at the prevailing wage on
the terms and conditions offered.77 The burden is on the employer to qualify each position separately before the company can employ a foreign
worker.
U.S. immigration laws have long been concerned with the protection of
American labor. At one time the law specifically prohibited the entry of
non-citizens for whom work contracts had been arranged in advance. 78 In
1952, this system was repealed, and in its place Congress substituted the
labor certification requirement. Originally, the statute authorized the Secretary of Labor to preclude the entry of specific immigrants or classes of
immigrants if the Secretary found they were coming for employment that
would displace American workers or undercut wages and working conditions of similarly situated American workers. 79 In reality, the Labor Secretary rarely issued certifications to exclude immigrant foreign workers. 80
77. See INA§ 212(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing labor certification and qualification requirements).
78. See Act ofFeb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (enacting one-thousand dollar fine
for every violation). However, the fifth section exempted four groups from the terms of the
act: foreigners temporarily in the United States and engaging other foreigners as secretaries,
servants, or domestics; skilled laborers; professional actors, artists, lecturers, or singers, or
persons employed strictly as personal or domestic servants; and assistance by a resident of a
member of his family or a personal friend to come for the purpose of settlement. See id. § 5.
For further account of this Act, see E. P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, 87-89 (1981) (describing immigration bills affecting contract labor); 39 IMMIGRATION COMM'N REPORT 33-34 (1970) (describing historical events
surrounding Act ofFeb. 26).
79. Section 212(a)(l4) of the INA provided in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall be
ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United
States:
(14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or
unskilled labor, ifthe Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary
of State and to the Attorney General that (A) sufficient workers in the United States
who are able, willing, and qualified are available at the time (of application for a visa
and for admission into the United States} and place (to which the alien is destined) to
perform such skilled or unskilled labor, or (B) the employment of such aliens will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States
similarly employed.
INA. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(14), 66 Stat. 182-83 (1952) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)).
80. Only six negative certifications were issued between the years 1957 and 1961, and
a total of fifty-six were issued from the years 1957-1965. Initially, the Secretary of Labor
issued a certification only when an employer was visibly using foreign workers to lower la·
bor standards or to break a strike, and a complaint, generally, was filed by the union. See
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81

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 shifted the burden to the
sponsoring employer to secure a labor certification before an individual
could be admitted to the United States. The stated purpose of this shift was
to protect the U.S. labor market from the influx of both skilled and unskilleq foreign labor. 82 This converted the labor certification from a passive requirement, to be fulfilled only if the Secretary of Labor demanded it,
to an active requirement, to be fulfilled by all employers seeking to hire
immigrants. 83

c. Defining the Job Requirements
CSI must begin the process by describing, within the confines of the
proscribed Department of Labor form, the permanent position job duties. 84
Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., The Impact of Immigration on the American Labor Market, 27
RUTGERS L. REv. 245, 252-53 (1974) (explaining labor certification program concerning
immigrants).
81. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of8 U.S.C.).
82. See Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 83-84, 92 (1965) (statement of Hon. W.
Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor).
83. Section 212(a)(l4) was amended in section IO of the INA of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89236, § 10, 79 Stat. 911, 917, and now provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of excludable
aliens who are ineligible to receive visas and who shall be excluded from admission
into the United States:
(14) "Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled
or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the
Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers in the United States who are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of
application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place to which the
alien is destined to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment
of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the
workers in the United States similarly employed. The exclusion of aliens under this
paragraph shall apply to special immigrants defined in section 10l(a)(27)(A) (other
than the parents, spouses, or children of United States citizens or of aliens lawfully
admitted to the United States for permanent residence), to preference immigrant aliens described in section 203(a)(3) and (6), and to nonpreference immigrant aliens described in section 203(a)(8);".
INA§ 212(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § l l 82(a)(5).
84. The heart of successful labor certification drafting requires careful attention to the
job duties and requirements. See generally AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN c. BELL,
LABOR CERTIFICATION HANDBOOK (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1997) (summarizing labor
certification requirements and process); Lenni B. Benson & Roxana C. Bacon, A Practitioner's Guide to Successful Alien Labor Certifications, 88-5 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (1988)
(providing advice on drafting a successful labor certification application).
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They must also define the minimum education, training, and experience requirements necessary to perform the job.85 The second part of the form requires Ms. Cheng to describe her education and work experience. 86
CSI recruits at the nation's top engineering programs. Ms. Cheng possesses unique knowledge about a new programming language. She gained
this knowledge while working toward her master's degree. It took months
to find Ms. Cheng and she is the only person CSI believes to be qualified
for the job.
Before CSI submits the labor certification application to the Department
of Labor Regional level, they first submit the forms to the local State Employment Service Agency (State Agency) for processing. The State
Agency has contracted with the federal Department of Labor to supervise
the job requirements and recruitment for the position, and to determine the
prevailing wage. 87 To protect U.S. workers from foreign labor willing to
work at reduced rates, the statute requires that the Department of Labor
certify that the employment of the foreign worker will not harm U.S. wages
or working conditions. Thus, the determination that CSI will pay the prevailing wage is a key aspect of the certification process.88
Further, the Department of Labor mandates the firm only requires job
related education or experience qualifications that reflect CSI' s minimum
requirements. In other words, CSI may not use the certification process to
seek the most qualified or even those equally qualified to Ms. Cheng.
Rather, they must open the position to all minimally qualified applicants.
The State Agency reviews the forms and determines if the educational requirements and job experience complied with the usual requirements for
the occupation. If the State Agency finds that the requirements were higher
than those set as the norm for the industry and occupation, the State
Agency might instruct CSI to modify the forms to allow a broader pool of

85. The Department of Labor regulations require that the employer state the minimum
qualifications rather than the most desirable qualifications. The view of the Department of
Labor is that to test the availability of qualified workers, the employer must state the minimum qualifications. See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process, 20
C.F.R. § 656.2l(b)(5) (2001) (declaring employers must accurately detail minimum requirements for job opportunities concerning aliens); see also Jn re Applied Magnetics Corp.,
90-INA-105 (BALCA 1991), available at 191WL224001 (denying labor certification).
86. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.2l(a) (detailing labor certification process for aliens).
87. See In re Hathaway Children's Serv., 91-INA-386 (BALCA 1991) (en bane) (discussing prevailing vvage requirement); see also In rf! Abelardo Chaidez, 93-INA-256
(BALCA 1994), reprinted in 13 IMMIGR. REP. B3-20 (discussing prevailing wage requirement concerning employer's incorrect calculations).
88. The majority of denials and administrative reviews concern wage disputes. See
GoRDON ET AL, supra note 72, § 44.05[2)[d) {describing how labor certification procedures
affect U.S. labor and prevailing wage issues).
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applicants to meet the qualifications. 89
CSI says it wants Ms. Cheng because of her high grades and her expertise in the new programming language. However, the Department of Labor
may consider that requirement a "special or restrictive requirement."90 If
CSI submits the labor certification with the programming language requirement, the Department of Labor will require CSI to prove why the language is essential to the operation of the business. Similarly, CSI should
drop the grade point average requirement unless CSI uses that criteria for
all of it~ employees and can document how this requirement is necessary to
its business operations.91
Next, CSI must consider the necessity of the requirement of a masters
degree in computer engineering. In many regions, the State Agency and
Department of Labor insist that the employer open the job recruitment to
engineers with a masters degree or with a bachelors degree plus three years
of experience.92 The Department of Labor believes the masters degree requirement is not really a minimum requirement because so many engineers
learn skills on the job. Instead, the agency views it as a way to tailor the
criteria to fit the foreign worker or to reduce the number of qualified appli-

89. The Department of Labor used several publications to determine the minimum requirements for occupations. For many years the Department of Labor relied upon the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to describe basic job duties for occupations and on the
Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) to define educational, training, and work experience required to enter the occupation. See O*NET, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES
(JIST Works, Inc. 1998) (describing job descriptions of U.S. workforce); see also BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK-BULLETIN
2450 (2000-01 ed.) (setting forth projections of various occupations). Obviously, these giant catalogs cannot keep pace with changing economies, technologies, and forms of education. The agency has plans to replace the catalog with a computerized system called
O*NET.
90. All foreign language requirements are assumed to be unduly restrictive. See 20
C.F.R. § 656.21(b)(2)(i)(C) (declaring job opportunity requirements cannot require knowledge of a foreign language). Computer languages are treated more generously, but at times
the Department of Labor has demanded extensive corroboration of the necessity of this requirement.
91. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.2l(b}(2) (stating employer may only demand skills, knowledge, abilities and conditions of employment, which are normally required to satisfactorily
perform the job); In re Computer Programming & Sys. Inc., 97-INA-158 (BALCA 1998),
available at 1998 WL 124747 (rejecting specific grade point average and course requirements as unduly restrictive). Similarly, the Department of Labor will only allow employers
to use objective criteria. See also 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b)(6) (describing standards for the labor certification process). Generally, standards frequently used in hiring decisions, such as
"strong communication skills," cannot be required in a labor certification application.
92. There are no regulations or cases which expressly document this agency interpretation.
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cants.93
Although CSI is at the step of obtaining the prerequisite labor certification, the employer and employee anticipate that the INS will later classify
the job in one of the immigrant preferences based on the stated minimum
requirements in the labor certification application. The second preference
category is reserved for non-citizens with exceptional abilities in the arts,
science, or business, or those in positions requiring an advanced degree. 94
Although, as of the fall of 2001, most of the employment-based categories
have no quota backlogs, several times over the past eight years, demand in
the third preference category for professionals and skilled workers has had
a significant backlog.95
Inclusion in the higher preference category may mean Ms. Cheng avoids
extra months, if not years, of waiting for permanent resident status. They
may want to preserve the masters degree requirement because the INS will
later refuse to classify the position in the employment-based second preference visa category without it.96 Additionally, because Ms. Cheng was born
in China, she could be subject to a longer wait due to the per country cap. 97
Ms. Jones decides to keep the degree requirement.98
When examining the job requirements, particularly an advanced degree,
93. See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process, 20 C.F.R.
§ 656.20(c)(8) (2001) (stating employer may not tailor job requirements to immigrant's
qualifications).
94. See INA§ 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (defining "advanced degree" as a degree of specialized study after completion of a bachelor's degree).
95. See 8 VISA BULL. 16 (2000) (indicating no immigration quota backlog in March
2000), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin/2000-03bulletin.html. But
see 8 VISA BULL. 30 (2000) (listing backlog of almost three years for China and two years
for India in April 2000), available at http://www.immigration.com/newsletter/2001-04.html.
96. See INS Immigrant Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) (2001) (defining "masters degree" as the equivalent of a U.S. masters degree or a bachelors degi:ee and "at least five
years of progressive experience" in the occupation). But see Letter from Flora T.
Richardson, Chief of the Department of Labor's Division of Foreign Labor Certification, to
Edwin R. Rubin, Esq., Rubin & Dornbaum (Apr. 30, 1993), reprinted in 10 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 922 (1993) (noting Department of Labor requires, for most positions, only three
years of experience to meet the equivalent of a masters degree). This conflict and related
litigation is discussed infra Part 11.C.2.
97. See discussion of the visa category strategies, infra Part 11.C.2.
98. The employer must determine the minimum job requirements, but obviously the
employee is affected by the decision. It is not uncommon for an attorney to face contradic. tory demands from the employer _and employee. See Bruce A. Hake, Dual Representation
in Immigration Practice: The Simple Solution is the Wrong Solution, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
581, 587 (1991) (discussing common ethical problems of these contradictory demands). For
a bar opinion discussing the conflict, see Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm.,
Formal Op. 465 (1991) (stating lawyers must obtain informed written consent to dual representation of both employer and alien employee in labor certification).
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the Department of Labor concerns itself with fraud. The Department of
Labor believes that many of these positions would be suitably filled by
U.S. workers without advanced degrees, but with experience in the field.
In essence, the agency believes employers tailor job requirements, like advanced degrees, to fit only the non-citizen petitioner. However, employers
face confusion in trying to satisfy the Department of Labor and at the same
time accurately describe the job requirements. An employer filing a labor
certification application is required by statute to have a non-citizen suitable
for the position. Naturally then, the individual's qualifications meet the job
requirements. Presumably that is why the employer hired her in the first
place. The Department of Labor, however, is suspicious of any non-citizen
employee that meets the exact job requirements.
Furthermore, the Department of Labor makes a case-by-case adjudication to evaluate whether U.S. workers are available for the position. The
statutory delegation is broad and contains few parameters. These case determinations have, among other things, sought to define when a job requirement is "normal and usual" for the position. The vagueness of this
standard and its obvious dependence on the facts in the case combined to
create a burdensome adjudication process. From its inception, the Department of Labor program has been criticized for a lack of transparency and
perceived lack of uniformity. 99 When an agency chooses case adjudication
it necessarily reduces the ability of participants to predict the outcome of
any particular application, unless the participant has a great deal of experience in similar applications or the participant has studied reported decisions
of the agency. 100 In addition to the opaque nature of the substantive rules,
the Department of Labor has rarely published detailed procedural rules. 101

d.

The Recruitment Phase

Notwithstanding the difficult recruitment for CSI and Ms. Cheng's ex-

99. See Labor Department Creates New Procedures and Standards for Certification
and Review of Applications for Alien Employment in Nonagricultural Occupations, 51
INTERPRETER RELEASES l, 4 (1974) (stating "[tJhe need for more precise and definite information ... is generally acknowledged."); see also Rodino, supra note 80, at 245-46 (noting
growing impracticality of present labor certification program and lack of uniform standards
among regional offices).
100. Only administrative appellate decisions are reported in the labor certification context. See discussion infra Part IV.8.3.
IOI. The first published rules and the Technical Assistance Guidelines (TAG) were created in direct response to intense criticism by members of Congress and the Administrative
Conference. See Zengerle, supra note 26. Nevertheless, between the publication of the
TAG and today, few rules have been promulgated under the AP A. Instead, the agency tends
to rely on information memoranda to the field and General Advisory Letters.
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traordinary educational achievement, the Department of Labor has traditionally disregarded all prior recruitment efforts. 102 When an employer
seeks a labor certification, the agency requires the sponsor to complete a
new recruitment effort to prove that no qualified worker is wiJling to accept
the offered position. There is no filing fee for the certification procedure.
The costs, however, such as attorneys' fees, and the advertising directed by
the agency, however, can be very high. In some cases, the Department of
Labor requires multiple publications in specialty professional journals-the
costs of such advertisements can range from $1,000 to $5,000. 103 Even advertising in a newspaper of general circulation for the required three days
can cost $850 or more. 104
CSI must file the application in California, the state where the job is located. Labor certifications are valid only for the location or "metropolitan
statistical area" where the case was initially filed. 105 The presence of a
higher concentration of high technology industries or immigrant populations in some regions of the Department of Labor can increase the volume
and cause delays in processing. Because there are many companies in
Northern California hiring foreign workers, the Department of Labor's Region IX, of which California is a part, is one of the most backlogged. In
1999 and 2000, the Department of Labor took three years to process a
regular labor certification case there. 106 In New York the delay was four
102. In 1997, the Department of Labor expanded a program called "Reduction in Recruitment." See infra notes 121-42 and accompanying text (describing Reduction in Recruitment program). Because it is not available in all cases, I have chosen to describe the
traditional and default procedures. Moreover, the continued viability of the unsupervised
reduced recruitment program is in question due to the 2001 downturn in the economy.
103. There is little documented evidence of the costs of preparing labor certifications.
One 1995 news story estimates attorney's fees range from $5,000 to $10,000 or more to
prepare and file the labor certification. See Ann Davis, Skilled Foreign Recruits Could Face
Higher Hurdles, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 1995, at Bl; see also Michael D. Patrick, Reduction in
Recruitment, N.Y. L.J., May 14, 1998, at 3 (illustrating through a hypothetical high expense,
$20,000 per print advertisement, and low success of traditional methods to recruit for software positions). Based on my own representation of clients and interviews with immigration attorneys, the advertising and legal fees range from $5,000 to $20,000 in most cases.
These estimates do not include the time and other expenses spent by the human resources
department Several people asked to remain anonymous when I asked about fees. At least
one corporation budgets a minimum of $10,000 per immigrant for internal and external
costs related to the immigration process.
104. Several sources told me confidentially that advertising was approximately $1,000.
$1,500 per ,case.
105. See Employment & Training Admin. Temporary Employment of Aliens in the
United States, 20 C.F.R. § 655.2 (2001) (discussing applicant's filing procedure).
I 06. The vast majority of labor certification applications are filed in Region IX, which
includes California. In the Reduced Recruitment adjudication, cases might be approved in a
few months. However, due to expanded use the expedited process began to slow dramati-
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years, and in Boston nearly three. In contrast, Philadelphia had no significant backlog and cases were adjudicated within a few months. 107
As stated above, the State Agency is responsible for instructing the employer about the quality and quantity of recruitment needed to document
the lack of a qualified worker. The State Agency will instruct CSI to prepare an advertisement listing all the essential information, except company
identity on the ETA form in either a newspaper or a specialty journal publication.108 Instead of applying to CSI, the applicant would apply to a post
office box at the State Agency. In this manner, the State Agency adjudicator can theoretically monitor the qualifications of the people who applied
for the position. The Department of Labor requires that all applicants who
appear to meet the minimum qualifications be interviewed by CSI.
Most employers find the interview stage to be one of the most difficult
aspects of the labor certification process. They dislike interviewing applicants for a position they perceive as "filled." In a sense CSI must seriously
consider the qualifications of each applicant; but they are under no obligation to hire any of the applicants. If a qualified applicant is found, the labor
certification cannot be issued. CSI, however, is not mandated to offer employment to the applicant. Instead, they could simply elect to continue
with the temporary employment of Ms. Cheng and abandon the labor certification application. 109
The thirty-day recruitment period may also be a difficult period for Ms.
Cheng. 110 She cannot play a role in evaluating or interviewing the applicants, even if she knows that CSI is recruiting to fill her position. Attorneys also play a limited role in the recruitment. They can simply guide CSI
to document each stage of the recruitment to establish contact with the applicants, but cannot control or conduct the interviews. Traditionally, attorneys counsel employers to use certified mail with return receipts for all correspondence between applicants and the employer because the Department
cally in early 2001. See Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Senior Associate, Fragomen, Del
Rey, Bernsen & Loewy (July 2001 ).
107. It is difficult to explain why delays varied so dramatically. Workload differences
account for some proportion, but the regional office's application of substantive criteria
could also explain longer processing times. Generally, regions with stricter standards took
longer. See Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Senior Associate, Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen
& Loewy (Aug. 28, 2000) and other anonymous sources.
I08. The state agency also opens a local job order number at the same time the employer
is advertising. At least theoretically, the job order posting allows the state agency to reach
unemployed workers who might be seeking employment through its job offices.
109. See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process for Permanent
Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.29(a) (2001) (requiring employer to wait six-months to file another labor certification application for this position).
110. See id. § 656.24 (mandating length of recruitment and describing procedure for labor certification determinations).
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of Labor has often been suspicious about the good faith nature of the recruitment. m
Within forty-five days of the end of the recruitment period, CSI must
submit a recruitment report to the State Agency.m In this report, CSI
documents that their job requirements are reasonable and that no qualified
applicant applied. The State Agency reviews the recruitment results and
forwards the application to the federal regional office of the Department of
Labor for final adjudication.
At the regional office, a staff headed by a certifying officer reviews both
CSl's original application and the State Agency activity and recommendations, and then makes a final evaluation about whether CSI has demonstrated a shortage of qualified workers. The Certifying Officer (CO) is not
bound by any of the recommendations or actions the State Agency took. If
the CO finds that CSI has inadequately tested the market, 113 added unduly
restrictive job requirements, 114 or offered an inadequate wage, 115 then the
CO remands the case to CSI with a Notice of Findings. 116 CSI can either
accept the modifications ordered by the CO and begin a new recruitment
period including new advertising, or rebut the notice of findings in an effort
to convince the CO that the market test was appropriate. If the CO is ultimately satisfied that the labor market test has been properly conducted, the
Department of Labor affixes a multi-colored ink stamp to the original
forms and returns them to CSL If the CO rejects the rebuttal, the labor cer111. Cf In re Ambros Trading Corp., 97-INA-406, 1998 BALCA LEXIS 488, at •3
(BALCA July 27, 1998) (stating photocopies of metered postage stamp was sufficient evidence of an employer's contacting applicants).
112. The recruitment report must: (1) identify recruitment sources by names; (2) give
the number of all U.S. workers responding to the recruitment; (3) give the name, address,
and resume of all applicants; and (4) explain the objective job-related reasons for rejecting
any qualified applicant. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b)(l)(i)(A)-(F); see also Technical Assistance Guide (TAG) 64-65 (1981).
113. See In re S. Balian Designs, 89-INA-299 (BALCA 1991) (indicating employer
made inadequate efforts to contact applicants).
114. See In re Info. Indus., 88-INA-82 (BALCA 1989) (finding certain job requirements
are too stringent).
115. Employers may offer a wage, within five percent of the prevailing wage, but it can
only include guaranteed income. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.20(c)(3) (explaining wage is not
commission, bonus, or incentive based). Industries where income is conditional upon performance offer a greater challenge because the guaranteed wage may be low. If a position is
covered by the Davis Bacon or Contract Service Act, the prevailing wage determination is
much more restrictive. .See General Administrative Letter.2-98 (Oct. 31, 1997) [hereinafter .
GAL 2-98] (designating Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) wage data as the primary required source for all wage determinations).
116. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.25 (providing procedure for certifying officers when inadequacies are found); see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 72, § 44.05[c] (describing process
that is incurred by certifying officers).
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tification is denied and, under current regulations, CSI may not re-file for
the same position for six months. 117
If the certification is denied, then CSI could seek an administrative review of the CO denial by filing an appeal with the Department of Labor's
Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA). 118 If the appeal is
denied, they could file a petition for judicial review in federal district court
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 119 Nevertheless, employers never seek either administrative or judicial review of a denial of labor
certification. 120
At this point, Ms. Jones asks whether this case is a good candidate for
the Department of Labor Reduction in Recr;uitment procedures. Although
the Department of Labor regulations had included a Reduced Recruitment
procedure where employers could document adequate prior recruitment, the
regional offices rarely used the procedure. Forced by an expanding
caseload and significant budget cuts, 121 in 1997 the Department of Labor
revived the Reduction in Recruitment procedures to streamline adjudication.122 By 1999, the Department of Labor was willing to accept evidence

· 117. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.29(a) (establishing amount of time allotted to re-file for acertain position).
118. See discussion infra Part II. One attorney reported that BALCA routinely took
twenty months to adjudicate an appeal. See Audio tape: Linda Rose, Remarks at the 2000
American Immigration Lawyer's Association (AILA) National Conference, Chicago, Ill.
(June 15, 2000) (on file with author).
119. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Federal court jurisdiction is
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
120. It would rarely be cost effective to seek such review, except if an employer could
find no other way to conduct labor market tests. BALCA maintains the position that the
non-citizen worker has no standing to seek review of a denied certification. See In re Pat's
Pizza Ristorante, 97-INA-396, 1998 BALCA LEXIS 228 (BALCA Feb. 24, 1998). Some
courts have allowed the employee to seek judicial review of the Department of Labor actions. See, e.g., Gladysz v. Donovan, 595 F. Supp. 50, 52-53 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (granting
standing to alien to pursue claim).
121. The drop in available funds for the labor certification program illustrates the Department of Labor's resource problems. In FY 1993, $57 million were allocated for the
alien labor certification program at the state agencies. The appropriations have dropped
steadily since then, to $49.8 million in FY 1994, $51 million in FY 1995, $45.7 million in
FY 1996, and $31.3 million in both FY 1997 and FY 1998. The amount budgeted for the
administration of the labor certification program for the FY 1999 was $36.3 million, FY
2000 was $40.9 million, and FY 2001 was $26.1 million. The decrease in the funds allo~ated to labor certification prompted reductions in staff and the flight of experienced staff at
many state agencies. See Steven A. Clark et al., Labor Practice Advisory: Highlights of the
April 3 AILA-DOL Liaison Meeting, 16 AILA MONTHLY MAILING 343, 345 (May 1997).
122. See General Administrative Letter 1-97 (Oct. 1, 1996) [hereinafter GAL 1-97)
. (providing information on how the Department of Labor made adjudication more efficient).
See a recommendation for streamlining labor certification in VICE l'RESIDENT AL GoRE,
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of past recruitment, provided the employer advertised for a minimum of six
months and the employer documents that no qualified person applied for
the position. 123 The program dispenses with most of the State Agency's
role in supervising wages and job requirements, as welJ as the State
Agency's assessment of the adequacy of the prior recruitment. Both the
State Agency and the Department of Labor prioritize processing of Reduction in Recruitment labor certifications. Although the Department of Labor
refused to formally adopt regulatory change, through interpretive letters it
has expedited the adjudication process for a group of large employers or for
employers seeking specific job categories. 124
Various Regional offices of the Department of Labor were slow to adopt
this procedure, including Region IX, which was one of the most cautious.
The Regional offices originally authorized the procedure in limited occupations where past experience suggested employers could document labor
shortages. There was no, and continues to be no official list of occupations, only unofficial discussions with Regional COs and word of mouth
communication among members of the immigration bar. 125 The problem
for employers selecting Reduction in Recruitment is that, should the case
ultimately be rejected for unsupervised recruitment, the employer must refile the labor certification and proceed with new advertising as directed by
the agency. The major risk of this procedure is that the employee's priority
date, or place in line for an immigrant visa, will not be established as of the
reduction in recruitment filing, but rather at the next regular application. 126
AcCOMPANYlNG REP. OF THE NAT'L PERFORMANCE REV. 41, 44 (1993) (noting report was
instrumental in moving agency toward the reduced recruitment approach). See generally
Gary Endelman, Through the Looking Glass: The Impact of GAL 1-97 and the Future of
Labor Certification, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1461 (1997) (describing overall effect of
labor certification regulations).
123. Not withstanding the issuance of GAL 1-97, many regions of the Department of
Labor did not immediately adopt the reduced processing according to interviews with attorneys throughout the United States, which confirmed the delay in implementation.
124. See GAL 1-97, supra note 122 (establishing applications meeting a limited review
criteria will be expedited for approval when they are received in the Regional Office); see
also Lauretta v. Herman, No. 98-56061 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 1999) (court order).
125. The Department of Labor does not publish any list or criteria allowing employers
to determine whether the position is eligible for the reduction in recruitment procedure. Instead, attorneys rely on informal communication with the agency such as quarterly liaison
meetings or telephone calls. A non-specialist may not have any awareness of this procedure.
126. On July 26, 2000, the Department of Labor issued a proposed regulation to allow
the retention of the first priority date and the transfer of a regular labor certification application to the reduction in recruitment procedure. See Employment and Training Administration, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,081 (July 26, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 656). The proposed regulation, however, only applies to cases filed prior to July 26, 2000. The risk of
losing a priority date can be especially significant for nationals of India and China because
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Although Region IX is open to Reduction in Recruitment, CSI must consider that the state agency in California has had a policy of limiting reduction in recruitment where the employer had any special requirements.
Therefore, CSI might file for Reduction in Recruitment first. If the Department of Labor denies the application, they may have to start over with a
traditional labor certification filing. Although CSI would like to file both at
the same time, the Department of Labor precludes simultaneous filings for
the two procedures.
Clients naturally ask the attorney to assess their prospects to obtain a labor certification. Historically the rate of approval has been quite high. 127
For cases that are not withdrawn at the state agency level, the national
agency approval rate is approximately ninety-six percent. 128 Still, an employer will not reach the final adjudicatory stages if the labor certification
is stalled at the state level because of agency suspicions that the labor tests
were conducted unfairly.
In recent years, the approval rate may have grown even higher, apparently in response to pressure to reduce the growing backlogs. In June 1999,
an official of the Department of Labor discussed the agency's push to reduce the backlog of labor certification cases. He said that the regional offices had completed a "remarkable" number of cases, "well over 25,000
processed in the last six months." 129 He then paused briefly and said,
"They're all approvals." 130 He further commented, "I guess if you want to
get a little more philosophical you can wonder . . . whether some unmeritorious cases might be rolled into that but that's a philosophical issue I
am not going to try to wrestle with right now." 131
The work necessary to approve a case is the ministerial placement of a
stamp, and the work to deny a case involves the CO preparing a written
Notice of Findings presenting the reasons the case might be denied. This is
followed by consideration of the rebuttal evidence submitted by the emthe employment-based visas have not consistently remained available for natives of these
countries.
127. See infra Figure 3, p. 240 (statistical data provided by Patrick W. Stange, Department of Labor, Aug. 30, 2000, on file with author). See also PAPADEMETRIOU & YALELoEHR, supra note 60, at 154-55 (describing approval rates).
128. See generally PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 60 (discussing reduction in employment-based immigration). The Department of Labor has not regularly collected statistical data about cases filed with the state agencies alone. See Interview with
Harry Sheinfeld, Senior Counsel for the Employment and Training Administration of the
Department of Labor (Sept. 6, 2000).
129. Audio tape: Harry Sheinfeld, Senior Counsel for the Employment and Training
Administration of the Department of Labor, Statement at the AILA Annual Conference, Seattle, Wash. (June 12, 1999) (on file with author).
130. Id.
131. Id.

2002]

BREAKING BUREAUCRATIC BORDERS

239

ployer, which is done prior to preparing a final written assessment of why
the case should still be denied. Given this process, it is easy to see that denying a case takes much more work than approving one. Thus, the pressure
of the backlog and the tremendous amount of resources needed to complete
a case-by-case adjudication ultimately led to what appears to have been
summary adjudication or, as some who are critical of the program might
say, the absence of any adjudication. This summary approach appears to
be the best solution the Department of Labor can fashion. 132
In 2000, the pace of reducing the backlog continued to be quite rapid. In
June 2000, the Department of Labor reported on recent backlogs and
workload reduction plans. 133 The agency reported that in FY 1998 the
agency processed over 40,000 labor certification applications and in 1999,
over 72,000 cases. 134 The backlog of un-adjudicated cases was 75,400 at
the beginning of the fiscal year, and was expected to be at 40,400 by October 2000. 135 This represented a large reduction from prior backlogs. The
backlogs had grown dramatically even though overall filing rates remained
relatively steady. 136

132. For several years the Department of Labor has mentioned a new streamlining procedure, which eliminates most of the role of the state agencies and may go further toward
summary adjudication. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing streamlined electronic review program). To be fair, the Department of Labor is operating under tremendous resource constraints. Agency requests for more resources or the statutory authority to charge a user fee
have not been successful. The failure of Congress to allocate more funds to this agency reflects, at least in part, a lack of commitment to the supervised testing of the labor market.
Here, the process failures signal a real failure of substantive policy as well. Of course, it is
unlikely Congress wants to remove all labor testing because of the possible political back·
lash. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing elimination of Department of Labor's role altogether).
133. See Memorandum from Raymond Bramucci, Assistant Secretary for Employment
and Training, to Deputy Secretary Department of Labor (Feb. 24, 2000), reprinted in 77
INTERPRETER RELEASES 796, 796-803 (2000) (stating if plan suggested is successful, backlog
at Department of Labor will be reduced to z~ro by FY 2001, assuming no other immigration
programs are implemented during this time).
134. See id at 799 (examining amount of applications processed over a two year span).
135. See id at 801 (estimating Department of Labor's backlog reduction goals).
136. See id. (predicting 90,000 new filings for FY 2000). In FY 1999, the Agency completed 77,979 cases at the regional level. See id at 798.

240

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

[54:1

Figure 3: Department of Labor Workload and Approval Rates
Annual Lab or C artifica lion Filings
80 ,000
50 ,ODO

4 0 ,00 0
30

.ooo

20 ,000
10

.ooo
1HI

1HI

~

tHO

tlt1

1191

ap plicatlons

1H:I

1814

•

tltl

ttlt

1117

1111

ap prova Is

Sources BALANCING INTERESTS, supra note 60; and statistical data provided by Patrick
W. Stange, Department of Labor, Aug. 30, 2000 (copy on file with author).

In late 2000, Congress threw a major "monkey wrench" into the Department of Labor's effort to reduce the backlog. For four months, Congress revived a provision of the immigration laws which allows an individual who has worked without authorization, overstayed a temporary visa, or
entered the United States without permission to seek permanent resident
status, provided he or she is eligible under the family or employment visa
categories. 137 One of the ways to preserve eligibility to adjust status under
the limited statutory provision was to file a labor certification application
prior to the April 30, 2001 deadline. 138 In June, the Department of Labor
reported more than 230,000 new labor certification applications filed with
the state agencies during the four-month application period. 139 The Department of Labor estimated that the pending backlog of cases was close to
300,000 as of June of 200 I .140
Such erratic adjudication and workload greatly impacts other aspects of
the system. For instance, delays in adjudicating labor certifications result
in greater filings of temporary visa extensions, burdening other agencies
and draining valuable time and resources from completing immigrant petitions. Furthermore, large numbers of labor certification approvals following long delay and backlog create distrust in the adjudicative process. That
distrust is not just prevalent among potential immigrants, but also among

137. See Legal Immigration Family Equity Act of 2000, § l 102(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)
(Supp. V 1999) (reviving the INA of 1952 § 245(i) on a temporary basis).
138. See id.
139. See Chief Dale Zeigler, Alien Labor Certification Program, Statement at the An·
nual Conference of the AILA, Boston, Mass. (June 22, 2001) (notes on file with author).
140. See id.
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other agencies involved in later stages of the process. 141
Based on the high overall approval rates, it is likely that CSI will successfully obtain a certification for Ms. Cheng if the employer carefully prepares the application and follows agency procedures. The more difficult
question to answer, however, is when it will be issued. Notwithstanding
the effort to reduce backlogs, in some parts of the country labor certification applications still take several years to process unless the case fits into
the Reduction in Recruitment criteria. Given the huge new filings made in
spring 2001 and the recent downturn in hiring in the high-tech industries, it
is unclear whether the Department of Labor will continue to offer a Reduction in Recruitment procedure for these or other cases. 142
e.

Searching/or a Short-Cut: A Waiver of Labor Certification

Given the cost and delay in obtaining the labor certification and the employer's natural reluctance to spend time on recruitment, an attorney will
consider waivers of the labor certification requirement. Several statutory
categories do not require labor certification, such as family-based immigration or successful asylum applications. In the employment-based categories, there are labor certification exemptions for multinational executives
and managers, for persons with extraordinary ability in the arts and sciences, and for outstanding professors and researchers. 143 The INS adjudicates these applications directly, allowing a "waiver" of the labor certification process. If Ms. Cheng fits into one of these categories, CSI would be
exempt from filing the labor certification application.
In addition, the Department of Labor created lists of occupations subject
to special procedures granting persons a "short cut" through the labor certification process. The first occupational list known as Schedule A, identifies four classes of employment that the Department of Labor pre-certified
as labor shortage occupations. 144 The Department of Labor cross-delegated
141. See discussion infra Part IIl.B.3.e.
142. See Chief Dale Zeigler, Alien Labor Certification Program, Statement at the Annual Conference of the AILA, Boston, Mas£. (June22, 2001) (notes on file with author).
143. See INA § 203(bXl), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating exceptional ability may exist in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics); INS Immigrant Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) (2001) (defining exceptional ability in the sciences,
arts, or business to mean "a degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in the sciences, arts, or business.''); see also Employment & Training Admin. Occupational Labor Certification Detenninati<?ns, 20 C.F .R. § 656.l 0 (200 l) (IJ1andating professions, abilities, and expertise as eligible for Schedule A classification).
144. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 (explaining original Schedule A listed twenty shortage occupations: Accounting and Auditing, Architecture, Chemical Engineering, Industrial Engineering, Mathematics, Mechanical Engineering, Metallurgy and Metallurgical Engineering,
Mining and Petroleum Engineering, Nuclear Engineering, Nursing, Phannacy, Physical

242

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

[54:1

to the INS the authority to determine whether the employment opportunity
met the Schedule A criteria. Thus, an individual seeking this waiver of the
labor certification process bypasses the Department of Labor and the first
step altogether.
The Schedule A occupations are registered nurses, 145 physical therapists, 146 persons of exceptional ability in the arts and sciences 147 and managers and executives of multinational corporations employed outside of the
United States by the multinational for at least one year. 148 Schedule A,
adopted in 1976, continues in operation today, although exceptional performing artists and the multinational executives and managers have been
deleted. 149 These individuals are now exempt from labor certification pursuant to statutory exemptions. 1so If Ms. Cheng were in one of these occupations, she would qualify to bypass the Department of Labor certification
process. 1st
Therapy, and Physics); cf Labor Certification Process for Permanent Employment of Aliens
in the United States, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,933 (Dec. 19, 1980) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.10,
656.22) (stipulating numerical limitations on categories of visas under Act).
145. See INS Documentary Requirements: Nonimmigrants; Waivers; Admission of
Certain Inadmissible Aliens; Parole, 8 C.F.R. § 212.15(e) (2001) (designating only licensed
registered nurses qualify for exemption).
146. See id.§ 212.15(g)(4)(i) (stating physical therapists must also be licensed by state
of intended employment and are subject to a foreign credentialing exam requirement).
147. See discussion infra Part IV.A. Although this category uses language identical to
one of the 1990 employment-based immigrant visa criteria, the regulatory definitions are not
identical. Proving "exceptional" skills for the waiver is a higher standard than the standard
to obtain inclusion as a second preference immigrant. Although the 1990 criteria created a
number of statutory exceptions to the labor certification requirement for people who have
demonstrated "extraordinary ability," or who can establish that they would contribute to the
national best interests, Schedule A's "exceptional ability" standards remain a possible alternative.
148. This Schedule A classification also parallels a category in the 1990 employmentbased preferences. Here the elements of the Schedule A pre-certification of labor shortage
are identical to the requirements of the First Preference Employment-Based category for
multinational managers and executives.
149. See Labor Certification Process for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the
United States; Implementation oflmmigration Act of 1990, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,244, 32,244-51
(July 15, 1991) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 656) (amending Schedule A in 1991). The remaining two groups on Schedule A include: Group I, covering licensed physical therapists
and professional nurses, and Group II, covering aliens with exceptional ability in the sciences and the arts (excluding aliens in the performing arts). See id.; see also AUSTIN T.
FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVENC. BELL, LABOR CERTIFICATION HANDBOOK 1-1to1-19 (2000).
150. See INA§ 203(b)(l)(a), (c), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b)(l)(A), (C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
151. An analogy to Schedule A was developed in the labor market information (LMI)
pilot program that was proposed in conjunction with the Immigration Act of 1990. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 122(a), 104 Stat. 4994, 4994-95. The LMI
would have eliminated the Schedule A occupations list by directing the Secretary of Labor
to conduct a labor market information pilot program for employment-based immigrants to
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At the same time that the Department of Labor and INS created the
Schedule A shortcut, the Department of Labor introduced Schedule B,
listing occupations the agency deems to be in oversupply. 152 The list,
which may seem anachronistic today, having not been amended since 1976,
is fairly lengthy. It generally includes low-skilled, entry-level positions.
The Department of Labor believes U.S. employers can quickly train available U.S. workers to fill these jobs even where shortages may exist. 153
Thus, concegtually, Schedule B is a roadblock on the map or a "Do Not
Enter" sign. ·s4 Clearly, Ms. Cheng's position is not a Schedule B occupadetennine whether the pennanent alien labor certification process could be streamlined by
supplementing this case-by-case process with an approach utilizing lists of occupations in
which there are labor shortages or surpluses. The legislation provided, under the pilot program, a determination would be made that labor shortages or surpluses exist in up to ten defined occupational classifications. The legislation, section 122(a) of the 1990 Immigration
Act, required that in making these determinations, the Department of Labor consider occupations that have been previously approved under the permanent alien labor certification
program as well as labor market and other related information. The pilot program was set to
sunset in 1994. See id. Although the Department of Labor issued proposed regulations,
controversies over the market information methodology and opposition from a wide range
of interest groups killed the pilot program. See also Gary E. Endelman & Robert F.
Loughran, The Reality ofReliance: Immigration and Technology in the Age of Global Competition, 93-7 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (1993) (focusing on connection between foreign-born
scientists and the immigration bar).
152 See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process for Permanent
Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.1 l(a) (2001) (itemizing Schedule B occupations including: assemblers, gas station attendants, parking lot attendants, personal service attendants, amusement attendants, recreation attendants, bartenders, level II
bookkeepers, caretakers, cashiers, charworkers and cleaners, chauffeurs and taxi drivers,
hotel and motel cleaners, clerk typists, grocery clerks and checkers, general clerks, hotel
clerks, short order cooks, counter and fountain workers, dining room attendants, electric
truck operators, elevator operators, floorworkers, groundskeepers, guards, any industry
helpers, household domestic service workers, housekeepers, janitors, key punch operators,
kitchen workers, common laborers, farm laborers, mine laborers, loopers and toppers, material handlers, nurses' aides and orderlies, packers and markers and bottlers, porters, receptionists, sailors and deck hands, sales clerks, sewing machine operators and handstitchers,
stock room and warehouse workers, streetcar and bus conductors, telephone operators,
lesser skilled typists, recreation and amusement ushers, and yard workers).
153. See id § 656.J(a) (indicating there must not be "sufficient [U.S.] workers who are
able, willing, qualified and available at the time of application for a visa and admission into
the United States" before certain foreign workers are admitted).
154. See id.§ 656.ll(c); id§ 656.23 (2001) (informing prospective employers of possibility of obtaining a labor certifi~ation for a Schedule B position when an employer justifies
job duties or requirements which alter job). In reality, however, few employers seek Schedule B certifications because these positions are categorized by the Department of Labor as
requiring less than two years education or training. Accordingly, the INS will classify the
immigrant petition in the employment-based third preference for "other workers." INA
§ 203(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 211 (1994). This category is limited to 10,000 persons a year and
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tion. 155
Ms. Cheng may also want to know whether she qualifies for the ''National Interest Waiver." She has heard fellow Chinese students discussing
this strategy as a way of bypassing the lengthy labor certification process
and avoiding the recruitment of U.S. workers for her position. Congress
created the national interest waiver in 1990. 156 The waiver is theoretically
available to any non-citizen with an advanced degree, or one who can establish that her credentials make her an alien of exceptional ability. 157 Because of Ms. Cheng's advanced degree, the statute does not require that she
prove she is "exceptional," but rather she and CSI must establish that her
employment will make a significant contribution to the national interest of
the United States.
There is no regulatory definition of what constitutes immigration in the
national interest. CSI must primarily rely on the decisions of the INS Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). 158 Shortly after the passage of the
thus, there is usually a multi-year wait in this category for immigration. See id. § 201. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to question the wisdom of the 10,000 visa cap for lowskilled jobs. Moreover, beginning in FY 2000, 5,000 of the 10,000 visas are reallocated to
immigrants receiving benefits under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997. See Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 202, 111 Stat. 2193 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.). For a discussion of the need for these workers compare PAPADEMETRIOU & YALELOEHR, supra note 60, at 144-64, with AILA, ESSENTIAL WORKERS KEEP TIIE ECONOMY
GROWING (on file with author), available at http://www.aila.org (last visited Dec. 14, 2001).
155. A third schedule, Schedule C, was promulgated in 1967, but only briefly implemented. See Immigration; Availability of, and Adverse Effect Upon, American Workers, 67
Fed. Reg. 887 (Jan. 25, 1967). The regulation was cancelled in 1971. Schedule C precertified skilled and unskilled occupations found to be in short supply in certain regions,
with the requirement that the alien work only in that geographic area. See id.
156. See INA§ 203(b)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § J 153 {b)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (mandating Attorney General may waive labor certification when deemed to be in the national
interest). However, the statute does not define "national interest" and the INS declined to
define it in the regulations, preferring flexibility of a case-by case-basis, but stating that the
alien "must make a showing significantly above that necessary to prove 'prospective national benefit' [required of aliens seeking to qualify as 'exceptional']." Employment-Based
Immigrants, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,897, 60,900 (Nov. 29, 1991); see also Memorandum from R.
Michael Miller, Acting Assistant Commissioner for Adjudications, INS, to Michael L.
Aytes, Director, INS Service Center Operations, INS, File No. HQ 204.24-C (May 4, 1993),
reprinted in 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1150, 1151 (1993) (stating "the AAU is not planning at this time on publishing a precedent decision on the [national interest waiver] issue.").
.
.
157. See INA§ 203(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b)(l)(A) (defining extraordinary ability
attributes); see also INS Immigrant Petitions 8 C.F.R. § 204.S(h) (2001) (establishing procedure and evidence required to demonstrate exceptional ability).
158. See generally INS Powers and Duties of Service Officers; Availability of Service
Records, 8 C.F.R. § 103.l(f)(3) (2001); id: § 103.3(a) (mandating creation of AAO through
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1990 Act, INS regulations stated the government thought the qualifications
should be flexible and develop on a case-by-case basis of adjudication. 159
This continued for several years until many of the INS adjudicators became
uncomfortable with the Jack of consistency in the type of cases approved.
In 1995, the agency proposed regulations restricting the category by requiring proof of national, as opposed to regional or local contributions to
the national interest. 160 The INS also proposed several other narrowing
qualifications. 161 Commentators vigorously attacked the proposal as an
extreme restriction of the category. The proposed regulations were allowed
to die, and were never amended or re-proposed.
In 1998, the Wall Street Journal published a long article discussing the
national interest waiver and citing examples of approved cases. 162 The
story skeptically examined some of the approved cases. They included a
photographer of people indigenous to the Amazon rain forest, but who
drove taxis to earn a living; a novelist with a single publication of a science
fiction novel including gay characters; an acupuncturist, who specialized in
lower back pain; and a twenty-seven year old video filmmaker, who hoped
to produce a '"youth-oriented global news network. "' 163 The story documented the frustration within the INS concerning the lack of guidelines for
adjudicating these petitions. Ed Skerrett, a senior INS examiner responsible at that time for review of these adjudications, was quoted as saying,
"[s]ometimes we wondered ... 'how could they possibly approve a case
like that?"'164 Further, the story reported that the inability of issuing regulations providing more substance to the category was leading the AAO to
issue a precedent decision aimed at giving more definition to the category.165 In re New York Department of Transportation, 166 set forth the
Agency regulations). No form of administrative review is mandated in the INA.
159. See Employment-Based Immigrants, 56 Fed. Reg. at 60,900 (stating each case will
be "judged on its own merits.").
160. See Employment-Based Immigrants, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,771, 29,776-78 (June 6,
1995) (proposing four elements a petitioner must satisfy to qualify for national interest
waiver).
161. See id. at 29,772 (proposing to clarify the "portions of the regulations which have
been problematic for the Service and the public.").
162. See Barry Newman, The 'National Interest' Causes INS to Wander Down Peculiar
Paths: Or How a Roving Acrobat Got a Visa While Doctor Probing Cancer Didn't: Is the
Curio Cabinet Closed?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1998, at Al (discussing disparity between
those who are granted visas and those who are not).
163. Id
164. Id
165. See id. (stating after members of the public objected proposed rules, "the INS
backed off. Instead of defining the national interest officially, the INS set out to define itor so say its critics--by stealth.").
166. No. 3363 (B.l.A. 1998) (interim decision) (providing factors to be considered in
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same narrowing criteria which the proposed regulations championed. 167 In
other words, the INS made a change in the criteria through informal adjudication rather than rulemaking. 168
In this first precedent decision, the INS began to define some of the
qualifications for the waiver. 169 The case established a three-part test for
evaluating the non-citizen's potential contribution to the national interest.
First, the employer must show that while the employee will make a contribution in the "national interest," this contribution must be of such significant magnitude to outweigh the governmental interest in requiring the labor
certification market tests. 170 The AAO acknowledged that the engineer in
that case would make a contribution to the design of New York bridges, but
the sponsor failed to show how that contribution substantially benefited the
nation as a whole. Second, the employer must demonstrate that the alien
has a proven track record of accomplishments and that she is individually
important to the completion of the project or activity. 171 Making a contribution to a team of skilled professionals is not sufficient. 172 Third, the
agency found that even where the employer documents a shortage of available workers, a labor shortage was not relevant to a determination of the
national interest. 173
evaluating a national interest waiver request).
167. See, e.g., Nathan A. Waxman, The New York State Department of Transportation
Decision: The End ofthe Road for the National Interest Waiver?, 15 INTERPRETER RELEASES

1289 (1998) (discussing Wax.man's strategy in submitting successful national interest
waiver cases prior to the issuance of the AAO decision).
168. See David H.E. Becker, Judicial Review of INS Adjudication: When May the
Agency Make Sudden Changes in Policy and Apply Its Decisions Retroactively?, 52 ADMIN.
L. REv. 219 (2000) (discussing New York State Department of Transportation case and setting forth arguments for evaluating the legitimacy of the INS administrative decision in lieu
ofrulemaking); see generally Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty-Year Retrospective,
40 ADMIN. L. REV. 161 (1988) (discussing proposition that agencies are generally free to
choose between rulemaking or adjudication absent specific statutory restrictions).
169. See Adam J. Rosser, Note, The National Interest Waiver of IMMACT90, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 165, 166 ( 1999) (claiming case was first to address national interest waiver).
170. See generally In re New York State Dep 't of Transp., No. 3363 (providing petitioner's employment must be substantial and national in scope).
171. This element makes it difficult for large employers with highly-skilled personnel to
argue that any single employee is essential to the national interest. In many unreported decisions, the INS has stated that the strength of the petitioner indicates that the firm will be
able to continue without the services of the single individual unless that individual can be
shown to be unique. See GoROON ET AL., supra note 72, § 39.04 (discussing cases where
petitioning employees are professionals with exceptional ability).
172. See id. § 39.04 (defining visa applicant's required exceptional ability).
173. See In re New York State Dep 't of Transp., No. 3363 at 4 (stating waiver is not
based only on a labor shortage, since "labor certification process is already in place to address such shortages.").
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To qualify for a national interest waiver, Ms. Cheng must meet this
three-part test. Most likely, the INS will require a third-party expert affidavit about her achievements and contributions to the software engineering
field. She must also have someone outside of her educational institution,
and not personally interested in her employment, assess her contributions to
the national economy and the development of this field.
Determining an individual's chance for approval of a national interest
waiver is difficult, as previous approvals are unreported. Furthermore, denials of petitions at that level are unpublished and no opinions are prepared
for approved cases. Although there is a lack of approved cases to serve as
guidance, informal minutes of liaison meetings between the regional service center personnel and the American Immigration Lawyer's Association
(AILA}, along with word-of-mouth, are all one has to determine what criteria the service center employs in adjudicating cases. Occasionally, a service center prepares an informal memorandum discussing evidence or
documentation needed to support the visa petitions. 174 Similarly, but perhaps more surprising, the AAO does not publish its non-precedent decisions.17s A few publishers, however, gather non-precedent decisions and
publish them. 176 The AAO also designates very few of its decisions as
precedent. 177 Oddly, these cases are published with Board oflmmigration
174. These infonnal memoranda are not published in the Federal Register, nor made
public in any systematic way. The usual way to gain access to this infonnation is through
the AILA publications or experienced immigration attorneys. See, e.g., Texas Service Center, National Interest Waiver Advisory lnfonnation Memorandum of May 22, 1998, reprinted in 17 AILA MONmLY MAILING 670-71 (July/August 1998); California Service
Center Adjudicating Officers Comments Business Product Line Liaison Meeting on September 18, 1998, reprinted in HOT TOPICS IN EMPLOYMENT BASED IMMIGRATION 62-67
(Martin L. Rothstein & James D. Acoba eds., 1999).
175. Interview with Stephen Yale-Loehr, Of Counsel, Tree, Walsh & Miller, LLP,
Ithaca, NY, Adjunct Prof., Cornell Law School (Sept. 6, 2000) (describing procedures Matthew Bender uses to obtain non-precedent AAO decisions) (notes on file with author).
176. For example, INTERPRETER RELEASES, a weekly immigration newsletter periodically provides summaries of non-precedent AAO decisions. See, e.g., AAO Case Summaries, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 183, 183-86 (2000). Matthew Bender also regularly solicits
unpublished cases from its readers and occasionally publishes summaries of these cases in
BENDER'S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN, a weekly immigration magazine. According to Daniel
M. Kowalski, Editor-in-Chief of Bender's Immigration Bulletin, he receives approximately
two cases a month. This publication is only available to subscribers or in libraries that have
subscriptions. See Interview with Stephen Yale-Loehr, Of Counsel, True, Walsh & Miller,
LLP, Ithaca, NY, Adjunct Prof., Cornell Law School (June 15, 2000) (notes on file with
author).
177. In the past ten years, I could locate only six precedent decisions out of approximately 4,000 AAO cases per year. See Interview with Stephen Yale-Loehr, Of Counsel,
True, Walsh & Miller, LLP, Ithaca, NY, Adjunct Prof, Cornell Law School (Sept 6, 2000)
(notes on file with author).
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178

Appeals (BIA) opinions.
Attorneys specializing in immigration law
sometimes request the non-precedent decisions under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 179 and try to discern trends or consistency in the
various decisions. 180 Thus, due to the administrative set-up of immigration
proceedings, it is extremely rare to seek judicial review of the denial of one
of these waivers. 181
In the end, CSI could conclude that it might be worth the time and expense of pursuing both the labor certification and the national interest
waiver simultaneously. There are no regulations precluding the company
from filing for the labor certification with the Department of Labor, while
at the same time filing for an exemption with the INS. 182 The company,
however, may be hesitant to take this course of action, because other foreign workers might come to expect CSI to go to this expense for each of
them.
The national interest waiver exemplifies the problems that occur when
Congress fails to set out clear criteria. The agencies involved in adjudication have little guidance and, therefore, make erratic decisions. The par-

178. Cf INS Powers and Duties of Service Officers; Availability of Service Records, 8
C.F.R. § l03.9(b) (2001) (requiring retention of all unpublished decisions). The editors at
Matthew Bender reported it sometimes takes months to obtain access to the unpublished
cases even though all are supposed to be available at the national reading room. Approximately once a month they make a new FOIA request. See Interview with Stephen YaleLoehr, Of Counsel, True, Walsh & Miller, LLP, Ithaca, NY, Adjunct Prof., Cornell Law
School (Sept. 6, 2000) (notes on file with author) (stating "Matthew Bender uses FOIA to
obtain non-precedented AAO decisions"); see also E-mail from Stephen Yale-Loehr, Of
Counsel, Tree, Walsh & Miller, LLP, Ithaca, NY, Adjunct Prof., Cornell Law School to
author (Sept. 6, 2000) (on file with author).
179. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
180. See STEPHEN y ALE-LOEHR & RACHEL Joy v ALENTE, TRUE, WALSH & MILLER, LLP
NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVERS (May 13, 1999) (analyzing national interest waiver as another
immigrant category), at http://www.twmlaw.com/resources/immigrant/immigrant9.htm; see
also Phyllis A. Jewell, National Interest Waivers, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, 30TH
ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 319, 330-31 (1997) (describing
flexible approvals for a business executive, computer programmer, anthropologist, and general managers).
I 81. The expense and time involved in seeking judicial review is rarely worth it when
there is no rule against the employer filing in a different category or even refilling in the
same category with additional or different evidence. In one rare case, the alien, acting as a
self-petitioner, successfully challenged the INS denial on the basis that the agency disregarded the testimony of experts presented without sufficient explanation of why the evidence was not clear and convincing for eligibility of a waiver. See Laila Mnayer v. INS,
No. 94-2673, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21932 {S.D. Fla. June 20, 1995).
182. There are no limits on how many simultaneous petitions it may file with the INS.
The company could file in the outstanding researcher category while filing in the national
interest waiver.
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ticipants, in turn, cannot be sure where their case will come out because the
system lacks transparency. The lack of reported decisions in this area
makes advising a client extremely difficult. No attorney can be sure
whether a particular case will be approved for a national interest waiver because there are few decisions with which to compare the facts of their case.

2. Second Stop-INS Immigrant Petition
Following labor certification, CSI must file an immigrant petition with
the INS. This petition is made on a form called 1-140. Throughout 1999
and 2000, the California region of the INS routinely required nearly twelve
months to adjudicate the immigrant visa petition. 183 By the summer of
2001, the INS reported that processing times were down to approximately
seven to nine months. 184 Added together CSI and Ms. Cheng have survived
four to five years of waiting before the final stage, Ms. Cheng's individual
immigrant visa application. This assumes traditional labor certification, 1140 processing, and does not take into consideration immigrant visa availability for second preference emigrants from China. 185 As such, the waiting
period in this second stop varies.
CSI must file an I-140 petition on behalf of Ms. Cheng demonstrating
that she is qualified to accept the certified position and that CSI can pay the
certified wage before she can proceed with her individual application for an
immigrant visa. The 1-140 petition gives the INS the opportunity to make
an independent determination concerning Ms. Cheng's qualifications and
the job as described by CSI in the original labor certification filing. It also
determines the preference category into which Ms. Cheng will be placed.
The INA contains five employment-based preference categories that in tum
are subdivided into approximately twelve subgroups. 186 After the filing,
the INS assigns the approved 1-140 petition a formal "priority date." This
date will later determine the individual's place in line for a visa under the
quota limitations. 187 For categories requiring labor certification, the INS
allows the priority date to relate back to the date of the filing of the labor
certification. For almost all other cases, the priority date is the date of the
183. The delay rate was calculated by reviewing monthly progress reports published in

AILA Monthly Mailings, entitled Immigration Today. Confirmation of the delays was confirmed by conducting interviews with attorneys in private practice.
184. The California Region has jurisdiction over CSI's petition because the job is located in California.
185. The second preference is found in INA§ 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b)(2) (1994 &
Supp. V 1999).
186. See id. § 203(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b).
187. See Jay Solomon, Priorities and Preferences: Keeping Place in the Immigrant Visa
Line, 92 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS l (1992).
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filing of the I-140 petition. 188
A critical part of determining how long the process takes requires
knowledge of the demand and quota limits on each of the immigrant visa
categories. As explained earlier, almost all immigrants are subject to preference category quota limitations and individuals are further limited if they
come from a country with high demand for immigration. Furthermore, the
INA contains a category for employers to sponsor individuals who possess
an advanced degree or exceptional ability in the arts, sciences, or business
in a permanent position that requires the education and skill level. This
189
category is called employment-based second preference (EB-2).
Each
year, a minimum of 40,040 of the 140,000 employment-based visas are allocated to this category. 190
It is likely that Ms. Cheng, because of her master's degree, fits in this
category. The INS ultimately determines whether Ms. Cheng meets the
statutory qualifications for inclusion in this higher preference category. Inclusion in a higher category may mean that Ms. Cheng avoids the potential
of quota limitations which add to the processing delays she will have already experienced. For example, for most people, the employment-based
second preference category is available regardless of the individual's priority date, but in the employment-based third preference the category has frequently been subject to a several year backlog. Most importantly, because
of high visa demand in India and China, these countries have experienced
several quota delays in both the second and third employment-based preferences. Unfortunately, Ms. Cheng is from one of these oversubscribed
countries and, therefore, she will want to have as high a preference as possible.
In an effort to ensure the earliest immigration date possible, CSI and Ms.
Cheng will seek classification in the second preference based on CSI' s requirement of a master's degree for the position. As stated earlier, the INS
examines the job requirements as described in the initial labor certification
to the Department of Labor. Therefore, it is important that CSI describe the
position as one requiring an advanced degree. While the petitioning process after the completion of labor certification takes twelve months, no one

188. Learning to preserve, trade, and recapture priority dates is one of the prized skills in
immigration law. See Dep't of State Visas: Documentation of Immigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 C.F.R. § 42.53(b)-(c) (2001) (providing guidelines to obtaining different priority dates); see also Solomon, supra note 187, at 1-2 (explaining how priority dates are obtained, maintained, transferred, and lost).
189. See generally GoRDON ET AL., supra note 72, § 39.04 (explaining EB-2 visa category).
190. See INA§ 201(d), 8 U.S.C. § 115l(d) (1994) (outlining calculation procedure for
worldwide level of employment-based immigrants).
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can predict exactly when Ms. Cheng's priority date will authorize her to
apply for adjustment of status to become a permanent resident. Only when
her priority date matches or precedes the dates listed by the Department of
State can she move to the final stop on the immigration map. Furthermore,
the INS could challenge the bona fide nature of CSI's master's degree requirement, notwithstanding Department of Labor approval.
Recently, this conflicting treatment of the master's degree requirement
resulted in a class action lawsuit that required the INS to approve moot
cases for EB-2 classification. The lawsuit arose because the INS began to
reinterpret Department of Labor standard requirements for recruitment of
positions requiring advance degrees. For a number of years Region IX 191
of the Department of Labor required employers to expand a master's degree requirement to a master's degree or five years of progressive experience. The philosophy of the Department of Labor was to expand the pool
of U.S. workers qualified for entry-level high-tech positions. 192 When an
employer insisted that only persons with master's degrees were qualified,
the employer had to document why the degree was essential and that the
requirement was a reasonable and standard requirement of the position. In
some cases, the non-citizen did not have a master's degree but the employer wished to require a master's degree or work experience equivalent
to more closely capture the minimum requirements of the position and also
position the alien for qualification in the advanced degree preference category. Hundreds of labor certifications stated that the employer's minimum
requirement was a master's degree or progressive experience. For many
years, the California Service Center of the INS approved I-140 immigrant
petitions classifying aliens who had these labor certifications in the employment-based second preference category.
In 1997, the California Service Center of the INS suddenly denied these
I-140 petitions, stating the alien was not a qualified advanced degree holder
or that the employer did not genuinely require an advanced degree for the
position because the labor certification provided for an alternative. After
denials, several employers and aliens successfully challenged the INS adjudication on a number of legal and procedural grounds. 193
191. Region IX includes California, Hawaii, and Arizona. In the most recent Department of Labor reorganization, this region will expand to include Oregon and Washington.
192. One of the contentions of the software engineering community is that employers
discriminate against older software engineers in favor of foreign workers. Many critics of
the immigration pol.icy allege that this discrimination keeps wages lower. See, e.g., Norman
Matloff, Editorial, High-Tech Cheap Labor, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2000, at A35; Alexander
Nguyen, High Tech Migrant Labor, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 20, 1999, available at
http://www.prospect.org/print/VI 113/nguyen-a.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
193. See, e.g., Chintakuntla v. INS, No. C-99-521 l MMC (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2000)
(granting permanent injunction and class certification via court order).
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What are the lessons of this litigation? While some might dismiss the
INS' actions as a blunder or blame poor drafting of the labor certification
by the employer, the conflict illustrates several problems. First, it signifies
that the INS adjudicators are leery of basing immigration benefits on educational attainment. The INS took the ambiguous standard in the statutory
provisions to mean second preference is not only limited to individuals
with advanced degrees, but the offered position must itself require an advanced degree for performance of the job duties. 194 Perhaps this is a reasonable interpretation by the agency, but ifthe job requirements are of such
significance, Congress should have been more explicit. 195 Given there is no
requirement that the immigrant remain in the position for any particular period after immigrating, it would also be reasonable to assume that Congress
sought to measure the value of the immigrant by their past academic
achievements and not by the precise work to be performed. 196
More important, however, is the aspect of this litigation which demonstrates how the lack of coordination between the Department of Labor and

194. The exact language of the provision is that second preference visas may be issued
to:
[Q]ualified immigrants who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent or who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences,
arts, or business, will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural or educational interests, or welfare of the United States, and whose services in
the sciences, arts, professions, or business are sought by an employer in the United
States.
INA§ 203(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1 l53(b)(2)(A) (1994).
This Article is not meant to debate the merits of the substantive provisions, people with
high education versus lower education, etc. However, the story is an example that policy
makers should heed if serious consideration is given to a point system. Today's agency adjudicators do not appear to value the degree as a clear dividing line among potential beneficiaries. Cf PAPADEMETRJOU & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 60, at 144 (advocating selecting
immigrants for their skills rather than tying immigration to any particular job offer given
reluctance of Congress to mandate remaining same position).
195. For example, where Congress was skeptical about the value of degrees standing
alone, they specifically said so. Consider the provision concerning the definition of"exceptional ability:"
In determining under subparagraph (A) whether an immigrant has exceptional ability,
the possession of a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, university, school, or other institution of learning or a license to practice or certification
for a particular profession or occupation shall not by itself be considered sufficient
evidence of such exceptional ability.
INA§ 203(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1 J53(b)(2)(C).
196. Designing time requirements for any position is problematic and undoubtedly controversial because it would create a form of "indentured" employment. However, the continued delays and obstacles in processing immigration cases are creating de facto forms of
indentures.
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the INS adjudications resulted in conflicts for the agencies and for the participants in the system. Certainly the class action resolved some of the issues, but the litigation was years in formation. 197 Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of employers considered these conflicting adjudications and decided
how to handle the problem in the preparation of the labor certification and
visa petitions. The turmoil and uncertainty resulted in additional costs and
added months to the processing times because adjudicators more closely
examined the employer's criteria for employment. The fact the litigation
was decided adversely to the INS also harms the system in that it may encourage other challenges to the agency interpretations, or, at least, it makes
the participants in the system Jess trustful of the agency interpretations.
By delegating the labor certification to the Department of Labor, with its
mission of broadening the recruitment in search of qualified workers, and
the role of visa petition adjudication to the INS, which is concerned with
the over expansive use of the higher preference categories, Congress
planted the seeds of conflict. Often the procedures implementing the adjudications reflect little awareness of the other agencies' adjudication procedures or even of the documentary record submitted in the first adjudication.198 Instead, Congress should have provided for some high level of
oversight, policy development, and strategic planning necessary to the
communication of the rules to the participants and to an expeditious and
consistent adjudication.

3. Third Stop-Visa Petition in Hand
Following approval of the 1-140 procedure, Ms. Cheng may adjust her
status when her priority date is current. Each month the Department of
State reports the current priority dates for each of the visa categories. An
experienced attorney can usually approximate the visa movement based on
past experience, but cannot guarantee that the quota wil1 be available on
any particular date. 199 For example, in 1998 and 1999 the EB-2 category

J97. The INS did not amend its regulations; however, it did adopt a policy memorandum
seeking to clarify the standards for advanced degree requirements. See Memorandum from
Michael D. Cronin, INS Acting Associate Commissioner Office of Programs, and William
R. Yates, INS Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner Office of Field Operations, to all
Service Center Directors and all Regional Directors (Mar. 20, 2000), reprinted in Opportunity to File Untimely Motions to Reconsider Decisions Denying EB-2 Immigrant Visa Petitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,093, 41,095 (July 3, 2000) ,(clarifying requirements, which govern
immigrant visa petitions under second preference category).
198. See infra Part III (discussing similar conflict between Department of Labor and
INS treatment of past employment experience).
199. The Department of State does not publish estimates of waiting times. Rather, it
provides a monthly VISA BULLETIN listing the dates of the petitions currently being accepted
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became backlogged for people born in China or India but remained current
for all other countries. 20 For several months of both fiscal year 1999 and
2000, the Department of State reported that the EB-2 category was oversubscribed because of the country quota limitation. 201 As the fiscal year
progressed and the Department of State realized fewer visas had been issued to nationals of India and China in this category, the Department of
State removed the two year wait and listed the category as immediately
current for the last month of the fiscal year.202 Although many individuals
filed for adjustment of status or immigrant visa processing in that final
month, not all visas could be issued under such short notice. As a result in
fiscal year 1998, despite qualified immigrants from India and China, only
14,384 of 40,040 EB-2 visas were issued.203 These low numbers worsened
in 1999, when only thirty-eight percent of all the employment-based visas
were actually used.204
The EB-2 backlog of 1999 demonstrates that often the procedures put
into place to implement the adjudications reflect little awareness of the
other agencies' adjudication procedures or even of the documentary record
submitted in the first adjudication. The lack of high-level oversight, policy
development, and day-to-day coordination exacerbate the problems created
by the statutory requirements.
Was this erratic EB-2 visa movement due to the substantive limits of the

°

for processing. A prediction of future visa eligibility is technically impossible but trends in
quota delays can be guessed at by observing months, if not years, of prior movement. See
State Dep 't Explains Immigrant Visa Numerical Control System, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES
901, 913 (2000) (defining key terms essential to understanding priority date movement).
200. See 8 VISA BULL. (1999) (listing EB-2 visa applicants from India and China as
oversubscribed and thus rejected during the month of July), available at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin/9907bulletin.html.
201. See id (indicating establishment of quotas for nations from which number of visa
applicants received exceeded statutory or regulatory limits). Visa applicants who created
demand in excess of their respective nations' quota resulted in that foreign state being
deemed "oversubscribed." See id.
202. Telephone Interview with Charles Oppenheim, Chief of the Immigrant Visa Control and Reporting Division, Department of State (July 17, 2001) (explaining his office has
no hard data from INS about approved immigrant visa petitions). The INS does not maintain a nationwide inventory broken down by visa preference category, and aggregate data is
not useful. The Visa Office makes the calculation of visa availability based on the actual
number of visas issued in the prior months. Moreover, simply knowing the total number of
approved visa petitions is rather like knowing how many ticki;:ts have been issued but does
not predict whether or when. the sponsored indjvidual will actually choose to use the visa.
See id.
203. See supra Figure I, p. 215. Immigrants admitted by major Category of Admission:
FYs 1995-98. As of September 2000, the 1999 information has not been released although
the fiscal year ended in September 1999.
204. See supra Figure 1, p. 215 (depicting gap in visa issuance).
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quota numbers and country origins or was it due to process failures within
the agencies responsible for calculating visa movement? At least in part,
the perceived backlog was due to a failure of the INS to timely adjudicate
and report 1-140 immigrant petitions. The Department of State received a
large number of approvals from the INS in the spring of 1999.205 Accordingly it predicted larger annual demand and moved the visa processing date
backward to avoid issuing visas in excess of the annual cap. However, the
increase in approval rates did not signal a new and higher demand for visas,
but rather, the inefficiency and inconsistency of INS adjudication. The
process failure of one agency and lack of information about the failure, led
another agency to a second process dilemma which in turn has generated a
third process problem.
Delay distorts the entire immigration system. One of the most dramatic
examples is the erratic movement of the quota dates. When the INS does
not process adjustment of status cases at the rates nonnally expected, or in
205. Here is text from a 1995 VISA BULLETIN, which illustrates the problem:
NOTE ON FUTURE PREFERENCE VISA AVAILABILITY
Cut-off date movement in several immigrant categories during the first five
months of FY-1995 has been greater than might ordinarily be expected. This is because fewer applicants are appearing for interview or obtaining visas at consular posts
abroad as a result of the 1994 amendment to the adjustment of status provision in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). (Most qualified immigrant visa applicants
who are in the United States may now seek adjustment of status through INS even if
they are not in lawful nonimmigrant status; previously, most applicants who were not
maintaining lawful visa status were prohibited from such adjustment at INS and had
to travel abroad to make their formal immigrant visa applications. Further, the INA
now stipulates that most persons who are NOT in lawful nonimmigrant status at the
time of departure from the U.S. cannot be issued immigrant visas at a consular office
abroad within 90 days of such departure. These provisions taken together have resulted in fewer immigrant visa applications at consular offices since October 1994
and more applications filed with INS for adjustment of status.)
Although visa number use at consular offices has thus declined, the corresponding
increase in INS number use has not yet become apparent, since INS offices will need
time to process the adjustment of status applications. The result has been a temporary
decrease in visa number use, which has permitted faster cut-off date movements.
Once the cases of the additional adjustment of status applicants begin to be
brought to final action in large volume, there will be a significant increase in INS visa
number use and cut-off date movements will necessarily slow or stop. Moreover, in
some categories (such as the "Other Worker" category, for instance, where there has
been particularly rapid recent cut-off date movement), cut-off date retrogression is a
defi.nite possibility.
.
Interested parties should be aware that the recent rate of cut-off date advances will
not continue indefinitely, but it is not possible to say at present how soon a significantly increased INS number use will influence the cut-off date determinations.
7 VISA BULL. 46 (1995), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin/
9502bulletin.html.
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some cases, suspends adjudication altogether because the officers are
working on other types of petitions, the Department of State has no way to
predict future visa availability.206 The Visa Office predictions of future
availability are necessarily conservative for there is no data source, which
tells the officers how many people will apply for immigration in any one
month.207 Although the Visa Office knew hundreds of approved immigrant
petitions awaited action in pending adjustment of status applications, the
office bases its calculation of visa movement on the demand in the prior
month. 208 The Visa Office then predicts future visa demand based on the
prior month movement and adjusts the priority dates accordingly. When
the INS is not processing cases or is doing so very slowly, the demand appears to fall and the Visa Office reports no backlog in the category. But, as
the INS adjudicates cases in large batches, the Visa Office suddenly reports
a multi-year delay in the category. Although the Visa Office tries to warn
those waiting that movement may be erratic, it takes an experienced observer to understand the movement of the visa backlogs. This problem was
particularly acute from 1995 through 1998 when the second and third preference categories appeared to be current, only to retrogress several years
for nationals of India and China due to batch processing by the INS. 209
206. In an August AILA liaison questions and answers session with the Vennont Service Center (VSC), AILA asked, "Why has the processing ofl-130's remained stagnant for at
least the past five months?" The VSC answered, "A while back, HQ provided the VSC with
a list of priorities, i.e. I-90's, TPS, 765's, etc. I-130's were not considered a priority at that
time; consequently we have not touched these." See AILA's 1999 Annual Conference on
Immigration Law, available at http://www.alia.org (last visited Dec. 15, 2001).
207. Simply counting the number of approved immigration petitions is not sufficient, for
people sometimes do not choose to pursue immigration at the time their petition is approved
or for some other reason they are temporarily ineligible to immigrate. Because dependent
family members are also counted in this immigrant category, but the I-140 petition does not
identify the total number of family members, who will accompany the immigrant, there is
no way to predict the exact number of visas required even if one could count I-140 petitions.
208. The Visa Office measures demand by recording phone call requests from INS officers to the Visa Office. Demand is also measured by visa issuance at the posts around the
world. The Visa Office makes its calculation during the first week of each calendar month
after the visa use of the prior month is tallied. See, e.g., 8 VISA BULL. 24 (2000) (describing
visa availability and publication dates), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_
bulletin/2000-IObulletin.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2002).
209. See 8 VISA BULL. 21 (2000) (reporting employment based petitions in second preference category are current only for petitions with priority dates before April 15, 1998, and
in third preference :wait goes back to petitions which. predate June 1, 1997), available .at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin/2000-08bulletin.html. The backlogs for India
are similar: second preference requires a priority date of prior to September 15, 1999, and
for third preference before February 1, 1997. See id.; see also 8 VISA BULL. 14 (2000)
(showing no backlog in this category), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/
visa_bulletin/2000-0lbulletin.html; 8 VISA BULL. 23 (2000) (indicating there is only a
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Furthennore, the inability to estimate the demand meant the Visa Office
sometimes had to aim short, resulting in fewer visas being issued in the
year than authorized by the quota.210 In an effort to fix the problem, Congress created a "band-aid" approach by recapturing the unused visas of fiscal years 1999 and 2000 and adding them to the per country cap in an attempt to restore the level of some of the employment-based visas.211
Whenever the State Department indicates the numbers are current for a
visa category, or moves the quota priority date significantly, individuals
waiting in the backlog can immediately file for either adjustment of status
or immigrant visa processing.212 If the quota subsequently retrogresses and
the individual's priority date is no longer current, they are not denied adjustment or visa processing, instead the adjudication of their individual petition is held in limbo.
Moreover, for non-citizens seeking adjustment of status, like Ms. Cheng,
the limbo status is not necessarily a benign state. Dependent family members are not entitled to work authorization and may need pennission to
travel outside the United States while the adjustment of status application is
pending. If the limbo continues for a long period, and in some situations
the retrogression has lasted an entire fiscal year and in other cases, a period
of many months, Ms. Cheng may need renewal of the work authorization
and travel pennission. Another typical headache of the limbo status is that
several pieces of evidence necessary to the adjustment application become
stale or unusable. Fingerprints required to detennine if the applicant has a
criminal record are valid for fifteen months, while medical exams completed with designated physician remain valid for only twelve months.
Thus, both the Department of State and INS have to keep track of and
hold in indefinite status these limbo cases. Due to the large number of visas allocated for fiscal year 2001 and the inability of INS to give estimates
of anticipated demand, the Visa Office opened the employment-based categories in July and August of 2001.213 By posting these categories with no
current backlog, any worker in any employment-based category could file
for adjustment of status or overseas visa processing. Suddenly, individuals
who thought they had to wait years for an immigrant visa were now eligible
backlog for nationals of India and China in this category), available at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_bulletin/2000-09bulletin.html; see generally 8 VISA
BULL. 16 (2000) (describing erratic movement of priority dates), available at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_ bulletin/2000-03 bulletin.html.
210. See supra Figure I, p. 215.
211. See American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 § 102(b)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of8 U.S.C.) (discussing purposes for Act).
212. See id
213. See 8 VISA BULL. 23 (2000), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/visa_
bulletin/2000-09bulletin.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
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to file for immigration. If thousands of people take advantage of this new
eligibility and file, the INS will face large new workloads. Eventually as
the agency reports this new demand, the Visa Office will reestablish the cut
off dates in some, or potentially all categories. Another side effect of
posting open visa categories is that it could lead to the erroneous perception
by some employers or non-citizens that the easy way to immigrate to this
country is through employment. The Visa Bulletin cannot give an accurate
picture of the real demands because there is no statutory mandate that the
INS report accurate or necessary information to the Visa Office.
If Ms. Cheng navigates the labor certification process or the waiver, and
successfuJiy obtains the right I-140 preference classification, she can at last
proceed to her individual application for permanent resident status. If she
has managed to retain her non-immigrant status through the many years of
processing and has never violated her status with unauthorized work or
travel, she can apply for adjustment of status, a procedure which will allow
her to transfer from non-immigrant to permanent resident. 214
In major U.S. cities, the adjustment of status procedure requires a wait of
twelve to thirty-six months. During this wait, Ms. Cheng may not travel
outside the United States without permission.215 However, she and her dependent family members may receive work authorization during the adjustment application period. If she determines that overseas immigrant
processing in her native country might be more expeditious, she can pursue
that route. However, if Ms. Cheng failed to identify that choice at the time
CSI filed the I-140 petition, she may face an additional twelve-month delay
before the INS notifies the Department of State of her eligibility for immigrant visa processing. Even assuming she originally selected the overseas
214. Cf INA§ 245(k), 8 U.S.C. § 1221(k) (1994) (discussing exception). See INS Adjustment of Status to that of Person Admitted for Permanent Residence, 8 C.F.R. § 245.2
(2001) (discussing criteria for exemptions).
215. The INS amended the regulation to allow H-IB and L-1 non-immigrants to travel
provided that the underlying non-immigrant petition was valid at the time they seek reentry.
See Adjustment of Status; Continued Validity of Nonimmigrant Status, Unexpired Employment Authorization, and Travel Authorization for Certain Applicants Maintaining
Nonimmigrant Hor L Status, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,208-12 (June 1, 1999) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§
214.2, 245). The requirement of obtaining advanced parole for all travel, while an individual is going through the adjustment of status procedures, has been one of the most criticized
requirements. The INS has maintained that once an individual files an application for adjustment of status she has demonstrated an intent to remain permanently in the United States
and thus, the INS cannot allow readmission using a non-immigrant visa. A second rationale
for requiring parole is that an individual who enter the U.S. territory under a grant of parole
has not clearly been admitted and thus may be subject to exclusion rather than deportation.
Given the 1996 amendments which in many respects unified the exclusion and deportation
procedures into single removal procedures, there no longer appears to be a sound rationale
for requiring the parole procedure. See Part IV.A for a related reform proposal.
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adjudication process, delays at some posts are more than six months and in
countries where immigration demand is high, a wait of one year is not exceptional.
However, the decision to choose overseas processing is also subject to
timing and adjudication risks. Let us imagine that Ms. Cheng, in an effort
to avoid the multi-year delay for adjustment of status in the United States,
requests processing of her immigrant visa petition in her home country. In
several countries, notwithstanding the size of the territory or the population, the Department of State only authorizes a single post to issue immigrant visas. In China that post is Guangzho. The workload at these posts
varies, but in most situations, the Department of State reports that immigrant visa processing can be scheduled within two to four months of receiving the approved 1-140 petition. At times, Department of State resources have not been sufficient to meet demand and at some posts, the
delays can approach one year.216
Even when her interview date is reached, Ms. Cheng may face another
re-adjudication of her eligibility for inclusion in the employment-based
second preference. It is possible for a consular officer to return a petition
to the INS for reassessment of the bona tides of the petition.217 The consular officer may be skeptical of the employee's qualifications for the labor
certification or of the company's ability to pay the wage certified in the petition. CSI, as a large employer, should not face this problem, and Ms.
Cheng's U.S. master's degree also mitigates against consular suspicion, but
the consular officer does have the power to return petitions to the INS for
investigation or reconsideration for revocation. 218 These overlapping juris216. Haiti is an example of a post that has experienced long delays. See Interview with
Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assistance,
Department of State, Visa Office (July 28, 2000) (on file with author).
217. While the consular officer does not have the authority to revoke the immigrant petition, the consul may refuse to issue an immigrant petition where the evidence suggests that
the employer could not prove it can pay the certified wage. See Dep't of State Visas:
Documentation of Immigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 22
C.F.R. § 42.81 (2001). While the regulations state the consular may not re-adjudication petitions, the consular can refuse to issue the immigrant visa unless the INS reaffirms its approval of the immigrant petition. See DEP'T OF STATE. 9 FOREIGN AFF. MANuAL § 42.43
(2001), available at http://www.foia.state.gov/fam/fams.asp?level=2&id=IO&fam=O. The
Department of Labor has granted the INS and consular officers the authority to invalidate
labor certifications where they believe the certification was secured by fraud or misrepresentation. See Employ~ent & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process for Permanent
Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.JO(d) (2001). The problems
create by these overlapping jurisdictions are considered in Part Ill. See infra Part III.B.1
(discussing sources of process obstacles).
218. See INS, Revocation of Approval of Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 205 (2001) (promulgating
requirements for revocation of immigrant petitions); see also 20 C.F.R. § 656.JO(d) (reiter-
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dictions and redundant adjudications are usually justified as necessary to
detect or deter fraud. Even if a consular officer issues an immigrant visa
stamp in a passport, when Ms. Cheng arrives at the U.S. border, the INS
inspector may once again make an independent detennination about her
219
eligibility for the visa classification and her admissibility.
Still, the clients want to know how long the process will take.220 No one
can predict the exact processing times because of system complexity and
the lack of infonnation from the·agencies. The best anyone can do is explain the basic patterns and time frames experienced by similarly situated
clients. Adding all of these procedures together, CSI and Ms. Cheng may
wait several years for the labor certificate, unless Ms. Cheng qualifies under some of the streamlined procedures. Then, they could potentially wait
one year for the immigrant visa petition and one to two years to complete
the adjustment procedures or overseas processing. The bottom line is, it
ating consular revocation authority). See, e.g., Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417,
425 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding INS has independent authority to determine whether factual
inaccuracies in labor certification meant the immigrant obtained his visa by fraud or misrepresentation-remanded for inquiry). Immigration attorneys have been very critical of this
procedure because the result of a referral to the INS is that the case usually falls into a
"black hole." See Interview with Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation,
Regulations and Advisory Assistance, Department of State, Visa Office (July 28, 2000) (on
file with author). Attorneys regularly file mandamus actions to force the Department of
State to adjudicate the case as approved by the INS because the INS takes no action on these
returned cases. See id. This is an obvious example of a problem for the government systems as well, because there is no clear authority or procedure established for the handling of
suspicious or fraudulent cases. See id.; see also infra Part IV (discussing recommendations
for fraud investigations).
219. The most likely ground of inadmissibility would be an allegation of fraud or misrepresentation in the visa application. See INA§ 212(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(6) (1994 &
Supp. V 1999). Immigration law contains multiple grounds of exclusion, which may bar a
person's entry to the United States. See id. These include criminal conduct, terrorist activity or affiliation, past immigration violations, poverty, illness, and the examiner's assessment of the person's intentions regarding their stay in the United States. See generally id
§ 1182(a).
220. Some employers have already encountered employees who select job offers based
on the ability of that employer to expedite the immigration process. See Interview with
Margie Jones, Immigration Specialist, Intel Corporation (Aug. 15, 2000) (on file with
author). The clients will also ask how much will it cost. Most attorneys who specialize in
immigration law charge a flat fee for the various steps in the immigration process rather
than a charge for the hours spent in pursuit of the client's goals. As process obstacles have
multiplied, attorneys have sometimes added hourly or additional fees when a client requires
that the attorney try to expedite the. petition or hound the agency in. the hope that the
"squeaky wheel" will make the adjudication proceed more quickly. In addition, the clients
will undoubtedly face additional procedural costs due to the need to extend or renew nonimmigrant status or to pursue interim work authorization or permission to travel during the
last step in the immigration process. See Interview with Attorney Frances Berger, Law Office of Frances Berger (Aug. 8, 2000) (on file with author).

2002]

BREAK.ING BUREAUCRATIC BORDERS

261

takes a total of four to seven years for completion. Lastly, CSI must continue to offer Ms. Cheng the same position throughout this process. Furthermore, Ms. Cheng must accept the terms and conditions of employment
as described in the underlying petition, regardless of the length of time required to complete the adjudication procedures. A simple promotion or
change of job location could invalidate the entire petition.
As previously mentioned, if CSI wants to ensure the recruitment will
satisfy the Department of Labor, they will choose the regular labor certification process. This process typically requires three to four years in most
of the busy regions. If they are willing to gamble that the prior recruitment
is sufficient, or are willing to invest six months of recruitment designed to
satisfy the Reduction in Recruitment criteria, they may get a result within
two to four months. 221 However, process delays are not limited to the Department ofLabor. 222 They are only the first stop on the immigration map.
Moreover, the entire petition is predicated on the concept that Ms.
Cheng is going to accept a specific job with CSI.223 The employer must
remain a viable business and must continue to offer the position certified
by the Department of Labor or approved by the INS. Since even relatively
minor changes can invalidate the petition, the participants in the process
often feel ethically bound to continue outmoded employment relationships
solely to aid the individual in completing the immigration process. In other
situations, the parties will simply agree not to inform the government about
the changes. The ethical pressures put on all the participants, are caused
largely by the lengthy process, and are enormous.224
. Long processing times for adjustment of status also exacerbate hardship
to the applicant if the application for adjustment of status is ultimately denied. The family can rarely be returned to the prior non-immigrant status

22 l. See supra Part Il.C. l.d (discussing Reduction in Recruitment).
222. As will later be shown, the Department of Labor appears to be on the verge of implementing dramatic streamlining of its adjudication approach in an effort to eliminate all
backlogs. See infra text accompanying notes 272-81 (discussing Department of Labor processing and reforms).
223. Although the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act created
some limited options for non-citizens to change employers, in general, the worker is dependent on the employer to continue to offer the job throughout the entire long road to immigrant status. See American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000,
§ 104, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (Supp. V 1999).
. 224. It is a common theme in ethical literature designed for use by immigration lawyers
to discuss how to handle the situation where either the employer or the employee has informed the attorney of an intention to terminate or alter the employment relationship. See,
e.g., AM. IMMJGR. LAWYERS Ass'N, Ennes AND YOUR IMMIGRATION PRACTICE: HAVE YOU
CONSIDERED .... (Alfonso Caprara et al. eds., 1998). See also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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due to the long processing delay and so, if a family is denied adjustment of
status processing, they may face a period of unauthorized presence in the
United States. Although denials of adjustment of status in business immigration cases are fairly rare, the hardship mounts when there is a delay in
the adjudication of the original application. 225
Obviously, the effect of the erratic processing is confusion, lack of predictability, and aggravated participants. The less obvious impact is that
people can get caught in the middle of immigrant processing and, as was
previously explained, the Jong period of "limbo" increases the need for the
INS to make repeat adjudications of the essential elements of the adjustment of status application.

III. ANALYZING THE PROBLEM AT ITS ROOTS
A. Integrity, Efficiency, and Transparency: The Essential Process Values
Where did all of the delay, confusion, and redundant procedures come
from? Why is it so difficult for attorneys, let alone the immigrants, to understand how to get from there to here. 226 The process obstacles are largely
the result of the fundamental structure of the immigration adjudication
system. 227 This structure is built out of the substantive statutory provisions,
the tripartite delegation to agencies with conflicting missions, and the specific culture of the immigration adjudication system. In combination, or
separately, these fundamental structural elements undermine the essential
values that are necessary to promote an effective and strong adjudication
system.228 I describe each value briefly before examining the sources of
225. The INS Yearbook reports that the traditional denial rate is seven percent of all
adjustment of status applications. See 1997 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 62, at 17.
226. As will be discussed later, these problems also frustrate people within the agencies
and unnecessarily complicate the adjudications.
227. Following in the tradition of administrative reform papers sponsored by ACUS, I
have both identified structural and statutory factors that contributed to the problems in the
adjudications and developed paradigmatic criteria essential to effective reforms. Professor
David Martin identified similar structural problems in his analysis of the INS adjudication
of political asylum claims during the late 1980s. See generally Martin, supra note 26 (arriving at similar conclusions by attributing problems in process to its fundamental structure).
228. Professor Martin also identified four key objectives of a good asylum adjudication
scheme: speed, fairness, accuracy, and consistency. See Martin, supra note 26, at 1322-36.
Professor Martin referred to these criteria as key objectives, I will borrow the term process
values from Jerry Mashaw. See MASHAW, supra note I, at 88; see also Robert S. Summers,
Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L.
R.Ev. I, 3 (1974) (attributing rationality, humanity, and regard for dignity and privacy as
"process values"). Although Summers and Mashaw grounded the process values in the requirements of Constitutional Due Process, I use the term more broadly to reflect those val-
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process failures, and the way in which these values are inadequately fostered and protected.
The first of these values, and the most essential to the ability of the administrative adjudication to conform to the substantive law, is integrity.
The integrity of the adjudication system measures the degree to which it
produces accurate, consistent, and fair results. Accuracy ensures the law is
being carried out, and not undennined through error or fraud. 229 Consistency, not only of outcome, but also of treatment along the way, is required
to maintain fairness among and between participants, and thus, is necessary
to foster respect for and trust in the system.230 In addition, consistency allows the agency to anticipate and manage workloads, as well as to evaluate
agency perfonnance.
Obviously the need to protect the integrity of the decision making is a
difficult task. As will be discussed below, the desire to produce accurate
and correct adjudications must be balanced against the burdens on the applicants and the resources available to fund the agency operations. Frankly,
the fear of fraud is one of the single most important aspects of immigration
adjudication and any procedural reforms must give adequate consideration
to this concern.
An efficient system successfully manages the agency resources to complete accurate.adjudications by acting in a timely manner. Efficiency also
refers to the ability of the system to carry out congressional mandates withues and other qualities that are important while not constitutionally required.
Similarly, Professor Stephen Legomsky evaluated the existing forms of administrative
and judicial review of a wide range of immigration related adjudications. See Legomsky,
supra note 26, at 1313 (citing Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The
Effects of S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REY. 108,
111-12 (1964)) (discussing three goals of any administrative process). Legomsky focused
on essential process values or goals of good administrative process: accuracy, efficiency,
acceptability (meaning perceived fairness), and the requirement of consistency. See id He
emphasized the need to integrate the study of adjudication objectives with an understanding
of the attributes of the cases and the attributes of the organization making the adjudication.
See id. To choose the optimum forum, the administrative process designer must consider
both the task and the organization. See generally David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1975).
229. Accuracy alone is insufficient From the agency perspective, preventing "false
positives" is one of the most important design features. See Martin, supra note 26, at 126770 (using this term).
230. When the 1986 legalization programs ~ent into operation, the low level. of evidence needed to qualify for amnesty as a Seasonal Agricultural Worker may have contributed to the distrust the adjudicators demonstrated in reviewing the applications of many
groups. The claims of black Haitian agricultural workers were denied at a rate many times
greater than the denial rates of white workers. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 962 (11th
Cir. 1984), modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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out unnecessary duplication, delay, and costs. Efficiency is important to
any adjudication system, but it is doubly so here where the decisions control the lives of the immigrant and her family and may be of central economic importance to the sponsoring employer. The lack of resources or the
mismanagement of resources has led to long processing delays and redundant procedures. In a system with so many parts, efficiency requires that
resources be distributed fairly and appropriately. Moreover, efficient management would integrate the operation of each part with the whole.
Transparency ensures that participants in a system are able to understand
both its substantive legal requirements and the processes employed to attain
them. 231 It refers, as well, to the participant's abilities to predict with reasonable accuracy the likely outcomes of proceedings. It is of especially
great importance in a system administered by three agencies that play differing, but related, roles. 232 Systems that lack transparency are likely to
lack consistency as well, thus, undermining the system's integrity and;
therefore, respect for the system. Lack of transparency also impedes efficiency by creating increased numbers of appeals and reviews, as well as inappropriate applications and requests.233

B. Process Values Undermined: Three Sources ofBureaucratic Borders
1. Process Choices in Substantive Statutory Provisions
Statutes sometimes specify the procedures to be followed in carrying out

231. Other writers have used the term transparency as the measure of clarity in the substantive provision of law. Transparency is an important factor in measuring the precision of
the Jaw. See Diver, supra note I, at 76 (focusing primarily on the transparency of substance
rather than on the clarity of the procedures used); see also MASHAw, supra note I, at 90
(stating "the transparency of a decision process-its openness and comprehensibility-will
make a worthwhile contribution to the sense of self-respect of any participant .... '').
232. Because the three agencies should coordinate actions, the lack of transparency in
procedures makes it more difficult to manage that coordination. Moreover, the technological systems of the agencies are so poor that it is extremely difficult to locate and track individual petitions. When agency managers cannot estimate the workload or productivity of
existing adjudicators, it is extremely difficult to reduce backlogs, or identify necessary improvements. Even when the GAO or Congress is critical of one of the agency's systems and
workload management, the critic rarely considers the larger inter-agency complications.
See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 28. The report does not mention the need for the INS to
coordinate technological systems with the Department of State or the Department of Labor.
233. Professors Diver and Sofaer concluded that the vague standards in the adjustment
of status provisions and the failure of the INS to either adopt rules or to publish cases concerning the exercise of discretion in these applications led to wasted resources within the
INS and to a high rate of reversal upon administrative or judicial review. See generally
Diver, supra note 1; Sofaer, supra note 26.
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statutory mandates, albeit, in quite general tenns. A statute could mandate
that an agency establish and publish rules, or it might create the structure
for a "trial-like" adjudication system.234 Frequently, Congress leaves open
the issue of how the agency will conduct its adjudications. 235 Providing for
flexibility in developing procedures is not, in and of itself, a design flaw. It
is the lack of specificity in the INA that makes the agencies' interpretations
very important. The divided responsibility, discussed in the next subsection, compounds the problems of infonnal interpretations and lack of transparency in the adjudication criteria. Each agency has different approaches
to its adjudications. The three do not necessarily share the same adjudication priorities and they vary in the frequency with which the agency will
promulgate regulations or issue precedent decisions.
In business immigration, Congress has done little beyond delegating responsibility to a three-headed monster. It has not only failed to specify
details of the adjudicatory system, but also has left to the agencies the job
of delineating the specific content and definition of far too many vague
substantive categories. Vague standards necessitate a process to determine
who qualifies under the standard. Thus, the process itself becomes a more
significant factor in the outcome of the adjudication. Like many other
agencies, the INS, Department of State, and Department of Labor chose to
implement the law through informal adjudication. These adjudications are
exempt from the quasi-trial type procedures of the APA. 236 To guide the
informal adjudications, agencies may promulgate regulations, publish administrative decisions, or adopt guidelines and infonnal policy statements.
In many situations, agencies use a variety of informal procedures. However, in the business immigration arena, the task of determining the "law"
and understanding the procedures is more complex because the three agencies have completely separate approaches to the development of the law
and have no formal coordination amongst themselves. For example, the
Department of State routinely promulgates regulations under the full rulemaking procedures of the APA and publishes a Foreign Affairs Manual
(FAM) containing instructions regarding the application of the regulations.237 The manual also documents procedures for Department of State
234. See, e.g., INA§ 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (explaining statutory
structure mandating immigration hearings for the removal procedures).
235. In some situations, where Congress has required a "hearing on the record," courts
have required formal adjudication procedures under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556557 (1994 & Supp. V 199.9). The INA does not include a re!luirement of a hearing for any
of the business immigration procedures discussed in this Article.
236. See id § 553 (authorizing informal agency adjudication). See Verkuil, supra note
45, at 740 (inferring APA and Due Process Clause provide only minimal requirements for
most informal adjudication).
237. See DEP'T OF STATE, 1 FOREIGN AFF. MANuAL § 000, available at
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adjudications. 238 The Department of State regularly publishes copies of its
memoranda to the field regarding changes in procedures or noting special
emergencies.239 However, there is no administrative or judicial review of
Department of State regulations and adjudications. 240
In contrast, the Department of Labor rarely issues formal rules and publishes few memoranda or informal policy statements. Yet, its administrative review procedures of denied labor certifications are the most formal
adjudications made by any of the three agencies. When a labor certification is denied by the Regional Certifying Officer, the employer may appeal
to a board of administrative law judges assigned to the area. This Board of
Alien Labor Certification Appeals issues three times the number of INS
precedent decisions.
The INS, while publishing more formal rules than the Department of
Labor, does not frequently publish precedent administrative decisions regarding adjudications under the regulations and has infrequently published
material as "Operating lnstructions."241 Finally, even if the INS provided
more detailed published regulations or more precedent decisions, the failure of Congress to provide a clear delegation of more precise standards
may ultimately defeat the goal of flexibility in the adjudication. The INS
has a history of reducing broad standards to extremely narrow rules via its
http://www.foia.state.gov/masterdocs/O 1fam/O ImOOOO.pdf (explaining purpose and structure
of the FAM) (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
238. See generally id. (describing procedural requirements consular officers must follow
if the officer believes an applicant has made a fraudulent statement).
239. The Department of State Cables are published on the Department website and released to a range of industry publications.
See DEP'T OF STATE, CABLES, at
http://www.state.gov. However, they are not published in the Federal Register.
240. The decision ofa consular officer is immune from judicial or administrative review
and meant to guarantee consular officers independence. See INA § 104, 8 U.S.C. § 1104
(1994 & Supp. V 1999). The only administrative actions of the consular officers that are
subject to internal administrative process or review are cases where the visa is denied due to
fraud or misrepresentation requires See, e.g., Dep't of State Regulations Pertaining to BotQ
Nonimmigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 C.F.R. § 40.6
(2001); DEP'T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL § 40.6, Nl.1, available at
http://www.foia.state.gov/masterdocs/09fam/0940006N.pdf(last visited Jan. 29, 2002). The
Advisory Opinions of the Visa Office are not published either externally nor are they internally circulated among consular officers. See also Nafziger, supra note 3.
241. In the place of the Operations Instructions, the INS reported that it would be preparing separate Field Manuals.
See INS, OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS, at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphicsllawsregs/instruc.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). A possible disadvantage of separate Field Manuals could be a failure of the agency to ensure
cross-training and wider gulfs of understanding could grow between INS enforcement and
adjudication. The Field Manuals are not available online and are not routinely distributed to
public sources. In some cases, the failure to publish informal policy memoranda would be
considered a violation. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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regulations and interpretive decisions. The culture of the agency,242 discussed below, the history of the agency adjudications, and Congress's failure to insulate the agency from the political battles which face almost all
immigration policy choices, encourage the agency to reduce the broad
standards to narrow rules, such that they become of limited use.
The INS also has an old pattern of failing to adopt regulations altogether.243 For example, in 1979, the INS proposed a rule establishing stan-

242. See infra Part IIl.B.3 (discussing territorial culture of the INS).
243. For example, the INS did not adopt regulations defining the non-immigrant investor (E-1/E-2) visa category until 1997. See Nonimmigrant Classes; Treaty Aliens; E Classification, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,138 (Sept. 12, 1997) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e)). The confusion between the INS and Department of State adjudication of this visa category resulted in
frequent inconsistencies. See In re Walsh & Pollard, 20 I. & N. Dec. No. 3111 (B.I.A.
1988) (describing how Department of State granted E-2 status but INS refused admission
because it interpreted the category more narrowly and how interpretations were not supported by any published regulations).
Another important example is the INS failure to adopt sufficient regulations defining the
scope of permitted activity under the business visitor visa. The minimal definitions that appear in title 8, section 214.2, of the Code of Federal Regulations primarily describe special
situations. This non-immigrant visa category may be the single most important tool for international business people, but the limits on the business activity permitted under this visa
category have never been defined in the regulations. There have been few precedent decisions issued over the years. See, e.g., In re Cote, 17 I. & N. Dec. No. 336 (BJ.A. 1980); In
re Hira., 11 I. & N. Dec. No. 1647 (BJ.A. 1966); In re W, 6 I. & N. Dec. No. 2783 (B.I.A.
1955). While some might argue that the lack of regulations adds flexibility for case-by-case
consideration of admission at the border, the lack of clear standards makes it nearly impossible for a businessperson to argue for admission at the border and it makes it difficult to
provide legal guidance to business clients. Because the INS is now empowered to summarily exclude even people with valid visas if the inspector believes the visa was obtained
based on fraud, misrepresentation, or because the officer believes the individual holds the
wrong visa category, the issue is of more pressing concern. The new expedited removal
procedures do not provide for administrative or judicial review of the removal decision. See
Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1449-52 (1997) (discussing controversy
surrounding lack of administrative and judicial review for persons subject to new expedited
removal provisions). In one case, the INS denied admission to a Chinese businesswoman
who presented a valid B-1 visa, maintaining that she needed a different visa stamp. There
may be other cases, but the inability of scholars to study this procedure makes it difficult to
measure its impact. See Karen Musalo et al., The Expedited Removal Study: Report on the
First Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PuB. PoL'Y 1 (2000) (examining INS expedited removal proceedings since 1997).
1'.he INS has also refused to allow l!lw professors or non-profit organizations to observe
these expedited proceedings. See INA§ 235(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(I) (1994 & Supp. V
1999). While the INS is required to produce information under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), section 552 of the APA states that there are bona fide exceptions to releasing
information. See RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 8.3
(1995). Some statistical information was ultimately obtained after prolonged negotiations
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dards for detennining when an applicant should be granted adjustment of
status as a matter of discretion.244 The INS later withdrew its own proposal
stating it would be impossible to foresee all the necessary relevant factors
needed to create a comprehensible list and any list created would be unnecessarily rigid. 24s While flexibility may be a noble and equitable principal,
the INS worried that clearly stated standards would result in increased litigation.246 Writing about this failure to promulgate rules, Professor Colin
Diver rejected the INS assumption of increased litigation because most ap247
peals of denied applications were granted.
Therefore, he believed the
INS could achieve greater unifonnity and operate more efficiently if the
agency promulgated rules.248 Further, clearer rules would create stronger
precedent and reduce the amount of cases requiring "elaborate ad hoc justification. " 249
The lack of clear rules in adjustment of status is even more troubling today. At the time Professors Diver and Sofaer were studying the procedure,
the INS processed fewer than 200,000 applications for adjustment of status

between the INS and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). See UNIV. OF CAL.,
COLL. OF LAW, THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY, at http://www.uchastings.edu/
ers (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
244. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing adjustment of status). It is the process where an
individual converts from non-immigrant or unlawful presence to permanent resident within
the United States and thus does not have to complete her immigration at a U.S. consular post
abroad. Professor Diver documented this example of the INS' rejection of the regulatory
approach. See generally Diver, supra note I (providing a discussion on INS rule making).
245. See Factors to be Considered in the Exercise of Administrative Decision, 46 Fed.
Reg. 9119 (Jan. 28, 1981) (indicating the cancellation of proposed rule).
246. See id.; see also Diver, supra note 1, at 94-95; Sofaer, supra note 26. Technically,
there is no right to an administrative appeal of a denial of adjustment of status. See INS
Adjustment of Status to that of Person Admitted for Permanent Residence, 8 C.F.R.
§ 245.2(a)(5)(ii) (2001). Applicants request reconsideration or may push for referral to the
District Director or the Regional Service Center Director who has the authority to overturn
the individual examiner's refusal. See INS Powers and Duties of Service, Department of
Justice, 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 (2001). Many courts have ruled that when the INS denies adjustment of status, the court lacks jurisdiction due to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, because the INA allows renewal of the application in removal proceedings. See, e.g.,
Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2000); McBrearty v. Perryman, 212 F.3d 985, 98687 (7th Cir. 2000). The government has also tried to argue the 1996 statutory amendments
bar review of denied adjustment of status applications. See, e.g., Prado v. Reno, 198 F.3d
286 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting limit on subject matter jurisdiction).
247. See Diver, I note 1, at 95.
248. See id
249. See id.; see also Verkuil, supra note 26; cf. Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the
Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in US. Immigration Law, 71 TUI.. L. REV.
703 (1997) (discussing problem of exercise of discretion in immigration removal proceedings).
HASTINGS
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per year. 250 In December of 1999, the INS reported more than 1,001,550
permanent resident adjustment applications were awaiting adjudication.2 51
Moreover, in the employment-based adjustment of status application, the
adjudication is made at the Regional Service Center without any individual
interview of the immigrant. 252 Thus, one of the most important stops on the
route to immigration is conducted by a nameless, faceless bureaucrat solely
on the basis of the forms and supporting documentation submitted. Finally,
the stakes have risen since the prior studies of the adjustment of status procedure. Prior to 1996, if the INS denied an application for adjustment of
status in the exercise of discretion the immigrant could renew the application overseas at a U.S. consulate.253 This continues to be true, however, for
any person who has acquired more than 180 days of unlawful presence in
the United States. Departure from the physical territory of the United
States triggers the operation of a new multi-year bar to immigration.254
Given the huge volume, the absence of a personal interview, and for some
people, the importance of the decision, the continuing failure of the INS to
promulgate clear rules is irresponsible. To compound the difficulties, for
more than five years, the INS has failed to issue even proposed rules defining "unlawful presence."255 The lack of regulations makes it difficult for
INS examiners and participants, but raises a particular problem for the U.S.
consular officers who must make a case-by-case determination of inadmissibility due to the period of "unlawful presence."256 This one example illustrates the problems created by a lack of rules and the way this problem
intensifies due to the multi-agency delegation. 257
These differences in promulgating rules or publishing policy may seem
one of style, however, they are more significant. The manner in which an
250. See generally Diver, supra note l; Sofaer, supra note 26.
251. See INS, INA STATISTICS, at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/
index.htin (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
252. In a few cases, the Regional Service Center may refer the case for interview at an
INS District Office. See Interview with Frances C. Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of
Frances Berger, New York, N.Y. (Aug. 15, 2000) (notes on file with author).
253. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 72, at§ 51.01 [l][b], [2][c], [3).
254. See INA § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(9) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Unlawful
presence of more than 180 days bars the individual from reentry for three years. If the individual has acquired more than 365 days of unlawful presence, the bar increases to ten years.

See id.
255. The INS has issued a myriad of informal memoranda and opinions from its Office
of General Counsel. See PAUL W. VIRTUE, INS, INS ADVISES. ON UNLAWFUL PRESENCE,
available at http://www.aila.org (last visited Dec. 24, 2001).
256. See DEP'T OF STATE, CABLE No. 36, reprinted in 3 IMMIGR. BULL. 438 (May I,
1998) (issuing a general cable providing an interim preliminary interpretation of INA
§ 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(9)).
257. This problem is discussed more fully in the next subsection. See infra Part Ill.B.2.
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agency develops rules, whether by rule making or adjudication, shapes the
information available to both the public consumers and the officers working within the agency. Moreover, the rulemaking or adjudication initiatives
of one agency may conflict with or alter the policy choices of another
agency. This was clearly the case in the master's degree employmentbased second preference litigation discussed above. 258 Yet beyond litigation, these differences and failures to coordinate policy can lead to distrust
between government actors regarding the accuracy of other agencies' adjudication because the standards, rationale, and procedures used to make the
initial adjudication are unclear.
Consider the example of the INS adjudication of "National Interest
Waiver."259 Congress gave no express definition in the INA, thus, inviting
the INS to determine whether the adjudications should be bounded by defining regulations or left open to case-by-case adjudication. 260 Because
there are few published opinions describing approved cases, the outsider
has few clues regarding the quality of the adjudication or the standards applied. We can see from the earlier discussion that the value of transparency
has been left out of both the Congressional and agency choice. Ultimately,
the client filing an application cannot know whether she meets the definition.
The lack of transparency means that businesses are unable to determine
whether to go to the expense and trouble of filing such petitions. Individuals are uncertain as to the likelihood their petition will be granted and are
unable to plan their lives, make living arrangements, give notice at existing
jobs, and make judgments about alternative job offers in countries throughout the world. 261
Of course, the INS response to this critique will be that they purposely
did not adopt regulations because the agency wanted to leave the greatest
possible flexibility in the adjudication of qualifications. 262 While this is a
noble goal, the agency could have adopted regulations giving the public
258. See Chintakuntla v. INS, No. C 99-5211 MMC (N.D. Cal. May4, 2000).
259. See INA § 203(b)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b)(2)(D) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); INS
Immigration Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 (2001).
260. In a sense, this distinction is not so pure, for even when the agency published
regulations, each case is still resolved based on the individual adjudicators application of the
regulatory criteria to the facts of the case.
261. In the cases of persons likely to fit the "national interest" category this is no small
matter, for they are likely to have skills and expertise which cause them to be in great demand. If it is truly in the interest of the nation to bring them into the United States, such
lack of transparency harms the national interest, because they are hardly likely to tolerate
the uncertainty, duplication, and delay that characterize the current process.
262. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 29,771, 29,776 (June 6, 1995) (setting forth INS preamble to
rules discussing flexibility by not providing definition).
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guidance but preserving adequate room for the exercise of discretion. In
fact, in the INS' own regulations concerning qualifications for "Aliens of
Extraordinary Ability in the Arts, Sciences or Business," they set forth detailed examples of qualifying evidence,263 but retained flexibility by providing that if the prior standards "do not readily apply to the beneficiary's
occupation, the petitioner may submit comparable evidence to establish the
beneficiary's eligibility."264
Furthermore, from the national interest example we can see how Congress failed to consider efficiency in the operation of the process. If the
Department of State or Department of Labor begin to perceive this category
as a "loophole," they may pressure the INS to restructure the adjudication
standards or, in the case of the Department of State, find ways to force the
INS to re-adjudicate approved petitions.265 Further, the other agencies
could call for the INS to require greater documentation from the applicant
to prove, to their liking, that she meets the definition. These pressures burden the system in general and lead to delays.
Perhaps more importantly, Congress's failure to specify the nature of the
process for the labor certification application severely undermines the integrity, as well as the transparency and efficiency, of the system. The INA
states that the Secretary of Labor grants a labor certification, but the statute
is silent about how that adjudication process must proceed.266 Originally,
the Department of Labor tried to adjudicate the labor certification cases by
comparing the application to general labor market information. If the Department had no statistical information indicating shortages in the occupation, the agency denied the certification. Employers challenged the agency
procedure because the statute refers to certification of no "able, willing,
qualified ... and available" U.S. workers. 267 The employers successfully
argued that unless the Department could ~oint to an available worker, the
employer was entitled to the certification. 68 The Department of Labor re-

263. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) (including standards such as: "(i) Documentation of the
alien's receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence in the field of endeavor; ... [or] (viii) (e]vidence that the alien has performed in a
leading or critical role for organizations or establishments that have a distinguished reputation").
264. Id.§ 204.5(h)(4).
265. This type of distrust in the quality and accuracy of INS adjudication of EB-5 investor petitions leads directly to criticism of the program by the Department of State and the
referral of cases back to INS headquarters. Eventually, the INS suspended the adjudication
of its own petitions based on concerns about the quality of the adjudications taking place at
its service centers. See infra Part IV.D.5 (discussing EB 5 adjudications).
266. See INA§ 212(a)(5), 8U.S.C.§J182(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Digilab, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 495 F.2d. 323 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding
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sponded by requiring, in almost all situations, case-by-case supervised recruitment to ensure no such worker existed.269 Thus, Congress's failure to
more carefully consider the procedural implications of its statutory certification resulted in litigation and ultimately a cumbersome, difficult, and irrational procedure of trying to measure individual market failures. 270
Setting aside that classic example of the failure to design a process adequate to the task, the labor certification process has operated basically as a
case-by-case test of the bona fides of the employer and the job conditions
since 1977. For nearly a quarter of a Ct(ntury, the INS and Department of
State have assumed the Department of Labor is making an adjudication of
the working conditions and prevailing wage. The failure of Congress and
the Department of Labor to adequately address the implications of the labor
certification adjudication led to the horrific processing delays and expensive advertising and professional costs described previously. And while the
obstacles and hurdles of the labor certification process clearly forced some
cases out of the system, the overall approval rates were extraordinarily
high. 271 Given the frequency of approval, it is difficult to understand why
employers and employees should have to endure $10,000 or more in adjudication costs and years of waiting.
As explained in Part II, in many parts of the country the delays in labor
certification climbed to three and four years. 272 Congress became frustrated
with the operation of the program and began to dramatically reduce the labor certification program budget. 273 The belt tightening and political pressures forced the Department of Labor to fashion expedited adjudication
274
The Department of Labor revived preexisting (but rarely used)
systems.
Reduction in Recruitment regulations. 275 Under those regulations, as detailed in Part II, employers submit evidence of past recruitment (unsuperDepartment of Labor could not merely rely on general information about availability of
electrical engineers to establish employer did not have a bona fide need for a specific engineer.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974); Reddy, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th
Cir. 1974) (holding a similar rejection of agency methodology), reh 'g denied, 495 F.2d
1372 (1974).
269. See Labor Certification Process for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United
States, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,933 (Dec. 19, 1980) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 656).
270. See infra Part IV for a discussion of eliminating the Department of Labor and the
labor certification requirement.
271. See supra Figure 3, p. 240 (explaining approval rates).
272. See generally supra Part II (analyzing delays in labor certification).
273. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (outlining drop in funds for labor certification program).
274. See GAL 1-97, supra note 122 (providing information on how the Department of
Labor made adjudication more efficient).
275. Although the regulations authorized reduction in recruitment procedures, it was the
practice of most regional officers to refuse the procedure in all cases.
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vised by the Department of Labor or state agency) to prove the lack of
available workers. 276 However, the Department of Labor began an even
more streamlined re-engineering of its procedures and proposed the development of an automated adjudication procedure.277 The proposed system
will ask employers to submit a form to be electronically scanned for an initial review by a computer.278 This procedure would rely on employer attestation without supporting documentation. 279 If the answers provided in
the new form match Department of Labor criteria,280 the case would be approved without participation by the state agency or the Regional Certifying
Officer. One official estimated the new procedure might result in nearly
eighty-five percent of all filings being approved without further inquiry.281
These examples also demonstrate that the current system does not sufficiently protect the value of integrity. As the Department of Labor streamlines its labor certification procedures, other agencies become concerned
about "false positives." If the Department of Labor streamlines its adjudication to an attestation model where most cases pass through quickly with
minimal review of the evidence, the other two agencies will become concerned that some cases were approved erroneously. It is highly likely that
without coordination and trust in the Department of Labor procedures, the
other agencies will delay or intensify their adjudication of immigrant petitions and individual visa applications to ensure the job offer is bona fide
and the labor certificate deserved.m Thus, the drive to protect the system

276. See discussion in text accompanying notes supra 122-26.
277. See Labor Certification Process for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the
United States, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,777 (Aug. 25, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R pt. 656).
This program is also discussed in Part IV.C.2. The announced notice of intent to propose a
rule gives no details about the new program. The information discussed here is based on
interviews with agency personnel and public comments made at the annual meeting of
AILA held June 15, 2000, in Chicago, Ill. As of February 2002, the changes have not been
implemented.
278. Information obtained during interviews with agency personnel and public com·
ments made at the AILA's annual meeting.
279. See id.
280. It is unclear whether the criteria would differ from the substantive criteria applied
at the current time. It will be difficult to assess the impact of this change because the criteria of the Regional Certifying Officers were not spelled out in detailed regulations and obviously adapted to changes in occupations or labor conditions. Thus a system which was already opaque may become impenetrable. In the past, attorneys often learned about current
criteria through.informal conversations with the Regional Certifying officers or through attorney/agency liaison meetings. See discussion of these meetings infra Part IV.
281. See Audio tape: Jim Norris, Special Counsel, Remarks at the American Immigration Lawyers' Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill. (June 16, 2000) (on file with
author).
282. See discussion of re-adjudication across agency operations, supra Part II.
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decreases efficient operations and outcomes become more obscured as
cases are shuffled back and forth between the agencies. This problem is
discussed further in the next section, which considers the specific process
problems generated by splitting responsibilities among the three agencies.283
The failure to adequately consider the process requirements of the substantive provisions is a problem in many areas of law. However, in the
specific context of business immigration adjudications, the vague statutes
work a particularly devastating blow to transparency, integrity, and efficiency.

2. Delegation to Multiple Agencies
Many scholars have suggested, when Congress adopts vague standards
and delegates adjudication to agencies, Congress is trying to look like it
made hard policy choices while really shielding themselves from criticism.284 The delegation of the final adjudication to the agency allows
members of Congress to blame the agency for approving the wrong cases
or for failing to approve the right cases.285 Here, the situation is made even
more complex by delegating closely related responsibilities to more than
one agency. 286 Further, because it is a general tenet of administrative law
that courts will generally defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute,287
including agency interpretation of how to implement the law, the confusing
structural delegation issues in the INA contnbute to immigration law's insulation from judicial review. By selecting at least three federal agencies to
implement the immigration laws without any one agency having authority
over the other two, Congress laid the foundation for conflict and confusion.
Of course, a chief executive wanting to control the three has authority over
alJ, but the ability of the executive to continuously monitor the actions,
policies, and management of immigration adjudications is obviously lim283. See infra text accompanying notes 284-314.
284. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 119-34 (1993) (arguing only theory
of agency delegative process may be better, but practice of agency process is subject to
same political pressures and arbitrariness as regular congressional legislative process).
285. See id. Cf Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985) (arguing in favor of broad delegations
of authority to administrators).
286. The situation, in many ways, parallels the confusion when Congress delegates responsibility to both state and federal agencies.
287. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(assuming interpretation is not clearly in contradiction of statutory authority). Cf lNS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (finding INS had improperly interpreted statutory
standard for asylum eligibility).
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ited to larger policy concerns. The INA does not mandate coordination,
nor does it contain a mechanism for uniform reporting or even establish
formal mechanisms for communication.288 Yet, adjudication choices made
in one agency can have a dramatic impact on the workload and operations
of another.
Structural delegation can at times leave one of the actors insufficient
authority to act. The Department of State has limited authority to rescind
or cancel visas if the consular officer and the Visa Office find that the
beneficiary committed fraud. 289 The consular officer may not revoke the
underlying immigrant visa petition even if the consular officer has evidence
to support a belief that the case was inappropriately approved. Instead, the
consular will refer the case back to the INS for reconsideration or investigation. However, the INS will not take any action in the case. The beneficiary and petitioner become trapped in an administrative limbo. 290 Setting
aside the issue of which agency should have the authority to revoke a petition, the failure of the INA to consider the situation reflects a fundamental
source of process problems that needs a remedy. The absence of clear
statutory authority leaves the agency to battle out appropriate procedures
and the varying priorities or resources of the agencies may leave both dissatisfied.291 Moreover, if the consular officer is not responsible for making
the revocation decision, that officer may not feel accountable for his or her
action. On the other hand, if the INS does not act on the revocation request
or fails to inform the consular officer of the status of the case, the consular
officer may distrust other agency adjudications or feel there is little point in

288. Similarly, other reports discuss and evaluate the performance of the immigration
function, noting that the policies seem to be in regular tension--sucli as conflict between
admissions policies which seek to enhance competitiveness and those that seek to protect
U.S. workers. Furthermore, these reports identify poor relations between the executive and
legislative branches of government on immigration issues produce a congressional tendency
to micro-manage the issue and undervalue the expertise and experience of the agency's
managers and analysts. See DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEME'JRIOU ET AL., REoRGANIZING THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION FUNCTION: TOWARD A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILl1Y 28 (1998)
(noting external accountability suffers in performance of immigration function).
289. See Dep't of State Visas: Documentation of Immigrants under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 C.F.R. § 42.82(a)(I) (2001) (stating visa may be revoked if
consular office knows or is satisfied after investigation that the visa was received fraudulently).
290. Interview with Nancy-Jo Merritt, Partner, Littler Mendelson in Phoenix, Ariz.
(Aug. 15, 2000) (confirming it.is not uncommon for INS to fail ~o act upon referral from
Department of State).
291. Interview with Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and
Advisory Assistance, Department of State, Visa Office (July 28, 2000) (on file with author)
(confirming consular officers became frustrated with lack of INS or Department of Labor
resources to investigate fraud identified at overseas interviews).
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challenging the INS action.
Another clear example of confusing delegation to the three agencies
concerns the intersection of the labor certification requirement and the immigrant petition. While the INA requires all employment-based immigrants to obtain a labor certificate from the Department of Labor, the statute is unclear about the authority of the INS (or the Department of State) to
inquire into the legitimacy of the labor certificate. In some cases, the INS
questions the wage rate certified in the petition. 292 More commonly, the
INS has limited its inquiry to whether the employer can prove it is economically strong enough to pay the certified wage. 293 In the rare cases
challenging the authority of the INS to revisit the validity or terms of the
labor certification, federal courts have had great difficulty in defining the
scope and limit of the agency's authority. 294 Over time, a line of cases developed holding that while the INS has the ultimate authority to determine
if the immigrant is qualified for the visa category, the INS may not alter the
job requirements certified by the Department of Labor. 295 However, while
attorneys and judges may be capable of parsing these cases, it is unclear
that agency actors always understand the boundaries of their authority. 296
There are other examples in the INA. Section 204(b) of the INA instructs the INS to consult with the Department of Labor in adjudicating eligibility for the immigrant visa categories.297 In reality, the INS does not
consult with the Department of Labor at all. What did Congress mean by
this consultation requirement? Does the Department of Labor have the
authority to interfere with INS adjudications? It is impossible to answer
this question with certainty and yet, this is the kind of important question
that must be considered if the agencies are going to be able to reduce process barriers.

292. See, e.g., Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 742 F. Supp. 682, 684-85 (D.D.C.
1990) (finding INS acknowledged Department of Labor determines prevailing wage but argued that prevailing wage had increased since adjudication of labor certificate).
293. See In re Great Wall, 16 I. & N. Dec. No. 142 (B.I.A. 1977) (holding District Director determined petitioner had failed to establish he was financially able to pay the salary
rate as established in the job offer); In re Sonegawa, 12 I. & N. Dec. No. 612, 615 (B.I.A.
1967) (determining petitioner had ability to pay beneficiary stipulated wages of job offer
and to meet conditions of certification).
294. See Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 875 F.2d 898, 899-900 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding INS may evaluate employer's ability to pay prevailing wage at the time of the initial labor certification application).
295. See. e.g., Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-15 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting
proper statutory division of authority between Department of Labor's labor certification determination and INS preference classification decision).
296. See generally Mashaw, supra note 285.
297. See INA§ 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)(I994).
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All three of the essential process values are greatly compromised by this
type of re-adjudication when the procedural limits and responsibilities of
each agency are not well-defined. Perhaps the worst offense is the clear
lack of efficient and effective adjudication. The agencies and the participants are demoralized when a case is kicked back and forth between the
agencies and either falls into limbo or results in a lost immigrant visa. As
discussed in Part IV, there may be times when the Department of State, due
to its expertise in recognizing patterns of fraud in foreign countries, may be
preserving the integrity of the immigration system by questioning the actions of the Department of Labor or INS. 298 When those instances arise, the
statute must provide a clear mechanism for resolving the issue and Congress and the administration must support the agencies with adequate resources to complete the investigations.
There are other examples of direct conflict between the substantive interpretations and procedural requirements of the three agencies. For example, Congress authorizes multinational employers to transfer employees
temporarily to the United States who have at least one year of experience
with the multinational at a foreign location and who possess "specialized
knowledge."299 "[A]n alien is considered to [have] ... specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special[ized) knowledge
of the company product and its application in international markets or has
an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company."300 These multinational employees are generally not eligible for immigration as employment-based first preference or priority workers because they do not meet the statutory definition of manager or executive.301
Accordingly, if the U.S. branch of the multinational wishes to sponsor this
specialized employee for immigration, the employer wiH need to obtain a
labor certificate. This seems to indicate that Congress meant to facilitate
temporary admission of this category of worker but not necessarily to allow
the employer to be exempted from a labor market test if the employer
wishes to sponsor the worker for a permanent position.
The Department of Labor has long held that employers may not request
experience gained with the same employer as a minimum entry require-

298. See infra Part IV.D.S.
299. INA § lOI(a)(IS)(l), 8 U.S.C. § I IOl{a)(l5)(L) (1994) (describing an alien employed continuously for one year who seeks entrance into the United States to render services .in a managerial or executive capacity)..
300. INA§ 101(a)(44), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (defining specialized knowledge as advanced knowledge of company procedures).
301. See. INA § 203(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (describing an alien employed for at least one year by a firm or corporation who seeks to entrance into United States to render services in a managerial or executive capacity).
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ment for a labor certification position. The philosophy of the Department
of Labor is that the employer cannot normally include this experience as a
minimum requirement because if the employer initiaJJy hired the employee
without the skills, then the employer can similarly train a new worker. 302
However, the Department of Labor had not routinely applied this same restriction to experience gained with a related entity outside of the United
States.303 In 1990, the Department of Labor applied the rule against using
prior experience to multinational employers.304 Today, training or knowledge an employee acquired overseas cannot be used to justify the permanent need for the employee. Thus, the very specialized knowledge that
made the employee eligible for the L-lB temporary visa, becomes a disadvantage in the labor certification processing. Department of Labor personnel become suspicious of the employer's minimum requirements. From the
employer's perspective, it feels as if the multinational corporation is told to
prove one thing to allow the admission of the foreign worker by the INS
and to disavow the very same characteristics in the petition with the Department of Labor. Finally, assuming the labor certification is still issued,
the INS becomes suspicious of the original finding that the employee was a
person with specialized knowledge because that knowledge is not required
in the labor certification and immigrant visa petition.
Some of the conflict between the Department of Labor and INS in the
example above is created by the failure to waive the labor certification requirement for this group of multinational workers, and thus, the substantive
statutory provisions can be blamed. A great deal of the confusion and contradiction however, arises from the way the agencies handle the same factual information and the fact that the vagueness in the statutory criteria
forces the agencies to re-fight the political policy choices that Congress
should have made in the statutory criteria.
The agencies have different agendas and thus, different concerns. While
the agency differences are understandable, from the perspective of the participants, the system is baffling. Unsophisticated participants do not understand the intricacies of the agencies' policy goals. To them each stage of
the process results in a change in the rules.

302. The employer can challenge this rule by making a showing that the employer can
no longer train for the position due to severe time or economic pressures. See Jn re Info.
Indus. Inc., 88-INA-82, 1989 WL 250355, at *I (BALCA Feb. 9, 1989) (en bane) (defining
business necessity ex,ception for this and other requirem~nts).
303. By related entity I mean a subsidiary, affiliate, or branch of a multinational entity.
See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(a)(l) (2001) (discussing foreign government officials in general).
304. See In re Inmos Corp., 88-INA-326, 1990 WL 598564, at *2 (BALCA June 1,
1990) (en bane).
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The delegation to multiple agencies without building in coordination
simply complicates the communication between the agencies. For example, the INS decided to process business immigration cases at the Regional
Service Centers. This decision by one agency created a slow down in
overall processing because the Regional Service Centers were unable to
handle both the naturalization petition adjudication and the adjustment of
status procedures with their existing resources. Moreover, the Regional
Service Centers processed adjustment cases only if the employer and immigrant had first secured an approved 1-140. By separating the filing into a
two-step procedure, the Service Center necessarily required some repetitive
305
action and lengthened the adjudication process.
As delays became more
and more onerous, immigrants began avoiding the adjustment of status procedure and switched to overseas immigrant processing with the Department
of State. However, if at the time of original filing, the petitioner employer
indicated that the immigrant would complete the final stop via adjustment
of status processing, no formal notice of the 1-140 approval is sent to the
Department of State. As explained, many consulat~s will not accept copies
of approval notices mailed to the employer. Before the Department of
State accepted jurisdiction over the case, the employer must file a request
for the INS to issue a written notice, directly to the Department of State,
confirming INS prior approval. The INS requires the employer to file a
form to obtain the notification. 306 And, unfortunately, given the low priority of this type of petition, in some Regional Service Centers delays grew to
twelve months or more simply to get this verification issued.307

305. Until 1996, the INS had utilized a one-step procedure for immediate relatives and
employment based cases where there was no current backlog in the visa category. In the
one-step procedure, the immigrant petition and the adjustment of status application are adjudicated simultaneously.
306. See INS, FORM 1-824, APPUCATION FOR ACTION ON AN APPROVED APPLICATION OR
PETITION, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/i-824.htm (last
modified Jan. 29, 2002) (verifying to Department of State that INS has approved the visa
petition).
307. Not all of the Regional Service Centers became this backlogged, but the lack of
consistent processing between the Service Centers contributed to other problems. Some attorneys found it faster to file a new 1-140 petition requesting overseas processing. The INS
then had to adjudicate the same case twice. Apparently, the INS database does not necessarily signal to the examiner that this is a duplicate filing. See Interview with Frances
Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger, New York, N.Y. (Sept 3, 2000)
(reporting comments made .bY immigration attorneys at AILA meetings). In addition to the
duplicate filing, attorneys have also contacted consulates directly to see whether, and under
what circumstances, they would accept the original INS issued approval notice with an attorney certified copy of the 1-140 petition. Where this was allowed the immigrant could
pursue both adjustment of status and immigrant visa processing, completing the process that
resulted in the fastest decision. See Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Attorney, Fragomen,
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Figures 4 and S, 1-824 Processing Time Lines
California Service Center 1·824 Backlogs (In months)
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•Yearly averages based upon incomplete reporting. Figures are based on Service Center reported processing times, and reports of actual processing times ftom immigration attorneys.
Available reports include: 1997: November, December; 1998: May, November, December;
1999: February, March, April, July, August, October, November, December; 2000: January, March,
May.
1-824 Processing Backlogs (In months)
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•Yearly averages based upon incomplete reporting. Figures are based on Service Center reported
processing times, and reports of actual processing times from immigration attorneys.
Available reports include:
1997: NE-December. TX-December. VT-October, November.
1998: NE-February, March, May, July, October, December. TX-January, April, May, July, August,
October. VT-March, April, May, August, October, December.
1999: NE-January, March, April, July, August, October, November, December. TX-January, March,
April, May, July, August, September, October, November, December. VT-February, June, July,
August, September, October, November, December.
2000: NE-March, April. TX-January, March, April. VT-January, March, April.
2001: NE-January, February, March, April, May, June. TX-January, February, March, April, May, .
June. VT-January, February, March, April, May, June.

Del Rey, Bem~n & Loewy {Sept. 3, 2000).
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By delegating power to three agencies, Congress failed to consider the
good operation of the system as a whole. When no agency is in control of
the entire process, the decision of one to require a new filing or original approval notices, complicates and expands the work of another agency.
Moreover, the tremendous backlog in adjustment of status cases has triggered a marked increase in the Department of State's immigrant visa processing workload. The agency could not anticipate this increase based on
historical trends.
On one level, this example illustrates failure to communicate between
agency databases. 308 On another level, it is an extreme example of what
happens when two agencies have authority over the immigration adjudication function, but have little or no cooperation between their operations.
Further, attorneys and employers hoping to minimize delays in last stop
adjudication, filed duplicate petitions or requested special processing and
then abandoned the slower track application creating even more unnecessary work for the agencies. 309
In a few rare situations, the agencies negotiate adjudication procedures
minimizing redundancy or streamlining the procedures. For example, the
Department of Labor delegated to the INS the determination of which immigrants qualified for the exemption from labor certification found in
Schedule A. 310 The recent INS delegation of the adjudication of temporary
agricultural worker petitions (H-2A) to the Department of Labor is another
positive example.311 Delegation can save time in simply transmitting paper
and information between the agencies. On the other hand, in some situations, the special expertise of the agency may be lost if it gives up its adjudication role. While the agencies should certainly consider these cross
delegations, in some situations, it is more appropriate for Congress to make

308. Although the Department of State receives electronic infonnation about the approval of I-140's, the infonnation is so often filled with errors that the agency insists upon
written fonnal notification. See Interview with Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of
Legislation, Regulations and Advisol)' Assistance, Department of State, Visa Office (July
29, 2000) (on file with author).
309. Interview with Frances C. Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger,
New York, N.Y. (Aug. 8, 2000).
310. See Employment & Traning Admin. Labor Certification Process for Permanent
Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 (2001) (noting Director detennined there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available
for occupations listed on Schedule A).
.
311. See Delegation of the Adjudication of Certain Temporal)' Agricultural Workers (H2A) Petitions, Appellate and Revocation Authority for Those Petitions to the Secretary of
Labor, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,528 (July 13, 2000) (describing delegation of authority to Secretal)'
of Labor). The effective date of this regulation was delayed by the INS until October I,
2002. See 66 Fed. Reg. 49,514 (Sept. 28, 2001).
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a careful assessment of the purposes of the adjudication and which agency
is most likely to have the resources and skills to make the accurate determination.
Part IV of this Article suggests some structural reforms aimed at lessening the duplicative delegations and eliminating conflicts.312 Undoubtedly,
new issues will arise so long as multiple agencies share responsibility for
the immigration function. Unless measurement and feedback mechanisms
are fully developed between the actors, the tripartite delegation will continue to be a main contributor of interior process borders.

3. Territorial Culture
Many of the process failures arise from the failure of Congress and the
agencies to adequately contend with the internal and external forces that
shape the agency culture.313 Although many of these factors operate in
other areas of administrative law, several are particularly strong in immigration law. The failure to plan for and counteract these forces, has directly
contributed to the erosion of the essential process values.

a. Congressional Mandates and Dictated Priorities
Congress must bear a large part of the responsibility for the crisis in immigration adjudications.314 Congress mandated express and implied priorities in the statutes315 or demanded prioritization of specific programs with

312. See infra Part IV.B.
313. See JAMES Q. WJLSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIBS Do AND
WHY THEY Do IT 91 (1989) ("Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationship within an organization."). Wilson goes on to note that many organizations have multiple cultures and the
relationship of the agency culture(s) to the agency mission may dramatically impact the effectiveness of the organization. See id. at 91-92. Here I am using culture in a broad manner
to encompass both the internal and external forces that shape the organizations.
314. Politics presents a treacherous double-edged sword for the lNS' efficient and appropriate facilitation of immigration. The highly political debate persists about how vigorously the lNS should control illegal immigration. When the lNS engages in activities such
as surprise work-site inspection, criticism immediately flows from immigrant groups and its
conduct is subject to congressional scrutiny and investigation. Yet, on the other hand, if
lawmakers perceive the lNS as remiss in their duties, they immediately capitalize on the
agency's. unpopularity by encouraging reseµtment against it as congressional .elections approach. A similar situation plagues other agencies, such as the IRS. See GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 12; see also Laurent, supra note 12, 13-18 (outlining
Government Performance Project in detail).
315. See lNA § 214(c)(2)(C). 8 U.S.C. § I 184(c)(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (mandating thirty day processing for H-1 B and L-1 petitions).
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the threat of reduced funding or of imposing new statutory mandates. 316
For example, some statutory limits force an allocation of resources to a
particular visa category without adequate consideration of how the allocation might disadvantage or paralyze a separate function. Two of the most
obvious examples are the naturalization and H-1 B petitions. When Congress pressures INS to reform and expedite its naturalization backlogs, the
Service Centers move personnel away from the adjustment of status processing and the processing of the employment-based immigrant petitions.317
The limitation of the total number of H-IB visas, necessitated that the INS
put auditing procedures in place to be sure they did not approve more H-1 B
visas than the statute allowed. 318 Employers worrying about the cap filed
large numbers of petitions in the winter and early spring to avoid being shut
out of the category altogether.319 Moving adjudicators to meet the thirtyday deadline meant other visa petitions had to sit waiting for adjudication.
Although Congress did not intend the agency to suspend other operations, the management of the agency responded to congressional and community pressure. However, the failure to adjudicate one type of petition
means that pressure will mount in other categories or unnecessary work
will be created. For example, if the immigrant petition cannot be processed
in time, the employee will need a renewal of non-immigrant status. The
extension petition could have been eliminated altogether if the INS had
been able to process the l-140 in a timely fashion. The failure to adjudicate
the adjustment of status applications meant that fewer people became permanent residents and a push to rush through cases created a bulge in the
workflow. The sudden increase in workload resulted in delayed processing. Delayed processing means the initial grants of work or travel authorization expire. To obtain extensions of these, the individual must make a
formal request and the INS has more work for its adjudication officers.320
One bulge can build into a tidal wave five years later. In 1986, Congress
authorized a legalization program resulting in more than three million peo-

316. See Dep 'ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001: Hearing of the Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Subcomm. of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 106th Cong. 183-213 (2000) (transcribing detailed questioning of how appropriated money to INS will be spent).
317. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85 and 215- 16 (discussing current backlog
problems).
318. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting numerical 1imitations imposed by
statute).
319. Interview with Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger,
New York, N.Y. (July 8, 2000).
320. See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (2000) (detailing general requirements for admission, extension, and maintenance of status).
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ple becoming permanent residents over a five-year period. 321 Because
permanent residents cannot apply for naturalization until they have completed five years of resident status,322 the INS began to experience an up323
swing in the number of naturalization applications.
If the INS allows
backlogs to grow, and then, through special initiatives, completes the adjustment of status applications for record numbers of people, the bulge will
reappear a few years later in naturalization applications and in relative petitions for the employees' family members who have not yet immigrated to
the United States.
The executive branch can also pressure the agencies to shift priorities
without adequate time to retool the process. More commonly, in immigration law, it is the failure of the executive branch to coordinate the priorities
among the agencies involved in the adjudications that contributes to the
process failures. While executive branch interference is undoubtedly a
powerful source of process confusion, it lacks the permanence of a statutory mandate and therefore, should be more easily controlled within the
administration.
Obviously, these mandates, interfere with the good operation of the adjudication system when the agency has insufficient time to anticipate the
new programmatic priority. But perhaps less obviously, the attempt of
Congress or the executive branch to control the adjudication priorities of
the agencies can have an effect on the integrity of the agency operations.
In some cases, the mandate results in a decrease in the accuracy and quality
of the adjudications. In others, Congress or the executive may perceive an
inappropriate rate of false positives in agency adjudications and craft controls, which dramatically slow down the adjudications in an effort to reduce
error rates. Most recently, the operation of the naturalization program was
a victim of the tug of war between the Executive's desire to expedite naturalization and Congress's move to tighten the quality controls because of its

321. See INA§§ 210, 245A, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1255a (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also
Rep. Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, A Permanent Fixture?: Analyzing Current Trends in
Legal Immigration, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES I065, 1066 (1997) (indicating under Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 2.7 million undocumented people were
granted amnesty).
322. See INA§ 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1994). The residency requirement is only
three years for people married to U.S. citizens. See INA § 319(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a)
(1994). There are other special exceptions. See generally id. § 319(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(b)
(eliminating a residency requirement for applicants who are married to U.S. citizens who are
government employees or are otherwise employed by a U.S. corporation); id. § 328, 8
U.S.C. § 1439 (stating other exceptions for applicants who have served in U.S. Army).
323. See INS, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/natz99tables.pdf
(showing increase in number of petitions filed after 1991) (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
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b. Resources and Resource Allocation

If asked why the agency cannot produce efficient and rapid adjudications, agency management will always cite a lack of resources.32' However, this problem is more subtle than a mere lack of resources. Resources
placed in the wrong places or inappropriately prioritized also affect agency
operations. In some cases, Congress has given the agencies processing
deadlines or authorized user fees but limited the program's ability to apply
the fees to its operations.326 The natural result of interest group politics has
led to statutory priorities that may not allow the agency to make the most
appropriate management choices about spending. In other cases, it is not
Congress but the administration that is directly responsible for sabotaging
the agency operations by failing to adequately support the program or by
diverting agency resources to other priorities.
In one detailed study, the National Academy of Public Administrators,
concluded that the complex system of appropriations and user fees was directly responsible for management and performance failures within the
INS. 327 The Department of Labor lacks the statutory authority to charge
user fees and due to large budget cuts, has extremely limited resources. 328
These funding complications, particularly the lack of control, make the
adjudication tasks more difficult.

324. In a sense, this is an inappropriate example because of the high political stakes in
citizenship. Some critics perceived the controversy surrounding naturalization programs as
a politic battle involving a democratic administration, which was rushing naturalization to
gain new voters in the 1996 elections, and a Republican Congress, which was trying to taint
the Clinton administration with claims of fraud on the system and to slow down the creation
of new Democratic voters. See, e.g., David P. Schippers, Abusing the INS, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 23, 2000, at A22 (discussing politicization of INS by Clinton administration). Setting
aside the very real political concerns, the naturalization program adjudication operations
stole resources from other programs and the backlash against senior managers within the
INS created problems for the implementation of other program reforms. See also Interview
with senior INS examiner (July 28, 2000) (regarding impact of naturalization audits and priorities on overall adjudications in the employment-based categories).
325. I have never heard an agency manager publicly report that the agency was fully
staffed and. that all equipment and facilities were ready to handle the work assigned. Of
course, lack of resources is a common problem in administrative agencies.
326. See Immigration and Naturalization Service User Fee Advisory Committee: Meeting, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,980 (Aug. 23, 1999).
327. See id
328. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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Agency Training and Strategic Planning

Again, the existence of three separate agencies with diverse missions,
hiring, and training practices exacerbate and complicate the equation. It is
a difficult job to train agency adjudicators in substance and procedure, but
the failure to educate agency personnel about the operations and procedures
of the other agencies can produce miscommunication, poor strategic planning and even such basic problems as computer systems that do not "talk"
to one another.
Even within the confines of a single agency, the context factors are often
the single most significant factor in creating process failures. The INS has
been studied, audited, and criticized numerous times in the last several
years. INS management constantly reacts to the audits and criticism and
perhaps has not had sufficient time to develop long term strategic planning.
The agency seems to jump from crisis to crisis: a new emergency, a new
program, a new mandate from Congress or the auditors. 329 However, even
when planning initiatives were implemented they often were abject failures. The INS publicly stated the 1997 computer software system it developed to allow it to obtain meaningful information is incapable of keeping
up with or providing accurate information for its workload in 2000. 330 The
inability to reasonably forecast work flow and user fee income meant the
agency was improperly staffed and adjudication authority was not appropriately delegated when crunch times occurred. In the last few years, the
crunches came in unprecedented waves. 331
On August 1, 2000, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report criticizing INS management for failing to establish an enterprise architecture.332 "Enterprise Architecture" refers to both the operational

329. The Inspector General of the Department of Justice testified that more than fifty
percent of its resources were spent on INS audits alone. See Immigration Reorganization
and Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 20 (1999) (statement of Michael Bromwich, Inspector General, DOJ).
330. See 146 CONG. R.Ec. 87778-80 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (containing debate regarding the CLAIMS system regarding religious workers fraud).
331. And the waves may be just beginning. Congress may soon consider a new amnesty
program. If it is adopted the INS may be asked to adjudicate millions of new applications in
a short time period. In the last formal amnesty program, the INS processed more than five
million requests for legalization. Moreover, the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, have renewed pressure on the INS.
332. "INS recognizes that it does not have an enterprise architecture and has taken some
limited steps to develop one. . . . Moreover, its current approach to managing the development of its architecture lacks fundamental controls." GAO REP. GAO/AIMD-60-212,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: INS NEEDS TO BETTER MANAGE THE DEVEWPMENT OF ITS
ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE 2 (2000) [hereinafter INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY].
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structure of an agency and its technological resources. 333 The goal of the
plan is to identify both the current and target operating environments of the
agency and how the business and technological functions will work together.334 Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) ordered all federal agencies to develop enterprise architecture plans.335 The
GAO found INS management had no ability to measure workload and existing technological databases were created in a "stovepipe" fashion and
336
were impossible to coordinate.
The GAO report was highly critical of
the Office of Information Resource Management's lack of coordination
with the business operations of the agency. 337 The report chronicles several
years of management and technological problems within the INS despite
large amounts available for systems development.338
There can be other obstacles to training and retraining personnel. The
union agreements may carefully define the job duties of various agency
employees, and the collective bargaining agreement may not allow a
change in duties without intensive negotiations. Similarly, the agency may
have a subcontractor handling aspects of the procedure and changes in
forms or filing requirements also requires re-negotiation of these public
contracts.
Even locating adequate facilities to conduct training can be an enormous
challenge. Shortly after David Martin became General Counsel of the INS,
he planned to conduct significant training for the hundreds of new border
patrol officers.339 Although he located a former military base which could
be used to house the attorneys and to conduct the training, the training

333. See id at 4.
334. See id. at 8-10.
335. See Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104106, § 5125(b), 110 Stat. 679, 685 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 1425(b) (Supp. V
1999)); see also Memorandum from Franklin D. Raines. Executive Office of the President,
Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, M-97-02
(Oct. 25, 1996); Memorandum from Franklin D. Raines. Executive Office of the President,
Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies. M-97-16
(June 18, 1997).
336. See GAO REPoRT, supra note 28, at 9.
337. See id at 2-3.
338. See INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 332, at 4-7. These problems have persisted despite huge capital outlays. "For example, INS plans to spend about $11 million in
FY 2000 and another $10.5 million in FY 2001 to continue development of its CLAIMS 4,
which supports the proc;essing of applications and petitions for immigrant benefits and is
intended to fully replace CLAIMS 3." Id. at 5. Millions more are to be spent on other
agency operations regarding enforcement and for maintenance. In FY 2001 the total budget
is $288 million on information technology. See id.
339. Interview with David Martin, Former General Counsel of INS and current Professor ofLaw, Univ. of Va. (Sept. 15, 2000).
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plans were stalled because of the General Services Agency (GSA) contract
•
340
reqmrements.
Strategic planning is essential to efficient agency operations, but beyond
the dictates of efficiency, the very integrity of the agency adjudications is at
risk when the personnel are ill-prepared for the job at hand. Poor adjudications resulting in appeals or re-adjudication at later stages are both a waste
of resources and a factor that builds distrust of the entire immigration system.

d.

The Sophistication of the Participant

The vast majority of people filing applications and petitions with these
agencies for immigration benefits are unrepresented. 341 Many of them may
not be fluent in English, or may not have attended American educational
institutions. The well-represented and sophisticated participants in the
system, such as large multinational employers or certain industry sectors,342
expect high levels of service and are frequently successful in gaining the
ear of Congress or the agencies. 343 Designing programs, forms, and information comprehensible to the diverse populations served by these agencies
is a monumental challenge. 344 Procedure failures sometimes arise because
the agencies fail to adequately consider these differences and try to design
a "one-size fits all" system. The failure of the agencies to sufficiently
study the consumers of their services may be one of the most significant
contributors to endemic procedural problems.
In a sense, the failure to adequately orient the agency operations to the
sophistication of the participant diminishes the transparency of the agency

340. The General Services Agency must approve real estate development for government agencies among other aspects of general business operations.
341. See supra Part II.
342. A good example is the sheepgrower's association, which has successfully handled
the H-2A and labor certification applications for sheepherders for more than thirty years.
Although not on Schedule A, sheepherders receive a form of modified waiver of the labor
certification requirement.
343. A good example of special handling is found in the blanket L-1 petitions. In 1990,
Congress authorized large multinational corporations to make one "blanket" non-immigrant
visa petition, which became the mechanism by which the company can move large numbers
of international personnel. See INA § 214(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § Jl84(c)(2)(A) (1994 &
Supp. V 1999). Although this procedure is now formally part of the INA, the agencies established the "blanket" petitions regulation. See GoRDON ET AL., supra note 72, § 24.08
n.52; see also INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (2001) (discussing regulations
regarding blanket petition procedures); Temporary Alien Workers Seeking Classification
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 5738, 5742-45 (Feb. 26, 1987).
344. Of course, other federal agencies face similar challenges. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) must plan for the individual filing and the sophisticated corporate filer.
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operations. In immigration law, it is insufficient to publish regulations and
interpretive policy memoranda when the agencies know the vast majority
of users are not represented by skilled mediators such as attorneys. While
rulemaking theoretically increases the transparency of the agency operations, it does not do so for participants who cannot comprehend the published rules.
In tum, this lack of transparency may contribute to inadvertent abuse of
various immigration categories or weak applications for immigration benefits. Adjudicators become accustomed to weak applications, or to more
egregious attempts to defraud the system, and therefore, tighten the adjudication standards and increase the processing demands for alJ participants
resulting in less efficient operations. It is fundamental to the design of the
agency adjudications that the agency attempt to evaluate the ability of the
participant to understand both the substantive and procedural requirements.

e.

The Fear ofFraud

Perhaps the one uniform concern in all of the immigration adjudications
is the fear that the wrong people are "getting through" the system. Fear of
false positives is endemic in all adjudication, but it is of particular concern
in the distribution of limited benefits. Immigrant visas are most definitely a
limited benefit.34s This fear is also appropriate because it is at least anecdotally true that people will try to defraud the immigration law to meet
their personal goals. Marriage fraud is one of the most recognizable examples.346 At times the vague standards in the statutes combined with the
agencies' failure to anticipate some kinds of fraud have led to wholesale
suspension of adjudication.347 However, all too often, the agencies let the
possibility of fraud drive the adjudication and fail to use measured approaches to adjudication which might both deter fraud and allow appropriate corroboration of essential facts. Rather than do the wrong thing, the
agencies sometimes do nothing.
The fear of fraud is one of the most important features of the agency
culture. If the agencies would increase the transparency of the procedural
and substantive requirements, they would decrease the ability of the participants to commit fraud. However, in several interviews with agency ad345. See discussion supra Part I.
346. Of course, the government has often overstated the frequency of fraud. In litigation
regarding the 1986 marriage fraud amendments, the INS admitted t):Jat the agency testimony
that thirty percent of all marriage petitions were fraudulent. See INS Admits Fraud Survey
Not Valid, 66 INTERPRETERRELBAsES 1011 (1989).
347. The INS stopped adjudicating the millionaire investor petitions for more than two
years because it believed the existing regulations and the prevailing adjudication standards
were letting through unqualified investors.
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judicators, I heard the opposite concern. The adjudicators feared that telling the participant what documentation was essential or necessary would
lead to "tailor-made" applications.348
The agency fear of fraud also cuts against efficient adjudications because
the agencies sometimes layer the adjudications with demands for more or
additional documentation or the Department of State may revisit factual assertions accepted by the INS. Some of the recommendations in Part IV are
designed to anticipate and address the fear of fraud directly. 349 It is the
failure to confront this fear that too often results in disorganized and disjointed adjudications.

f

Anonymous Adjudications-Lack ofAccountability

Almost every adjudication made in the business immigration system is
made anonymously. Petitions are "signed" by simulated electronic signatures of Regional Service Center directors. Sophisticated attorneys recognize initials if they are typed on the correspondence or, in the case of adjudications require an interview, they may have learned the names and titles
of the individual officers. However, by and large, the process is anonymous to the participant. In some cases, the system may also be anonymous
to the internal agency management. In several instances, the agencies admitted that they lacked adequate controls to identify the actions of individual examiners or the patterns of examiner behavior. 350
Even if this anonymity is sometimes appropriate for security reasons, the
habit contributes to a culture within the agencies. Participants have difficulty knowing whom to contact, whom to praise, or whom to criticize.
Managers within the agencies have limited measurement tools for evaluating the officers' performance. Anonymity could lead to a culture which
lacks accountability and thus, to process failures.
IV. RADICAL REFORM V. INCREMENTAL PRAGMATISM

A. Responses to the Process Borders

Concern over immigration adjudication is growing throughout the

348. Interview with INS adjudicator (July 28, 2000). For example, consular officers
sometimes report the story of seeing the same gold necklace in dozens of interviews because
someone counseled the applicant for a visitor visa that he or she had to appear wealthy to
qualify for a non-immigrant visa. See id.
349. See infra Part IV.C.
350. See Exhibit 4: Immigration Services Division (/SD) Update-9110198, 17 AILA
MONTHLY MAILING 937 (1998).
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United States. One of the most dramatic examples arose in Iowa, traditionally a state with few new immigrants. In May 2000, a gubernatorial commission recommended that federal authorities authorize the State oflowa to
immediately recruit new foreign workers. 351 The commission called for an
Immigrant Enterprise Zone, entitling the state to priority processing of immigrant petitions for people seeking to settle in Iowa.352 The Iowa commission's recommendation reflects an appreciation of one of the largest obstacles to new immigration, the process itself. Rather than focusing solely
on new immigrant categories or the expansion of existing categories, the
commission seeks to streamline the process. 353
In the face of bureaucratic borders built by congressional neglect and
tripartite delegation, and compounded by the myriad of cultural and contextual factors I have detailed; how are the borders to be dismantled? What
type of change can not only reduce these barriers but prevent them in the
future? In this section, I briefly introduce some of the more radical responses which call for a wholesale change in the substantive policies.
However, because I believe most of these types of reforms lack political
support, at least in the short term, I will tum to incremental reforms, which
can reduce the impact of the process borders. In some cases, these reforms
may seem like I am merely redecorating the border walls; however, my
emphasis on increasing the transparency of the entire immigration process
will result in making the walls visible, a necessary first step to tearing them
down.
Given the horrible delays and wasted resources spent in trying to measure the labor market, several scholars and policy makers have suggested
deregulating the entire immigration system. 354 They prefer "market-based"
351. See IOWA 2010, GOVERNOR'S STRATEGIC PLANNING COUNCIL, JANUARY 2000
STATUS REl'ORT, available at http://www.iowa2010.com/news/status_report.pdf (last visited
Jan. 29, 2002); see also Pam Belluck, Short of People, Iowa Seeks to Be Ellis Island of
Midwest, N.Y. TlMEs, Aug. 28, 2000, at Al; Frank Trejo, Sowing Skepticism: Doubt Springs
Up Over Iowa Panel's Proposal to Lure Immigrants for New Lives, Work in State, DALLAS

MORNING NEWS, July 30, 2000, at IA.
352. See IOWA 2010, GoVERNOR'S STRATEGIC PLANNING COUNCll.., THE NEW FACE OF
lowA(2000), available at http://www.iowa2010.com/Jibrary/reportl.html.
353. Iowa is not alone. Canada is liberalizing its immigration criteria and procedures to
expand the rate of immigration. See Julian Beltrame, Canada's Yawning Need for Immigrants Grows: Proposals Seek to Expand Pool ofSkilled Workers, Bolster Social Programs,

WAIJ., ST. J., July 10, 2000, at A24. The Canadian Government has also identified processing delays as a major reason for lower immigration rate.s and is accordingly spending $40
million to expand the number of overseas immigration officers responsible for making the
entry detennination. Since 1998, Canadian provinces can adopt standards for immigration
based on local rather than national needs, a concept that does not appear to be part of the
Iowa proposal. See Immigration Act, R.S.C., c. I-2, § 6 (1985) (Can.).
354. See infra notes 359-62 and accompanying text.
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approaches to selecting and limiting the number of employment-related
immigrants. 355 They recommend abandoning the current immigration system, substituting auctions,356 an optimal immigration tariff, 357 or an immigrant tax surcharge358 as preferable methods of selecting immigrants. Others recommend the United States adopt a "point system" where individuals
who amass points for academic credentials, work experience, or other objective criteria receive a priority immigration status.359 Some advocate allowing entry based on labor shortages in limited skilled occupations.360 To
355. See id.
356. See JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 365-74 (2d
ed. 1999); see also Gary S. Becker, An Open Door for Immigrants-the Auction, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 14, 1992, at Al4; Gary S. Becker, Why Not Let Immigrants Pay for Speedy Entry?,
Bus. WK., Mar. 2, 1987, at 20.
357. See Alan o, Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical
Survey with an Analysis of U.S. Policy, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 190-93 (Warren F.
Schwartz ed., 1995); Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic
Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1147, 1222-25, 1238-44
(1997) (concluding liberalizing immigration policies, in conjuction with implementing fiscal
policies, would serve the national interest); Rex D. Khan, The Variable Up-Front Per Capita Visa Tax: A Contractual Approach to Immigration Law, 13 GEO. IMMJGR. L.J. 409, 40910, 431-32 {1999) (proposing immigrants pay up-front visa tax to enter United States); see
also Jagdish N. Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, On the Choice Between Capital and Labour
Mobility, 14 J. INT'LEcON. 209, 218-19 (1983) (showing policy ofoptimal taxation oflabor
inflow dominates policy of optimal taxation of capital outflow).
358. Former Senator Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.) introduced legislation that would have
eliminated the labor certification process for employers willing to pay a large fee. Senator
Simpson had initially proposed a fee of twenty-five percent of a worker's first-year salary,
but the fee was lowered during the subcommittee markup to ten percent of the salary or
$10,000, whichever was greater. The fees would be paid to private, industry-specific funds,
which would expend half of the fee revenue for scholarships and fellowships for citizens
and permanent residents studying "subjects of relevance" to the industry of which the employer paying the fee is a part; and the other half to be spent on training citizens and permanent residents in skills needed by the industry. The legislation entitled The Immigration Reform Act of 1996, died in committee and .was never enacted. See S. 1394, I04th Cong.
(1995). The idea was revived, however, in the 1997 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform recommendations for changes in the procedures used in testing the labor market im·
pact of employment-based admissions. Rather than use the lengthy, costly, and ineffectual
labor certification system, the Commission recommended using market forces as a labor
market test, with businesses recruiting foreign workers paying a set per-worker fee in an
amount sufficient to ensure there was no financial incentive to hire a foreign worker over a
qualified U.S. worker. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN
AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 69 (1997) [hereinafter BECOMING AN
AMERICAN].
359. See PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 60; BORJAS, supra note 25, at
290-99.
360. The current immigration system theoretically facilitates immigration for a limited
number of occupations where the Department of Labor has certified a shortage of workers.
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some degree, one of the motivations for these proposals is to eliminate
case-by-case adjudication and the concomitant confusion, delay, and costs.
While their embrace of deregulation is understandable, many of these
scholars fail to recognize the degree to which their solutions require a governmental body to make determinations that cannot be accomplished fairly
without some sort of adjudicatory process. Moreover, their proposals, thus,
threaten to replicate some of the very process failures that have led them to
361
embrace radical solutions.
For example, Professor Julian Simon, among others, proposes to auction
the right to immigrate.362 Assuming he contemplates that Congress will
establish limits on the number of allowable employment-based (or total)
immigrants in any given year, and that visas will be auctioned to the highest bidders,363 considerable administrative procedure will still be needed.364
If the auction is directed to employers who buy the right to sponsor a single
worker, it is possible that Congress will want to limit the number of visas a
single employer could purchase to prevent the development of secondary
markets or to prevent monopolizing sources of critical workers. 365 If on the
See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process for Pennanent Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R § 656.10 (2001) (discussing Schedule A exemptions for nurses, physical therapists, and persons of exceptional ability in arts and science). The Department of Labor has refused to update the list and based on interviews with
agency officials, proposing an update is a "non-starter." This attitude is, in part, based on
the difficulty of measuring labor shortages in a national economy. See PAPADEMETRIOU &
YALE-LoEHR, supra note 60, at 123 (discussing problem of Labor Market Infonnation Pilot
(LMI) measurement). Compare Immigration Act of 1990, § 122(a), Pub. L. No. 101-649,
104 Stat. 4978, 4994 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) (creating LMI
Program for employment based immigrants), with Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994, § 219 (f), Pub. L. No. 107-48, 108 Stat. 4305, 4319 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) (striking LMI program). See generally Endelman &
Loughran, supra note 151 (explaining agency and political opposition prevented the program's success).
361. It is not my purpose to methodically discuss the merits or disadvantages of all of
these alternatives; but rather to identify the likely intrusion of process in almost every
scheme.
362. See SIMON, supra note 356, at 357-63 (indicating such a plan would (I) recruit
younger immigrants, (2) allow for more equitable entry process into the United States, and
(3) increase the overall economic welfare of the sending country).
363. Simon does not provide sufficient detail to know precisely what he contemplates,
but this is a likely interpretation of his general proposal. See id
364. See id. He does not address whether only employers will qualify to participate in
th~ auction and I will assume that he would allow both employers and. self-sponsoring immigrants to compete. If family categories remain outside the auction, it is possible that
more affluent families would use the auction to bypass the lengthy quota delays in many of
the family-based categories.
365. Secondary markets refer to the ability of the purchases to resell the visa slot. Congress and the agencies have .become increasingly concerned about the growth of "job
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other hand, families are included in the auction, the political ramifications
of limited immigration, based on access to capital, raises serious political
and social considerations. Of course, our current system is not cost-free.
Many families are unable to sponsor immigrants because of the 1996
statutory amendment, which requires that the sponsor have an income
greater than 125% of the poverty level.366 This economic requirement applies to family based immigration and in any employment case where the
employee is related to the sponsor.367 It will be necessary to ensure that
bidders truly have the requisite funds, 368 as well as to ascertain the bona fides of bidders, to ensure they are not engaging in smuggling or fraud. 369
Any limit on the allowable number of bids or on visa resale will necessitate
regulation and auditing as well.
Thus, even putting aside the distastefulness of placing the American
dream on the auction block,370 the system is less efficient than proponents
shops." A job shop is a sophisticated temporary employment agency that uses nonirnmigrant visas to import workers who are later subcontracted to U.S. employers.
366. See INA§ 213(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(l) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (setting forth requirement sponsors must agree to support aliens at income levels not less than 125% offederal poverty line).
367. See M. FIX & w. ZIMMERMAN, WELFARE REFORM: A NEW IMMIGRANT POLICY FOR
THE UNITED STATES (1997) (indicating based on 1993 Census data, an estimated fifty-seven
percent of Mexican or Central American families would be unable to meet this standards),
available at http://migration.uni-konstanz.de/german/veranstaltungen/mm21/Fix.htrnl; see
also INS Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 8 C.F.R. § 213a. l (2001) (defining
federal poverty line as the level of income equal to the poverty guidelines as issued by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with certain guidelines).
368. In most governmental bidding schemes as well as other auctions involving large
amounts of money, bidders are pre-screened to ensure their ability to carry out the bid.
369. See generally PETER KWONG, FORBIDDEN WORKERS: ILLEGAL CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LABOR (1998) (describing organized smuggling, extortion, and
related abuses committed upon victims). Without screening and investigation, criminal
syndicates might bid on the visas, and then re-auction them at higher prices, or indenture
those to whom they are given. As Peter Kwong describes in his book, recent reports estimate that many Chinese nationals pay from $35,000 to $50,000 to organized smugglers who
bring them to the United States. The victim pays part of this fee as a down payment and
then must repay the "loan" over many years or face physical harm or harm to his or her
family. In many situations, the smugglers arrange the employment and the wages are paid
directly to the smuggler and only a stipend to the victim. In the recent past, the INS and
Department of State have become particularly cautious about the sources of funds used to
sponsor the "millionaire" investors. See In re Ho, Dec. No. 305 l, 1998 BIA LEXIS 29, at
*12-14 (B.I.A. July 31, 1998). This visa program is also discussed briefly in Part IV.C.5.
370. See 135 CONG. REC. S57,769 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (describing how Congress
perceived the millionaire investment program, which allowed millionaires to immigrate to
the United States, as a program which facilitated the "selling of citizenship"); see also
David Hirson, Immigrant Investors: Five Years After, 95 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS I (1995) (explaining program became more politically palatable once advertised as a job creation program).
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claim. While it appears that government need not ascertain anything other
than who has the highest bid, in fact the government will have to engage in
considerable administration and policing.
Among the central arguments for an auction are the assumptions that rational bidders would only sponsor desirable immigrants and that the auction would remove unnecessary government micro-management of employment decisions. It is not entirely clear all employment or immigrant
decisions are purely rational. They may be made for emotional or political
reasons. And while an auction may reduce the adjudication role of government, it is unlikely that Congress would completely eliminate the third
stop of adjustment of status or visa processing where an individual immigrant must prove he or she is admissible. Further, an auction may be unfair
to religious or nonprofit organizations or to other segments of society, who
might not have the ability to compete in the purely economic realm of an
auction.
Allocating immigrant visas by lottery is a close cousin to the auction, but
without its economic attributes. The United States currently uses a lottery
that allows 50,000 people per year to immigrate.371 The lottery visas are
called "diversity visas" because this program limits immigration to people
from countries designated "low admission states."372 If a country has more
than 50,000 immigrants over a five year period, the nation cannot participate in the diversity visa lottery.373 Assuming the lottery would replace the
current employment-based categories, would the lottery have entry criteria
such as a job offer or proven skills and educationr74 If there are no qualifying criteria the system may be free of the general adjudication headaches,
but is the system then a rational substitute for the selection of employmentbased immigrants? It is difficult to imagine a political acceptance of pool-

371. One of the benefits of an auction or of the tax system discussed next is the ability
of the government to recoup costs of the immigration system or to defray costs of new immigration. Theoretically, the lottery could also charge for "tickets" and thus more closely
emulate the auction or tax alternatives.
372. See INA§ 203(c), 8 U.S.C. § l l53(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
373. See id. (outlining how visas should be distributed among natives of foreign states).
In recent years, Congress has eliminated 5,000 of the diversity visas and allocated these to
limited legalization program for certain Nicaraguans, Cubans, and people from former Eastern Block nations, see District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105100, 111 Stat. 2160.
374. See. INA § 203(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § l 1~3(c)(2) (providing diversity visas are only
available to individuals who completed equivalent of a U.S. high school education or who
have at least two years experience in a job). Under the current employment-based third
preference, even if an employee has a labor certificate, if the job is considered to require less
than two years training or experience, the individual will be characterized as an "other
worker" and only 10,000 visas per year are available for this category.
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ing in a single lottery the petitions of software engineers and medical researchers with specialty cooks or nannies. But perhaps it is no less rational
than the existing lottery.
Professor Howard Chang and others have instead suggested a "head tax"
or optimal tariff. 375 Immigrants wjth high skills, important jobs, or who
demonstrate special attributes would pay a low fee, while immigrants who
are relatively unskilled or likely to contribute less to the public weal would
pay a higher tax. 376 The empirical support for the proposition that lowerskilled workers use more resources than they contribute is, of course, hotly
contested.377 Leaving aside the political battling over the taxation scheme,
such a system would require a significant adjudicatory bureaucracy to assess, inter alia, the skills, education, training, experience, and available job
opportunities of the taxed applicant.
Former Senator Alan Simpson and the Commission on Immigration Reform both have proposed that employers pay a tax in lieu of fulfilling labor
certification requirements. Initially in the Immigration Reform Act of
1996, Senator Simpson set the fee at twenty-five percent of the proposed
salary or $25,000 whichever was higher. 378 It is unlikely that the proponents of the optimal tariff meant to quantify all human accomplishments
into rigid tariff rate schedules. The designers would probably want to ensure flexibility and discretion in the adjudication. Indeed, one of the theories of the tariff is that the schedules could recapture the cost each immigrant would impose on the U.S. economy. How would this be measured?
Annually, weekly, locally, regionally, nationally? The efficiency and
transparency of the system are greatly reduced as the tariff scheme is altered to recapture the substantive goal it meant to reach. 379
375. See Chang, supra note 74, at 380 (arguing private sector would benefit from elimination of all restrictions on immigration oflabor). Head taices have an ugly racial and ethnic
history in our country and for reasons similar to the auction, the scheme is likely to be perceived as a method of buying your way in if you are rich or resourceful.
376. Seeid.
377. Compare BORJAS, supra note 25, with SIMON, supra note 356.
378. See S. 1394, 104th Cong. (1995) (indicating taJC rate should be either twenty-five
percent of the proposed salary or $25,000, whichever is higher). See generally BECOMING
AN AMERICAN, supra note 358 (recommending strategies to prevent exploitation of immigrant workers and to facilitate a more efficient system in which to employ immigrant workers). Both proposals are aimed at streamlining the immigration process and recapturing
some of the resources spent on lawyers, advertising fees, and internal costs spent in completing the existing cumbersome system.
379. For example, in an article which attempts to set up a variable tariff, Rex Khan suggests that the INS would measure several personal characteristics in order to set the appropriate tariff. He recommends such criteria as measuring health, education, language, job
experience, education, intellect, and emotional intelligence. He acknowledges that he does
not know of objective tests or measures for several of these criteria. See Khan, supra note
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To the extent the tax is meant to serve as a disincentive to using immigrant, rather than American, workers, the effectiveness, however, requires
varying the tax by job, employer, and potential immigrant.380 This tax assessment would entail considerable administrative process. To prevent
employers from passing on tax costs to the foreign worker or making the
system a covert purchases of immigration benefits, some sort of investigatory or grievance system would need to be administered. Any type of tax
is, of course, vulnerable to the same issues of fraud, smuggling, and political distaste as the other proposals.
Another prominent proposal, one which has been adopted in part in Canada and Australia, is known as a "point system," and operates by allocating
points for desired qualities such as skill, education, job experience, net
worth, existingjob offers, and the like.381 The notion is that if the point of
allocation is well designed, the government can quickly and clearly identify
desirable immigrants.382 Plainly, such a system requires considerable administration and adjudication, for not only do the bona tides of claims to
points need to be established, but also administrators must compare educational accomplishments among different educational systems, as well as
training and skills which are differently understood and labeled. 383 Moreover, measuring even Jess precise criteria, such as "past work experience" or
individual "personal suitability,"384 requires a great deal of case-by-case
357, at 412-16.

380. Some employers would be dissuaded at costs much lower than twenty-five percent
of salary, others would value the immigrant in other ways not necessarily reflected in the
base salary. For example, the foreign worker may be expected to generate new sources of
income for the employer or add a status or cache to the employer's workplace.
381. See generally PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LoEHR., supra note 60.
382. Advocates of this system suggest that an immigration scheme which focuses on the
selection of skilled individuals who have demonstrated the ability to compete, to change,
and to continue a pattern of "life long learning" are the type of immigrants we need in our
society. See, e.g., PAPADEMETRJOU & YALE-LOEHR., supra note 60, at 162 (attempting to
substitute past measurable achievements as a way to prove quality of adaptability).
383. For instance, questions will arise about whether a Class A welder in France is
equivalent to a Class A welder in the United States, and so forth. Nor do all point systems
rely on strictly objective criteria such as age or a score on a standardized language exam.
See id. (suggesting a sliding scale of points be awarded for immigrants who demonstrate
training or work experience which establishes individual's potential to adapt in changing
economic and technological environments).
384. See Benjamin J. Tristler, Canada Continues to Toughen /ts lmmigration and Citizenship Laws, in IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL11Y HANDBO!JK II 435 (2000-01) (explaining
points for this category are awarded based on the visa officer's impressions of the applicant's adaptability, motivation, initiative, and resourcefulness). For description and chart
illustrating the Canadian point system see CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. CAN., CANADA'S
IMMIGRATION LAW, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/immlaw.html (last visited
Jan. 29, 2002).
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adjudication. 385 The reform most likely to gamer political support involves
enhancing the flexibility for the Department of Labor to pre-certify occupations and to create blanket waivers for persons qualified to enter those
occupations.386 Yet this solution, too, continues to require considerable
administrative process. Indeed, it was the Department of Labor that undermined the most recent effort to implement a shortage occupation approach.387
So, at least for the moment, it is worth pursuing incremental, pragmatic
reforms which might minimize or alleviate some of the worst of the failures
of process by increasing the transparency of agency action, preserving the
integrity of agency adjudications, and balancing the need for timely adjudication with orderly procedures. I have grouped these recommendations
into several areas: structural or substantive reforms, measuring performance, and incentives for improved performance.

B. Structural and Substantive Changes
1. Create a Coordinating Authority
Far too many of the problems illustrated in this Article result from a lack
of coordination of policies and priorities. Although the president could order coordination by the Attorney General, Secretary of Labor, and Secretary of State, it is, perhaps, politically expedient to allow immigration adju-

385. See, e.g., PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 60, at 144-70 (proposing
specially trained INS adjudicators be responsible for implementing selection criteria). Generally speaking, the book largely focuses on the substantive requirements of the point system and its relative advantages over other selection criteria. Moreover, it appears to suggest
a trust in the administrative expertise of the INS adjudicators that I do not completely share
without more procedural protections. See infra Part IV.A (critiquing point system adjudication); BORJAS, supra note 25, at 194-95 (acknowledging potential for bias in criteria in a
point system and suggests a similar potential for bias in how the adjudicator applies system).
In my view, this type of adjudication is more rationally related to the goals of the immigration system than attempting to conduct artificial tests of labor shortages. However, it is
not inevitably adequately transparent or efficient, and attention to process is essential to
making it so. Among other things, ensuring integrity will require that training and monitoring take place to avoid the likely tendency of adjudicators to make decisions biased toward the type of education and skills they personally value. The more the system is designed to ensure its substantive goals, the less likely it is that it will operate without
substantial administrative adjudication.
386. See Employment & Training Admin. Labor Certification Process for Permanent
Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 (2001) (listing Schedule A occupations,
which provides a limited example of the pre-certification, blanket waiver approach).
387. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing rationale and history behind
the proposed LMI program).
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dication to remain a divided task. The reason for this is that it becomes
more difficult to blame any single agency for program failures or for each
agency to point fingers at the others.388 Also, each agency fears control by
the other and, therefore, the cabinet level officers each want to protect their
administrative turf.
Either Congress or the president should establish an authority to coordinate these functions. Ideally, the president would create a cabinet level office to coordinate the immigration function and Congress would Support
this structure with appropriate statutory reforms. 389 The INS, standing
alone without regard to the Department of State and Department of Labor,
is a large federal agency employing over 25,000 people and operating with
an annual budget of 3.9 billion dollars. 390 Beyond mere size and expense,

388. At an August AILA liaison questions and answers session with the Vennont Service Center, AILA asked, "We also understood that ifan applicant had a pending I-140 and
was about to reach the end of six years under an H- IB, this too would be a basis to request
an expedite. Could you elaborate on the criteria used to detennine when an expedite would
be appropriate, i.e., what specific factors must be established to qualify for an expedite under those circumstances?" The response was, "As you know, the issue usually driving this
is not ours [INS], but rather it is a factor of the large backlogs at the DOL, which can vary
over the passage of time and by jurisdiction. For that reason, we do not consider these requests to be an 'automatic' expedite approval. That is not to say that all similar requests of
this type are the result of DOL processing delays. Therefore, each request is looked at, as
you know, on a case-by-case basis and we will continue to treat them that way. AILA might
want to bring some of its considerable influence to bear on the DOL for if their backlogs
were reduced, many of these problems would disappear." See AILA, VSC LIASON
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, at http://www.aila.org (on file with author).
389. Others have suggested the creation of a cabinet level office or a new independent
agency. See PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra note 288, at 27-28 (recommending either an independent agency or an elevation of the function within Department of Justice). See generally Mn.TON D. MORRIS, IMMIGRATION: THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY (1985) (calling
for either an independent agency or elevating INS within Department of Justice). I am not
recommending an independent agency because the political issues that dominate immigration politics require leadership from an accountable executive. I realize others may view
independent agencies as more likely to act without regard to politics and therefore to be
more able to effect policies articulated in the statutes. I would prefer, however, to test the
ability of the executive branch to maintain and achieve policy and thereby make at least one
branch of government more accountable for its operation of the immigration function. For a
discussion of the role of independent agencies see Symposium, The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L. REv. 215.
390. See INS, STATISTICS, available at www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/
index.htm (describing statistics on employees and budget operations) (last visited Jan. 12,
2002). When the personnel and resources of the Department of State and Department of
Labor are added, the commitment of resources to the immigration adjudication is even more
significant See PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra note 288, at 37 (comparing several agencies
by size of workforce).
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the immigration operations touch millions of lives.391 As the economy
continues to globalize, immigration policy will become more integrated
with international trade policy. It is definitely time to prioritize immigration policy and if policy is to be implemented, then the administration of
the immigration agency operations deserves equal attention.
Others have provided thoughtful reasons for the elevation of the immigration function to a cabinet level office.392 Rather than repeat those reasons, let me briefly clarify that I recommend placing all immigration related activity within this single new agency. Thus, for business related
immigration, such a move would include the visa adjudication of the Department of State, the labor certification and temporary certifications of the
Department of Labor, and all INS functions. While this Article focuses
solely on business immigration, my recommendation applies equally to
other aspects of immigration law, such as border inspections or the removal
process. Accordingly, I would move all of the enforcement immigration
operations into this same agency. 393 While there are currently several calls
for separating the benefits adjudication from the enforcement operations,
the benefits of a unitary agency under the supervision of a cabinet level officer should be carefully examined before separating these functions. 394
The unitary executive and agency structure should also increase efficiency in immigration adjudications because procedures could be fully
designed and implemented within the same "shop." Many of the cultural
factors mentioned earlier, such as the fear of fraud or lack of coordinated
priorities, would have a reduced ability to frustrate the adjudication operations. Minimizing these should also lead to greater integrity in the process.
While transparency is not necessarily increased by folding the operations
into a single agency, efforts to make the process more transparent will not
391. See discussion supra Part I.
392. See supra note 288 and accompanying text. Many of the benefits of a unitary manager are discussed in the Ash Commission Report. See Glen 0. Robinson, On Reorganizing
the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REv. 947 (1971) (citing THE PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXEC. REORGANlZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK:
REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 27 n. 7 (1971 )).
393. These include the border patrol, Executive Office for Immigration Review, currently within the INS, and the Customs Service, currently within the Department of the
Treasury.
394. To the outsider, the adjudication of legal immigration benefits and the enforcement
of the borders and removal statutes may seem completely unrelated. However, many others
and I perceive the system as an interconnected web. Moreover, as I discussed in Part II, a
main factor in the culture of the immigration law adjudications is a fear of fraud. Separating
the benefits section from the tools and resources of the enforcement section may unnecessarily complicate the adjudicator's responsibility to deter and detect fraud. See generally
PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., supra note 288, at 18 (recommending, with minor exceptions, a
separation of functions but retaining both operations inside the immigration agency).
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be hampered by the failure to integrate discussion of the other agencies'
roles. As I have described, current participants in the system have little understanding of the way in which the adjudication of one agency impacts the
other, how the pieces fit together, or when the immigration process will
come to an end. While creating a single agency with a high level executive
will not solve all of the problems articulated in this Article, it is my belief
that this change would go a long way to eliminate or reduce many of the
process borders.

2. Eliminate Department ofLabor Role, It Is Not Essential
As this Article has shown, the Department of Labor processing delays
approached three to four years in many regions and pushed the agency to
adopt alternatives to the regular processing procedures. In 1999 and 2000,
the Department of Labor completed record numbers of adjudications by
relying heaviJy on the Reduction in Recruitment procedure.395 Nevertheless, the Department of Labor continues to face increasing filings with decreasing resources. Within the last five years the budget for the program
has been cut in half. 396 Facing these huge cuts, the Department of Labor
began to investigate a concept called Program Electronic Review Management System (PERM). 397 The idea behind the program is to supplement the
state leve] of review and the case-by-case adjudication by Regional Department of Labor staff with an automated computer review of forms submitted by the employer. 398 These forms would require the employer to
make an attestation as to recruitment conducted in the past and the terms
and conditions of the job. As described in an official notice and in recent
public meetings, the Department of Labor anticipates this would be an adjudication without supporting documentation.399 Originally, the Department of Labor had anticipated seeking statutory authority for post-approval
auditing and sanctions for violations of the attestation requirements. 400 In395. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 121.
397. See supra note 272-81 and accompanying text.
398. See Labor Certification Process for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the
United States, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,777-79 (Aug. 25, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R pt. 656).
Despite this announcement, as of February 2002, the regulations have not been modified in
any relevant manner.
399. See Audio tape: Statement of Jim Norris, Special Counsel, Employment and
Training Administration, at meeting of the AILA Annual Conference, Chicago, Ill. (June
2000) (on file with author).
400. Based on my participation in agency discussions, I had understood the agency intended to follow the pattern in the non-immigrant H-IB visa attestation on the Labor Condition Application (LCA). The Department of Labor makes no adjudicatory decisions when
the LCA is filed, but may pursue complaints or investigations regarding the validity of the
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stead, however, the agency determined that for cases not clearly meeting
the program criteria, the Department of Labor would either require additional evidence concerning the fabor recruitment efforts or would require
the employer to conduct supervised recruitment.401 One of the immediate
questions about the post-approval audits would be the impact on the individual beneficiary of the labor certification.402
The goal of PERM is to allow 80% to 85% of the cases to pass through
the automatic review without further inquiry by a Department of Labor
employee.403 Approximately 15% to 20% of the cases would trigger individualized adjudication and review. 404 Some of these cases would be selected at random as a quality control.405 Others would be selected for review based on characteristics of the application. 406
attestations. The Employment and Standards Administration of the Department of Labor
has the responsibility for these investigations and enforcement actions. The INS authorizes
both fines and debarment penalties. See generally Angelo A. Paparelli & Catherine L.
Haight, Avoiding or Accepting Risks of H-JBILCA Practice: Part I, 92 lMMIGR. BRIEFINGS
15 (1992). As of February 2002, no post-approval audit has been announced by the Department of Labor.
401. See Labor Certification Process for the Pennanent Employment of Aliens in the
United States, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,777-79.
402. It would be very disturbing if an employer's failure to comply with all attestations
resulted in the loss of pennanent resident status for an employee who may not have had any
power to control the employer. However, it would also be problematic if an employee, who
might have colluded with an employer to obtain a fraudulent labor certification, did not face
a rescission of pennanent resident status. Current statutory and regulatory authority would
allow the INS to bring rescission proceedings within five years of the grant of pennanent
resident status.
403. See Audio tape: Statement of Jim Norris, Special Counsel, Employment and
Training Administration, at the AILA Annual Conference, Chicago, Ill. (June 2000) (on file
with author). In subsequent interviews, several Department of Labor officials stated that the
program might have this capacity but it was not the goal of the system. Rather, establishing
the PERM system would allow regional certifying officers to prioritize their adjudications
and devote more time to cases requiring supervised recruitment. These officials vigorously
denied that there was any quota or processing goal for the program. Nevertheless, in several
public meetings where the Department of Labor presented the concept of PERM, the officials repeatedly stated that they were forced into this system because they had to complete
more adjudications with fewer funds. At several meetings the figure of 80% to 85% was
announced and the Department of Labor published the figure of 80% automated-approvals
in a "power point" slide. See DIV. OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, DeP'T OF LABOR, THE
PERM SYSTEM POWER PO!NT PRESENTATION (1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter PERM
SYSTEM].
404. Seeid.
405. Seeid.
406. As of the writing of this Article, the Department of Labor has not released details
of the adjudication triggers. I participated in several task force meetings with members of
affected industries, special interest groups, and high level Department of Labor policy analysts. Many suggested that factors such as an awareness of a work stoppage in an industry,
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While the PERM adjudication model may be a modern and intelligent
response to the adjudication requirements of the INA, it is unclear why the
best agency to handle this adjudication is the Department of Labor. At
least in cases that pass the automated adjudication, the process might be
streamlined by allowing the INS to handle the entire operation. Cases triggering audits could be referred back to the Department of Labor for caseby-case adjudication. 407
More radically, I question the continued need for participation by the
Department of Labor altogether.408 If the substantive goal of our law was
to measure labor shortages and to find U.S. workers for open positions, it is
time to call the program a failure. In an economy of more than 140 million
jobs, the 65,000 average labor certifications issued per year represent less
than half of one thousand percent of the total jobs.409 Before the 1990
limitation on the "other worker" or low skilled category, labor certification
might have been a more important restriction on the entry of lesser skilled
workers.410 Given that we continue to restrict the total number of employment-based visas, is the labor certification essential to the proper allocation
of the potential pool of 80,800 visas in the employment-based second and
third preference categories?4 11 Moreover, obtaining the labor certificate in
no way ties the immigrant to the specific job. Therefore, it would be more
rational to measure the qualities of the immigrant rather than the job it-

evidence of high unemployment in an occupation, or knowing that the job was currently
held by a non-citizen worker might trigger case-by-case review. See PERM SYSTEM, supra
note 403.
407. There is precedent for this cross-delegation betWeen agencies. Since the 1970s the
INS has evaluated whether individuals qualify for the Schedule A waiver of labor certification.
408. Several years ago the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform similarly called for
reorganization of the agencies responsible for the immigration function. See BECOMING AN
AMERICAN, supra note 358, at 48. In addition to recommending a reorganization of the
overall immigration agency functions, the Commission, in its final report, recommended
eliminating the Department of Labor from the immigrant visa adjudications. The Commission, however, favored creating an enforcement role for the agency, allowing for greater investigations of fraud and enforcement of the wage and hour laws and the employer sanctions
provisions. See id
409. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, TABLE A-1. EMPLOYMENT
STATUS OF nm CIVILIAN POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE, available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.tOJ.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). As of August
2000, the economy contains 146,742,000 jobs.
.
410. See supra note 152 (describing Schedule B occupations as a deterrent to employers). Although waivers of the Schedule B bar to certification could be obtained whenever
the employer could establish the complete absence of qualified, available workers. See
GoRDON ET AL., supra note 72, § 44.04[2].
411. All other immigrant categories are exempt from the labor certification requirement.
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self.412
Even if we wanted to retain a labor market test, the INS might, in consultation with the Department of Labor, develop criteria for labor certification adjudication similar to the proposed PERM program. The INS can
learn to identify the cases where an employer has insufficiently tested the
available market or is not offering the prevailing wage.413
Assuming Congress wishes to retain the basic substantive provision requiring employers to prove the U.S. labor market cannot provide a qualified, willing, and available worker, the key issue in reform will be integrity.
If a streamlined adjudication proposal allows employers to inappropriately
certify shortages, eventually the public or the agencies will come to distrust
the system. Even ifthe program were folded into tqe INS, the reality is that
the substantive standard is susceptible to manipulation or fraud. If the program continues to be handled by the Department of Labor and labor certifications are issued, which the INS mistrusts, then the efficiency of the entire
system will be impaired. Understandably, the INS slows down adjudication of the immigration visa petition in an effort to "hold the line" and deter
visa fraud. As currently described, the transparency of the proposed PERM
program is difficult to measure because few details have been released.
But, it does appear the Department of Labor is unlikely to give employers
advance guidelines about which occupations are appropriate for attestation
approval or the necessary measure of recruitment. If the occupations were
named and the recruiting standards spelled out, the agency is likely to feel
that employers would tailor labor certification cases to fit the "approvable
profile."
412. This is the approach taken by Canada and Australia.
See generally
PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-Loam, supra note 60 (recommending similar approach). In each
of these points systems, employment sponsorship and occupation are relevant to the points
allocated to the individual but the job offer does not in and of itself control the entire immigration process.
413. Department of Labor specialists can train INS adjudicators or personnel already
trained in this area can be relocated to the INS. To some degree Congress has already mandated that several of the immigration related adjudications are tied to information provided
by other divisions of the Department of Labor. For example, the determination of the prevailing wage has been tied to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) database. See DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCuPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS,
FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign/
wageinfo.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2002); see also GAL 2-98, supra note 115. OES is unfortunately a very limited database that contains fewer than nine hundr~d job categories and
few allowances for skill level differences in the database. ·Tue Department of Labor has
tried to put some flexibility into prevailing wage determinations by allowing employers to
submit private surveys. But the INS should be capable of replicating this adjudication to the
degree that most cases are automated and hard cases appear to need local state agency
evaluation rather than the national office.
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Perhaps no agency could design a labor certification adjudication model
which preserves the integrity of the decisions, and operates efficiently in a
transparent manner. At root, the difficulty in fashioning the ideal system
lies with the particular character of the substantive requirement. By requiring employers to identify the immigrant beneficiary before commencing the labor market test, the system seems to ignore the conflict employer
and employee must feel from the beginning. True reform of employmentbased immigration adjudication will undoubtedly require serious reconsideration of this substantive requirement.

3. Elevate Administrative Appeals
The administrative appellate function must be improved and made more
transparent. More than ten years ago, Professor Stephen Legomsky completed a study for ACUS concerning the optimal forum for review of immigration related adjudication.414 This comprehensive report discussed a
wide variety of adjudications, from the trial type proceedings in deportation
and exclusion hearings to the informal administrative review of visa petition adjudications. In that report, he explored a framework for selecting the
appropriate forum for administrative review allowing the agency to balance
efficiency with accuracy in adjudication. 415 He specifically recommended
that the Administrative Appeals Office416 be separated from the INS adjudications function to foster greater independence in decision making and to
allow for more formal reporting of the decisions of this office.417 These
recommendations have not been acted upon. The Administrative Appeals
Office is under the control of the INS Associate Commissioner for Examinations and the hearing officers, while they may be senior INS examiners,
are not necessarily lawyers and are not Administrative Law Judges.
As was previously mentioned, the decisions of the Administrative Appeals Office are not reported unless the decision is a precedent case. The
current volume of appeals appears to be approximately 4,000 per year. 418
Publishing the decisions of the INS at the appellate level is an obvious first
step in making the adjudications more transparent. Publishing this small
414. See Legomsky, supra note 26, at 1297. See generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY
SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL
THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION (1990).

415. See Legomsky, supra note 26, at 1312-14 (discussing general criteria for choosing
a review forum).
.
416. It was then called the Administrative Appeals Unit
417. See Legomsky, supra note 26, at 1336-38.
418. There is no official reporting of the workload of this office. These numbers are
based on an interview with attorney Nancy-Jo Merritt who has studied the operations of this
office in connection with her representation of clients.
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volume of cases would not be burdensome419 and should be even more
valuable and less burdensome given the smaJJer volume of cases.
In its final report, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform similarly called for improvement in the appellate review of agency adjudications.420 The Commission called for the creation of a separate agency to
handle review of the decisions made in connection with immigration law.421
In addition to review of the INS adjudications, this agency would also have
jurisdiction over the decisions of the Department of State visa refusals. 422
It is beyond the scope of this Article to reconsider the pros and cons of
requiring administrative or judicial review of all decisions of the Department of State. The common objection to administrative review of these decisions is that because the consular officers consider millions of nonimmigrant visa applications, the volume of cases would be so high that any
administrative review would be extremely costly and cumbersome. Yet this
is a much smaller pool of cases and obviously involves significant interests
of the U.S. business or family member.
The real value of administrative or judicial review to the operation of the
administrative process is its ability to preserve integrity and to increase
transparency in the operation of the system. Serious evaluation of the
benefits and costs of review should be a fundamental part of administrative
reform.

419. The INS has decided to publish all precedent decisions of the Board oflmmigration
Appeals. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DOJ, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS PRECEDENT DECISIONS, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/
biaindx.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2001). The Department of Labor publishes all of the en
bane decisions of the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals and the Office of the Administrative Hearing Office for Immigration Related Employment Discrimination Practices
publishes all of its decisions. Both of these administrative appellate agencies operate separately from the agency itself and are staffed by Administrative Law Judges.
420. See BECOMING AN AMERICAN, supra note 358, at 175-83 (1997).
421. See id.
422. The need for some sort of external administrative or judicial control over Department of State decisions has been debated for many years. See generally Nafziger, supra
note 3 (discussing value of judicial review of consular decisions). More recently, the Commission on Immigration Reform found that while judicial review might be expensive and
burdensome, administrative review would be beneficial to the participants and to the agency
itselfb~ause of the resulting protections for consistency, accuracy, and faimei;s.
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4. Privatize Aspects ofAdjudications423
Some adjudications the INS and other agencies must make in immigration cases require the agencies to be sophisticated analysts of a wide array
of information. For example, the INS must evaluate whether a foreign
educational credential is the equivalent of a U.S. degree.424 Currently, the
agencies often request and rely upon third party evaluations of these degrees made by experts in the education related industries.425 Two of the
most popular categories of non-immigrant visas, the foreign student and
exchange visitor, are in a sense privatized, or the sponsoring institution selects the non-immigrant and issues the primary essential documents.426
While the government has not always monitored the private institutions
sufficiently, in large part the programs operate in an effective manner.427
It is difficult to see why separate agency adjudication of the qualities of
the individual are essential if the sponsor is held accountable for the selection of qualified candidates. This model of private actor selection might be
expanded to select non-immigrant or immigrant categories.428 Where Congress believes it is appropriate to test the bona tides of the individual's
competence or qualifications, it may be possible to use existing non-profit
organizations, which already make substantive evaluation of individual
merit. Such repetitive adjudication is neither efficient nor transparent. Ab-

423. See generally Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use ofAudited Self-Regulation
as a Regulatory Technique, 41 ADMIN. L. R.Ev. 171 (1995) (discussing benefit of similar
privatization); Daniel W. Sutherland, The Federal Immigration Bureaucracy: The Achilles
Heel of Immigration Reform, JO GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 109 (1996) (calling for privatization of
some immigration related functions).
424. Of course, one of the fundamental problems in this area is that the INS and Department of State must also determine ifthe degree certificates are fraudulent.
425. There is nothing about these credential evaluators in the regulations, but experienced participants know that the agencies frequently ask for this corroboration.
426. These are not insignificant categories. Besides admitting a large number of people,
many foreign students or exchange visitors, such as Ms. Cheng in the narrative discussed
above in Part II, later change status to remain in the United States.
427. Recently, the INS has undertaken a number of technological experiments to create
a more integrated communication and record keeping system between the INS and the educational institutions using the student (F-1) visa. See Kate Zernike & Christopher Drew, A
Nation Challenged: Student Visas; Efforts to Track Foreign Students Are Said to Lag, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at Al. At one time the GAO severely criticized the INS for lack supervision of the student visa program. GAO, CONTROLS OVER NONIMMIGRANT ALIENS
REMA.IN INEFFECTIV,E (1980), discussed in MILTON D. MORRIS, IMMIGRATION: THE
BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY 113 (1985).
428. Congress already instructed the INS to consider the opinion of some private organizations in the adjudication of several non-immigrant visa categories such as the extraordinary ability in business, arts or science (0 visa) or the outstanding entertainer or athlete (P
visa). See INS Nonimmigration Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(0)-(p) (2001).
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sent a negative private consultation, an individual could simply be issued
the appropriate visa at the U.S. consulate. If a private organization issued a
negative recommendation on the admission of the individual, then the INS
could adjudicate the case to avoid undue private control and to ensure fair
adjudication, thus fostering the integrity of the system. These same principles could be used to adjudicate the employment-based first preference extraordinary ability in those cases where a private evaluation could be obtained from a reputable non-profit organization.429
·
The use of private parties does not mean that the agencies do not carefully design and oversee the private adjudications. It is unfortunate that recently some INS attempts to privatize operations were unsuccessful. For
example, the INS suspected that citizenship exams administered by certain
private organizations were rigged to pass unqualified applicants. The use
of private Qualified Designated Entities, assisting in the legalization programs of 1986, was not uniformly successful and in some cases may have
inappropriately prevented a qualified applicant from obtaining beneflts.430
Still, rather than reject all privatization, it would be more beneficial to examine the characteristics of the public/private adjudication that have operated well and to identify the missing safeguards in other operations.431 This
kind of systematic analysis may allow the agencies to test and implement
other appropriate programs.
There may be other areas where the agencies could delegate adjudication

429. In the interest of fairness, and to maintain control over the quality of the adjudication, the INS may want to establish an accreditation and record-keeping requirement similar
to the exchange visitor program or the registration of blanket multinational employers for
the L-1 visa. See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1), G) (2001 ). While the accreditation process obviously necessitates an adjudication process, ideally it would be less
cumbersome and result in economical adjudication of hundreds or thousands of individual
petitions. Moreover, these private organizations would need to provide public infonnation
about costs, standards, and procedures to ensure fairness and accuracy. See generally
Tracking International Students in Higher Education: Policy Options and Implications for
Students: Hearing Before the House Educ. Comm. Subcomm. On 21st Century Competitiveness and Select Educ., 108th Cong. (2001) (statement of Michael Becraft, Acting Deputy

Comm'r, INS) (commenting on foreign student visas).
430. See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., 509 U.S. 43, 46 (1993) (vacating judgment on
grounds record was insufficient to decide all of jurisdictional issues and remanding to lower
court to determine which class members were front-desked); Catholic Soc. Serv. v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming lower court granting summary
judgement); Catholic Soc. Serv. v. Meese, 664 F. Supp. 1378, 1388 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (allegation was QDE's front-desk qualified applicants inappropriately turning away some bona
fide applications).
431. By and large, the use of private physicians to conduct required medical exams has
operated well for many years. The physicians must be certified by the Public Health Service. See generally GORDON ET AL., supra note 72.
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of some criteria to third parties. For example a private credit reporting
agency might verify the viability of a business and the INS could find this
sufficient to establish the company's ability to pay the offered wage in a
visa petition. Congress and the agencies should consider the availability of
private sector evaluators for a wide variety of the immigration-related
functions.
C. Measuring Performance and Bringing Process to Light

Important to any true attempt at reform are mechanisms to measure the
effectiveness of agency operations and a formalized structure for continuous reporting, feedback, and re-engineering. In fact, the need for information to allow for continued flexibility and adaptation is critically important
if other reforms are to be sustained. The following recommendations are
designed to increase the transparency of the process in operation.
1. Create a Feedback Source to Keep Measurement and Accountability
Paramount

A number of mechanisms could be used to generate feedback and measure performance for each of the agencies involved in immigration.432 Some
of the mechanisms, such as congressional oversight hearings or sunset provisions that terminate programs, are so formal and highly visible that they
actually might reduce the likelihood of objective and sober agency performance evaluation. While congressional oversight will obviously continue through committee hearings and the appropriations process, each
agency needs the resources and expertise to monitor its own performance
objectively.433 Given the abysmal record of immigration adjudications,
close congressional oversight is imperative at this time. However, developing agency competence and the ability to monitor and correct its own
performance should be the long-term goal.
In recent years, the INS hired outside consulting firms specializing in
management and accounting systems.434 Congress should continue to ap432. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. I, 27 (1997) (discussing benefits ofpartcipation in a collective model); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 578 (2000) (proposing public and private actors negotiate over policy-making, therby decentralizing the decisionmaking process).
433. Congress has de!Jlanded a great deal of reporting from the INS in recent years, specifically information about the H-lB non-immigrant visas and the naturalization adjudications. The effect of pinpointing various visa or petition categories has the unfortunate effect
of leaving other program areas to founder as the agency understandably reroutes time and
resources.
434. See 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1245 (1997) (confirming appointment of outside
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propriate sufficient funding for access to such independent expertise.
However, the consultants should be required to gather data and information
about agency performance from sources external to government. These include major participants in the system, such as industries which regularly
rely on business visas, academic, and policy observers of the system, foreign governments regularly called upon to address the complaints of their
nationals, and selected representatives of the different streams of immigrants.435
Currently, several informal feedback opportunities operate, with various
degrees of effectiveness, to provide the agencies with information about
process problems and potential solutions. As an example, the AILA holds
informal liaison meetings with national and regional personnel.436 Increasingly, these liaison meetings have been essential in reporting on processing times, new procedures and in designing effective solutions to problems. The agencies also hold liaison meetings with other institutional
representatives of the participants in its system, such as the non-profit providers and humanitarian groups.
However, in many situations, the agencies' unwillingness or inability to
incorporate suggested changes or to communicate its policies to the field
limited the effectiveness of these informal meetings. Accordingly, Congress should consider mandating public liaison meetings and providing the
staff and resources necessary to publish the text of the meetings and the
agreed to recommendations.437 In the current procedures, AILA or other
groups external to the agency usually write the minutes of the meetings and
submit them to the agencies for approval. Although this is done in a very
consultants).
435. The INS did convene such a group when it hired outside consultants to advise it on
reforming its operations. The consultant reports are not public, see Interpreter Releases
where such reports are referenced. Still, there is a continuing need to create such advisory
committees on an institutional level. Congress mandated the creation of one such committee to oversee INS operations at international airports. See 8 U.S.C. § 1356(d) (Supp. V
1999). The committee is required to publish notice of the meetings and to prepare written
minutes. See Immigration and Naturalization Service User Fee Advisory Committee;
Meeting, 65 Fed. Reg. 8209 (Feb. 17, 2000). At times, local advisory committees have also
been established. See, e.g., New York District Advisory Committee. However, the minutes
of these meetings reveal little or no information about the items discussed at the meetings.
See, e.g., Minutes of March and June meetings (on file with author). If the advisory committees are to fulfill the role of providing feedback and increasing accountability, the minutes must be detailed and publicly available.
436. While the AILA performs this function very well, it is a private bar association and
the liaison minutes are not routinely made available to the general public. To join AILA, an
individual must be an attorney admitted to practice and the individual must pay dues. Al·
though AILA offers some reduced dues for non-profit attorneys, membership is not free.
437. Apparently, AILA has been discussing a similar proposal. See Interview with
Frances Berger, Member of AILA Board of Governors (Aug. 29, 2000).
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expeditious manner and even when agency management commits to procedural reform, the minutes of these meetings are not consistently transmitted
to the operational levels to guide the adjudicators.
Some, but certainly not all, of the topics discussed in the liaison meetings should be reduced to written policy memoranda. These memoranda
should be widely distributed to commercial publishers and participant organizations. Further, they should be posted on the INS Web site and published in the Federal Register. Where accountability is essential and the
agency has not initiated AP A rulemaking, the non-governmental actors
should consider formalizing the liaison agreements into petitions for rule
making.438 Although the petitions may never be promulgated as regu!ations
under the APA, the agencies could publish rule proposals as policy memoranda when they are in general agreement with the petition.439
While an agency is not required to take steps to actually promulgate
rules based on a petition for rule making, the APA requires that, within a
reasonable time, it either deny the petition or begin the rulemaking process. 440 In the immigration area, Congress should consider giving petitioners more power by creating a specific time period wherein the agency must
explain why it will not act on the procedure recommended or notify petitioners of an adoption of similar or modified procedural solutions. With
specific time frames, actors could petition federal district courts for an order for agency action or, if court participation is deemed too burdensome,
for referral to a Congressional oversight committee. 441

2. Improve Public Reporting of Procedure
Some of the recommendations made here are easy to implement and
438. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."). See
generally Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1267-89 (1992) (discussing lack of judicial review of petitions).
439. Many commentators have discussed agency reluctance to engage in rulemaking.
See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41
Duke L.J. 1385, 1391 (1992). Those agreements which are purely procedural are also exempt from the rulemaking requirements of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(A).
440. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e); Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing limits on judicial review of failure to act on a petition for rulemaking). Generally, courts have held there is no right to force the agency to consider the
petition, but there may be limited review of the agency rejection of the petition. See ALFRED
C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.1.l (1998) (gathering
cases on petition for rulemaking).
441. While I recognize that these rulemaking efforts divert agency resources in the short
term, forcing the agency to adopt more rules over time will increase efficiency and transparency.
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greatly increase the ability of the participants to comply with filing requirements. Congress should consider creating a special provision for procedural rules for the agencies and, although not requiring the full APA
rulemaking protocol, require the publication of all procedures in the Federal Register and on agency Web sites.442 District offices of the INS, regional offices of the Department of Labor, state agencies, and the various
consulates of the Department of State should maintain a public access library with these procedural memoranda, and whenever possible, post
comments on their Web site addressing the local implementation of the
procedures.443 These local implementation comments are very important.
Merely announcing a new national procedure will not result in uniform
change. For example, after the Department of Labor adopted the Reduction
in Recruitment procedure, the various Regional Certifying Officers implemented the program in very different ways, and in many regions Reduction
in Recruitment was not widely available.444 Posting information about the
current status of implementation of new national policies is essential.
While the substantive Jaw is difficult to comprehend, the ability of nonspecialists to understand the procedural rules of the agencies is much
worse. In recent months, with the growth of the Internet and government
Web sites, more information is available, but even basic instructions about
procedures and processing times are sorely lacking. Visit the INS Web site
445
to learn how to sponsor your relative for immigration, and you will find
that as a U.S. citizen you can indeed sponsor your brother or sister. No-

442. Recent amendments to FOIA appear to require electronic posting. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(t)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
443. Publishing this data also bas the side benefit of allowing the public to monitor at
least one aspect of the performance levels of the agency. Some of the regional Department
of Labor offices are posting special procedures and information about special filing requirements of the state agencies under regional supervision. See DEP'T OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, available at
http://www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). The INS
Web site is beginning to provide more detailed information about forms, the proper jurisdiction for processing the application, suggestions for supporting evidence, and current information on filing fees. The INS Regional Service Centers now have pages on the INS
Web site. These pages contain helpful information about preparing applications for submission, mailing the documents, and supporting documentation. They do not contain processing time information. For how to file forms, see INS, FORMS, FEES, AND FJNGERPRJNTS,
available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/formsfee/index.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2002).
.
444. Initially in New York, the state agency and regional office considered only specialty cooks to be an occupation suitable for reduction in recruitment. See Interview with
Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger, New York, N.Y. (Aug. 15,
2000).
445. See generally INS, at http://www.ins.gov.
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where on the site, however, will you find a warning that the current waiting
time in this category is approaching twelve years. 446 Employers seeking
information about sponsoring workers are rerouted to the Department of
Labor Employment and Training Administration Web site.447 The Department of Labor has been improving the Web site but the quality and consistency of the information available makes it difficult to understand the
regular and expedited processing procedures and the multi-year processing
time differences in these procedures.448
The Department of State Web site contains very helpful summaries of
the immigration categories.449 However, this site, too, does little to explain
the delays or complexity of the adjudication process.45 Consider the explanation of the labor certification requirement:

°

The applicant must complete DOL Fonn ETA-750B, Statement of Qualifications of
Alien, and send this completed fonn to the prospective employer who completes
Fonn ETA-750A, Application for Alien Employment Certification, Offer of Employment. The prospective employer submits both fonns to the local office of the
State Employment Service in the area in the United States where the work will be
perfonned. The employer will then be notified by the appropriate regional office of
4 1
the DOL of its approval or disapproval. s

It reduces a complex procedure to filling out forms. 4s2 The description is
446. There is a vague statement about how "demand may exceed supply" and a link to
the Visa Bulletin. However, deciphering the Visa Bulletin is very challenging.
447. See generally EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKFORCE
SECURITY, at http://www. workforcesecurity .doleta.gov.
448. An unusual exception is the Region III website (now renamed Region) which contained processing times for the various types of applications in its office. Perhaps this office
publicized the times because the region was processing cases filed within the last two
months. See EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, ATLANTIC REGION, available at http://www.doleta.gov/regions/reg03/ (last modified Jan. 10, 2002). In contrast, the
infonnation for Region II (renamed Region l) gave no processing times but did list a status
phone line (212) 337-2193. These telephone numbers give tape-recorded infonnation about
the date of the cases being worked on. It is also possible to call and speak to an individual
officer. The Region IX website was unavailable. AILA reports that Region IX has the
worst backlogs and based on liaison minutes, cases filed more than four years earlier may
still be awaiting adjudication.
449. See generally DEP'T OF STATE, VISA SERVICES, available at http://travel.state.gov/
visa_services.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
450. It also contains one gross error. The site still refers to the Labor Market Infonnation pilot program. Although authorized in 1990, the statutory authority sunset four years
later and the program was never implemented. For a discussion of this program, see supra
note 151 and accompanying text.
451. DEP'T OF STATE, TIPS FOR U.S. VISAS: EMPLOYMENT-BASED VISAS, at
http://travel.state.gov/visa;employ-based.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
452. While fonns can be useful in guiding unsophisticated participants, far too often the
immigration forms and accompanying instruction do not adequately inform the public about
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irresponsible in its misleading simplicity. 453
Sophisticated participants may visit one of the public Web sites sponsored by law firms posting current processing time reports gathered by the
AILA. 454 However, the reports themselves use different criteria for describing the estimated processing times and can be completely deceptive.455
The INS Web site does not even link the user to these reports. Instead, the
INS tells the reader that the estimated processing times are reported on the
receipts issued at the time of filing an application. In reality, the receipt
times are often incorrect. Participants can try to call the INS customer
service line to learn estimated processing times, however participants are
not provided with information about how to contact the local or regional
office if a case is beyond that time frame. 456 Sophisticated participants may
utilize internal agency tracking procedures, but the general public does not
know these even exist.457
the substantive criteria, adjudication standards, or processing times. Moreover, the forms
are often out of date and infrequently updated.
453. Given the need for clarity in this field and the high number of people who rely on
the government to provide the information, the Department of State could at least link to the
Department of Labor site or do more to reflect the nature of the certification requirement.
454. See, e.g., LAW OFFICES OP CARL SHUSTERMAN, at http://www.shusterman.com (last
visited Jan. 29, 2002); FRAGOMEN, DEL REY, BERNSEN & LoEWY, P.C., at
http://www.fragomen.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2002); ILW.COM, at http://www.ilw.com
(last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
455. For example, the Texas Service Center reported processing times do not reflect the
actual time required because the time necessary to get the case assigned to an adjudicator is
not reported. The real processing times may double in many cases. See Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Senior Associate, Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy (July 31, 2000).
456. Interview with customer service representative concerning processing of naturalization petitions in New York. The representative assured me processing required a minimum of thirty-nine months. Receipts for these petitions said a processing time of up to
thirty-six months. The Customer Service National Hotline processing information was contradicted by the Vennont Service Center representative, who said that cases pending that
Jong were sometimes closed for inaction or had to be rerouted by special procedure to ensure New York District processing. Telephone interviews with anonymous customer service representatives (July 24, 2000).
457. It is difficult sometimes, even for trained immigration professionals, to identify the
status of a pending application because of the bureaucratic factors that complicate the existing inquiry process (Visa Bulletin reports, automated phone systems, etc.). Currently, the
California Service Center's (CSC) Director's Office created a backup to the existing inquiry
process. The Director's Office houses an Information Officer to field questions and resolve
problems, an Adjudication Officer, who can make final decisions on cases, and an Ombuds
who is specifically focused on those cases that require extraordinary involvement from the
Director's Office. The most appropriate time to tum to the Ombuds is when issues simply
cannot or have not been resolved through any other means. While the Ombuds can identify
and resolve problems in a timely manner, the CSC warns that the Ombuds can only remain
beneficial if used sparingly. See California Service Center/A/LA Liaison Meeting, 18 AILA
MONTHLY MAILING 860-65 (1999).
,
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Ideally, the government would create a single Web site that would answer the questions of a prospective immigrant or employer wishing to
sponsor an immigrant. The physical jumping from site to site in cyberspace is a poor introduction to the reality of journeying through this territory. The inability to imagine who would prepare and maintain such a site
is a further illustration of the structural problems inherent in this administration process. 458
3.

Use of Technology for Communication and Efficiency

Communication must be improved. As was discussed above, it can take
the INS more than one year to communicate to the Department of State that
the INS approved an immigrant petition.459 This is a gross abuse of public
trust and an example of the INS' failure to set appropriate priorities. The
technology of the three agencies should be developed in concert. If we are
going to continue with three separate entities, then the enterprise architecture460 design of each agency must include coordination with the others.
Apparently, the agencies appear unable to coordinate based on several
years of reports to Congress about working groups and problems with the
database designs. 461 Congress, which created this three-headed monster,
must take some of the responsibility and mandate coordination of the technological design. 462
Communication is essential to all three process values--integrity, efficiency, and transparency. Many of the problems identified in this Article
are directly attributable to the agencies' failure to establish inter and intra
agency communication. Communication with the public is obviously an
essential ingredient of transparency.

458. See supra Part IV.BJ (discussing need to create a coordinating authority).
459. See supra note 306 (discussing 1-824 processing times); see also supra Figures 4
and 5, p. 280.
460. See INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 332, at 2 (discussing GAO report on
poor state of INS technological planning referred to as an enterprise architecture).
461. Interview with Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and
Advisory Assistance, Department of State, Visa Office (July 29, 2000) (on file with author);
see also NIKOLAI WENZEL, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES, AMERICA'S 0TIJER BORDER PATROL:
THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S CONSULAR CORPS AND ITS ROLE IN U.S. IMMIGRATION 7 (Aug.
2000) (noting disconnect of State Department and INS databases creates difficulties for
State Department employees conducting background checks), available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2000/back800.html.
462. Merely ordering the agencies to coordinate would be insufficient In 1999 Congress ordered every agency to create a Central Information Officer. See discussion in GAO
REPoRT, supra note 28. Here Congress may need to create and fund a single office with the
authority to control the agency appropriations and technological development.
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4. Measuring Performance and Participant Satisfaction
In a popular book discussing efforts of governments to streamline and
refonn operations, the authors stress t~e need for government organizations
to be "customer oriented."463 One of the techniques mentioned is to create
an ombud, an office devoted to listening to customers and empowered to
act on customer complaints.464 The INS does not have an official ombud
office.465 Although recent proposed legislation466 suggested creating such
an office, the INS opposed the concept and in its draft reorganization plan
discussed creating a Customer Service Advocate.467 Ideally the INS would
support both a Customer Service Advocate and an independent ombud because the two do not necessarily serve the same function. Further, neither
the Department of Labor nor the Department of State have ombud offices.
If an ombud is to be effective, the office must be independent from the
control of agency management but sufficiently connected to the agency to
understand both the operations and how to resolve complaints or inquiries.468 One of the functions the.ombud office could undertake would be to
measure the satisfaction of participants in the system and to initiate inde-

463. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, RElNVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE
SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING nm PuBLIC SECTOR 167 (1992) (arguing because agencies obtain funding from the government, there is no motive for the agencies to
satisfy the "customer").
464. See id. at 179. The ACUS also recommended the creation of ombud offices in federal agencies. See David R. Anderson & Diane M. Stockton, Report for Recommendation
90-2, Ombudsman in Federal Agencies: The Theory and the Practice, in ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REcOMMENDATIONS AND REPoRTS 105, 111 {1990).
See generally Harold J. K.rent, Federal Agency Ombuds: The Costs, Benefits, and Countenance o/Confidentiality, 52 ADMIN. L. REY. 17 (2000).
465. The INS does have an Office of Congressional Liaison. The mission of this office
is limited to serving the constituent inquiries of Members of Congress. See INA,
INFORMATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES, at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/
congress/index.htm ("The information we provide is intended to support Congressional offices in their search for information .... ")(last visited Feb. 14, 2002); see also discussion of
an ombud in the California Regional Service Center, supra note 457. In the fall of2001, the
INS announced the creation of an Ombuds office directed at enforcement and a "Customer
Relations Office" for business and family based cases. See INS, INS REsTRUCTING PLAN
(2001), available at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheets/restruct.htm. It is
too early to assess its structure and characteristics.
466. See S. 1563, 106th Cong. § 104 (1999) (proposing creation of an office of the ombudsman within the service bure!UJ).
467. See July 1999 Draft Reorganization Plan, available at http://www.ins.gov. On December 7, 2001, the INS announced a new restructuring plan and named a Director of the
Office of INS Restructuring. See New Release, INS Restructing Director Announced (Dec.
7, 2001), available at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/insrestructrel.htm.
468. See supra note 457 and accompanying text (discussing qualities of ombud).
ENTREPRENEURIAL
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pendent investigations of problems.469
If a formal ombud is not possible, then the agencies should create informal feedback mechanisms such as regular customer satisfaction reports.
Businesses and immigrants should be questioned about their experience
with the system at regular intervals throughout the process. The INS and
Department of Labor should provide a formal receipt for approved petitions
and a written denial for denied petitions.470 A questionnaire inquiring about
timing, information, and service should be provided with every petition.471
These evaluations should be gathered by the agencies and special personnel
devoted to analyzing trends in reported problems, delays, or complications.
As mentioned above, one of the chronic problems of the agencies is the
anonymous nature of most adjudications. 472 All employees should sign
their work and wear name badges to allow participants in the system to
provide reports on their treatment and conduct.473 The INS has long had
the practice of signing all actions under the stamped signature of the District Directors or Directors of Regional Service Centers. The Department
of Labor prepares correspondence under the name of the Regional Certifying Officer. The Department of State frequently protects the identity of

469. Of course, creation of this independent office would take additional resources and
the ombud may, from time to time, interfere with the operations of the agency adjudications.
However, given the current complete lack of adequate customer service, for at least a trial
period, an ombud is an appropriate way to measure performance and perhaps remedy longstanding endemic problems.
470. The Department of State does not routinely issue receipts, but in the immigrant visa
system the individual interviewer has a clear opportunity to provide participants with customer service evaluation forms, which could be mailed to a central office.
471. The participant should be assured that all responses on the customer satisfaction
report will remain confidential. Notwithstanding the desire of Congress to limit the amount
of paperwork, there are some information gathering requirements that should be given a
high priority. See, e.g., William F. Funk, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets Administrative Law, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. I, 116 (1987) (arguing agency
paperwork should be evaluated on a cost-benefit basis); see generally 44 U.S.C. §§ 35013520 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (requiring justification for new imposition).
472. This aspect of the administrative culture is discussed supra Part III.B.3.f.
473. Of course, some participants will abuse this privilege and potentially harass a governmental employee or inappropriately provide negative feedback. However, if feedback is
continuously solicited and reported, the rare inappropriate evaluation will become obvious
because of the number of contradictory reports of fair treatment from other participants.
Moreover, employees of the government should be given some protection from sanction or
unfair evaluation from participants in their job performance. Nevertheless, failing to collect
the data simply because some will inappropriately blame the messenger disproportionately
shifts the burden to the immigrants and other participants. Further, employees may be motivated by praise and expressions of gratitude from participants as well as commendation and
respect from managers observing their performance as reported by these new sources of information.
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overseas personnel for fear of terrorist attacks. Yet, the Department of
State lists key officers at foreign service posts on its Web site and generally
makes available names of consular officers.474
If there are sufficient and appropriate reasons why personal identity
should not be revealed, then, at a minimum, all officers should be given a
badge number so that public interaction with that particular individual can
be tracked and reported.475 It seems strange that taxi drivers must display
their names and license numbers but individuals making important and significant decisions about visa status or naturalization remain anonymous.

5. Publish More Administrative Decisions
Almost all of the adjudications discussed in this Article are made on the
basis of written submissions of forms and supporting documents. The applicant submits the material by mail in most cases and awaits written action
from the agency. For the most part, the INS and Department of Labor adjudications are made without personal contact with either the sponsors or
the individual immigrants.476 Given the large and growing volume of adjudications, this form of informal and written adjudication makes practical
sense. However, understanding the procedures used to properly file the applications, identifying the standards the adjudicator will apply, predicting
the outcome in any particular case, and measuring the consistency of the
adjudications are all extremely difficult, if not impossible tasks.
The approvals and denials of the various petitions at this adjudication
level are not published. Individual applicants receive written denials con477
taining a basic explanation of the reasons for the denial.
If a case is ap-

474. See
DEP'T OF
STATE,
BIOGRAPHIES:
PRINCIPAL
OFFICERS,
at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/biog/index.4987.htm (providing biographies for "principal offi·
cers" in the State Department) (last visited Jan. 29, 2002); see also AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS
Ass'N, THE VISA PROCESSING GUIDE: PROCESS AND PROCEDURE AT U.S. CONSULATES AND
EMBASSIES (Miller et al., 7th ed. 1999).
475. Ironically, the border patrol, which has more physical contact with the public and
are at times in dangerous confrontations, wear name identification on their uniforms.
476. It is possible in most Department of Labor regions to speak with an adjudicator on
the telephone. This is very rarely the case in the INS.
477. The APA requires that the agency provide a brief statement of the grounds for denial. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 267-68 (1970) (mandating a statement of reasons for determination and evidence relied
on as a matter of proce~ural due process). While it is no~ my intent to argue the constitutional requirement of due process necessitates this type of notice in all immigration cases,
this practice has become fairly standard ii:i the agency operations even if not constitutionally
required. See generally Verkuil, supra note 26 (discussing INS failure to provide sufficient
protections in denial of adjustment of status cases); Verkuil, supra note 45 (noting most
agencies should include this element in informal adjudications).
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proved, the only document issued by the agency is a standard approval notice.478
In some visa categories, such as the national interest waiver discussed
above, the lack of detailed regulations or informal policy memoranda make
it difficult to assess the merits of any individual case or to gather the type
of supporting evidence the agency desires. In other categories, where the
regulations are more specific, issues arise about the interpretation of specific regulatory terms. In these areas,479 publishing the denials would go a
long way to making agency actions more transparent and at least providing
some tools for measuring consistency and accuracy in adjudication.480
While publishing all of the denials made at this level may, at first consideration, seem too labor intensive or burdensome for the agency, the
overall rates of denial are fairly low. 481 Using optical scanning devices and
posting denials to INS Web sites or making copies available through FOIA
requests would aid participants in understanding the evaluative process of
In practice, the INS provides written denials, which may contain an explanation of both
the evidentiary and legal inadequacies of the application. Some attorneys complain that
these denials contain little specific information and contain boilerplate recitations. If these
denials were to be publicly published it is possible that the agency would find it in its own
interest to invest more time in providing detailed guidance to the public because this information might prevent future insufficient applications. At the current time, there are no
regulations that prohibit re-filing. Some attorneys use the denials to redocument and resubmit the application for the same worker. Although administrative appeal procedures do exist. many attorneys find it more expeditious to simply refile. The current backlog for administrative adjudication of a business related petition is between eighteen and twenty-four
months. See Interview with Nancy-Jo Merritt, Partner, Littler Mendelson in Phoenix, Ariz.
(Aug. 15, 2000).
4 78. In the case of the Department of State, the individual receives a formal stamp in his
or her passport. The INS uses a single page document called Form I-797. This form contains the name of the petitioner, beneficiary, and the visa category. If a petition is valid for a
limited period of time, the length of the approval is also noted. See generally Memorandum
from Thomas Cook, Acting Assistant Commissioner for Adjudications, INS, to All Regional
Directors, All Service Center Directors, and Director, Administrative Appeals Office (Feb.
I 3, 200 J), at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/11 blanke.pdf.
479. Ideally, the INS would publish all denials in all categories but initially it would be
sufficient to identify those visa categories where transparency and vagueness in substantive
criteria are of particular importance. Rather than the agency selecting these areas alone, I
recommend an oversight committee, including members of the private bar, identify the visa
categories for publication and to remove from the publication list those where adjudication
standards appear to be well-established and accessible to participants.
480. Personal informati9n should be expunged in the published decisions to protect the
privacy of the individuals.
481. At least I believe the rates of denial are low. The INS does not formally report the
adjudication rates for each visa category. My assumption is based on reviewing testimony
before Congress, interviews with agency officials, and experienced immigration attorneys.
The INS does report a seven percent denial rate for adjustment of status.
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the agency.482
The publishing of denials would benefit the agency as well. Adjudicators would have the ability to search the work of other adjudicators.
Agency management could study the operations and determine if national
adjudication standards are appropriate. Congress and, other observers
might be better prepared to fine tune or refine the substantive criteria when
the agency appears to be too restrictive or narrow in its adjudications. Currently, the stories of "rogue" adjudications must be gathered on an ad hoc
or anecdotal basis. Special industry exemptions and procedures have often
been built into the statute on the basis of this type of evidence.483 The publishing of denied cases could also deter applicants from filing frivolous or
weak cases that fail to meet the substantive criteria.484
At first glance, the Department of Labor appears to provide more pub-

482. In August of2000, the INS began posting to its Electronic Reading Room optically
scanned copies of adjustment of status decisions, which had been considered by the Associate Commissioner for Examinations. See generally INS, ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS, at
http:l/www.ins.gov/graphics/lawsregs/admindec/index.htm (last modified Dec. 14, 2001).
The decisions included both denied and approved applications. In a telephone interview,
Pamela Ball, INS Reading Room Specialist, the Electronic Reading Room (ERR), stated
that the aim of the Administrative Decisions portion of the ERR is to be representative and
not to be complete. INS wants the public to be able to get an idea of the nature of INS Administrative Decisions. Ms. Ball said the site is not meant to serve as a research tool for
practitioners. She hoped that by September of 2000, the ERR would have several opinions
posted for each of the types of administrative decisions handled by the INS examinations
branch. Ms. Ball also said that all the opinions selected should be from the first three
months of 2000. She also reported that the INS is thinking about putting all administrative
decisions in CD-ROM format. According to Ms. Ball, the public could access the CD-ROM
if they came to Washington, but she did not think the CD-ROM would be available at other
offices. See Interview by Michael McCarthy, Reference Librarian, New York Law School
with Pamela Ball, INS Reading Room Specialist, the Electronic Reading Room (Aug. 17,
2000). The INS regulations require each District and Regional Center maintain a reading
room with copies of its decisions. See INS Powers and Duties of Service Officers; Availability of Service Records, 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(e) (2001). We found the New York District
Reading Room was closed and apparently there are no plans to reopen it. See Interview by
Michael McCarthy with several New York District INS employees (Aug. 21, 2000).
483. See, e.g., special treatment of professional athletes, sheepherders, professional
models, and healthcare workers. See INA§ 10l(A)(l5)(0)(i), 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(A)(15)(0)(i)
(1994).
484. Potentially, the agency could meet some of these goals by making the Adjudicator
Field Manuals and Examiner training materials publicly available. However, publication of
denials may be preferable because adjudicators may not follow the agency manuals, and the
agency does not update these materials with sufficient frequency. Despite FOIA requests,
Matthew Bender, a commercial publisher, has been unable to obtain all of these manuals
and training materials. See Letter from Stephen Yale-Loehr, Editor, Matthew Bender treatise, to Lenni B. Benson, Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School (Sept. 18,
2000) (on file with author).
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lished decisions than the other agencies because currently the agency publishes all of the decisions of its appellate body, the Board of Alien Labor
485
Certification Appeals (BALCA), on the agency Web site.
However, as
was previously discussed, few cases are denied and even fewer petitioners
486
appeal.
Also, publishing only at the appellate administrative level does
little to provide immediate guidance for the applicant. Especially in recent
years, where the Department of Labor has been reforming, retooling,
streamlining, and prodding the system, it has been particularly difficult for
participants to understand the current ground rules. This problem is compounded by the fact that labor certification involves both state agency officials and regional certifying officers who may, and frequently do, interpret
the national policies in their own way. 487
The Department of Labor regulations require that before a labor certification application can be denied, the Regional Certifying Officer must issue a written Notice of Findings detailing the insufficiencies of the application.488 These decisions could be published and disseminated via the
Web sites and commercial publishers.489 The state agencies frequently issue similar "assessment notices," indicating changes the agency would like
to see made in the initial application before the labor certification can be
further processed.490 Publishing these notice of assessments would increase
the transparency of the policy implementation, speed up correction by the
national Department of Labor and perhaps, deter agency officials from pre-

485. See DEP'T OF LABOR, OALJ LAW LIBRARY: IMMIGRATION COLLECTION, at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/libina.htm (providing BALCA decisions) (last visited Jan. 29,
2002). These opinions are also published in Lexis and Westlaw. Summaries are also
widely available in commercial reporters.
486. Todd Smyth, BALCA Administrator, reports a workload as follows: 1996 docketed, 495, disposed, 310; 1997 docketed, 559, disposed, 740; 1998 docketed, 294, disposed,
719; 1999 docketed, 313, disposed, 579. See Letter from Todd Smyth, BALCA Administrator, to Lenni B. Benson, Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School (on file with
author).
487. Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Senior Associate, Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen &
Loewy (Aug. 29, 2000).
488. See Labor & Employment Admin. Labor Certification Process, 20 C.F.R.
§ 656.25(c) (2001) (detailing procedures following a labor certification determination).
489. In some cases, the Notice of Findings is rebutted and the case is approved. Ideally
the agency would update the prior publication to indicate how the rebuttal was successfully
made. But even short of this ideal, the Notice of Findings alone would be a vast improvement.. In cases where the rebuttal is insufficient, the Department of Labor.issues a final decision and these should also be transmitted to the public. See id. § 656.25(e) (discussing
procedures to rebut a Notice of Finding determination).
490. Interview with Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger,
New York, N.Y. (Aug. 15, 2000); Interview with Veronica Jeffers, Senior Associate,
Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy (Aug. 25, 2000).
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cipitous changes unsupported by policy or precedent.491
The Department of State does not publish any denials or opinions concerning individual cases and the decisions of individual consular officers
are generally insulated from both administrative and judicial review.492
Rather than perceive such a requirement as a burden, the Department of
State might also consider the benefits such publication and review procedures would add to its operations. Just as in the INS adjudications, participants would have a clearer understanding of the necessary level of documentation required to support eligibility and of the standards applied to
cases. The Department of State decisions would also be a formal method
of communicating to the INS and Department of Labor problems the consular officers encounter in their individual adjudications. Congress would
have a clearer picture of the areas of visa abuse and how the lack of clear
standards might be leading to inappropriate denials of visas.
One of the objections usually made by the agencies to requests for more
guidance about supporting documentation or the application of the criteria
is that the agency does not want to be a school for impostors. In other
words, by studying the denials and cases rejected for insufficient evidence,
the fraudulent applicant is taught how to build a stronger facade. While
this may be true and some applicants might go to extreme lengths to document false corporations or employment relationships, if the requested
documentation is itself difficult to fabricate, the adjudicator should be more
confident that the cases approved are actually deserving of approval. Nor
does this suggestion mean that the agency would not be able to request different or additional supporting documentation should the examiner be in
doubt of qualification.

491. I realize that requiring publication may also freeze the programs because the
agency will proceed more cautiously than when it issued individualized written notices.
Nevertheless, the agency does, at the current time, prepare these written statements and it
should be willing to make the decisions public.
492. See Dep't of State Visas: Documentation ofNonimmigrants under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 C.F.R. § 41.12l(b) (2001); DEP'T OF STATE, 9
FOREIGN A.FF. MANuAL § 41.121, PN 1 Visa Refusal (stating regulations provide consular
officer must provide a brief written explanation of basis for refusal if the individual is ineligible for visa). In.many cases the refusal is simply stated as "application accepted" but ~oes
not note the reason for ineligibility. See id. In any case where the applicant can articulate a
bona fide legal issue, the applicant may request a legal opinion from the advisory opinion
office of the Visa Office. See also Dep't of State Regulations Pertaining to Both Nonimmigrants and Immigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 22 C.F.R.
§ 40.6 (2001); DEP'TOF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFF. MANuAL § 41.121, Nl.1.
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D. Incentives to Improve Performance
1. Fiscal Accountability and Incentives
All immigration procedures, except the labor certification application,
require a user fee. 493 In recent years, Congress greatly increased the
authority of the INS to charge these fees and sought to pass on many of the
costs of operating the immigration system to the participants.494 At times,
fees also served other purposes such as generating funds from business
immigrants to support border enforcement operations. Congress should
more carefully consider building in incentives for agency performance by
intelligent allocation of the user fees. The business lines of operations are
demoralized and all incentives for efficiency are removed when almost all
fees from those operations are directed to other agency functions. Therefore, as a paramount consideration, each operation should have sufficient
appropriated revenue to staff its main adjudication operation and then additional user fee revenue should be used to expand staff to meet demands
and move floating personnel from other areas when demand grows unexpectedly in a particular product line. The ability to be flexible and adaptable is not a traditional characteristic of government because of the long lag
terms in funding and appropriation cycles. However, if immigration operations are going to keep up with market demands and changing country
conditions or emergencies, the agencies must have the flexibility to use
funds to move personnel quickly. As unfashionable as it may sound, the
system should have a built in team of surplus adjudicators. In truth, there
will probably never be surplus at current agency staffing levels, but the
agency should be able to move these free agent teams when new needs
emerge.
Just as state governments object to unfunded congressional mandates,
Congress should listen to agency officials when new proposals are being
considered and seriously review requests for expansion of staff or user fees
to allow new programs to be implemented in a timely and effective manner.
Congress frequently gives INS performance deadlines for various visa line
products without accompanying the deadlines for appropriations and lead
times necessary to implement the changes or programmatic responsibilities.
493. Some of the fees charged by the Department of State reflect the reciprocal charges
the foreign country would charge a U.S. national. See INA§ 2~1, 8 U.S.C. § 1351 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999) (referencing non-immigrant visa fees); INA § 221(c), 8 U.S.C. § 120l(c)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999) (explaining reciprocal treatment of residents).
494. See, e.g., Customs Border Security Act of 2001, H.R 3129, 107th Cong. § 136
(2001) (empowering Comptroller General to conduct a study on amount of customs user
fees the Customs Service can impose).
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Not all the fault can be placed on Congress. The agencies seem to adopt a
"well, what can you expect, woe is us" attitude when these mandates appear. Here again, outside consultants and reporting from constituent participants can serve to mediate between Congress and the Executive. Hopefully, the informed dialogue would serve as a substitute for excuses and
castigation.

2. Fees Tied to Performance
In the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of
1998 (ACWIA) provisions concerning the H-lB, Congress gave the Department of Labor an incentive to adjudicate H-IB LCA forms within the
seven days required by Immigration and Nationality Act§ 212(n)(l).495 If
the agency reported substantial compliance with the LCA processing, Congress authorized that six percent of all fees collected by INS in the H-lB
program be returned to the Department of Labor for equal spending on the
LCA adjudication itself and the enforcement operations of the Department
of Labor.496 What the statute did not build in was reporting from participants in the system to verify the "substantial" compliance. If the agency is
to be rewarded for on time performance, surely outside observers' assessments of the performance is critical. 497 Apparently, the incentive that led to
a significant improvement in agency performance. In 1998, before the
ACWIA legislation was introduced, employers routinely faced delays of
more than thirty days.498
The concept of incentives for good performance is an important one and
should be carefully expanded. Even if only small amounts of revenue can
be tied to the incentive, the process of measuring performance, and publicly
reporting upon it is valuable in and of itself. However, reporting requirements should be more specific than an assertion of "substantial compliance" without corroborating details and reports from the consumers of the
495. Pub. L. No. 105-27, tit. IV,§ 414(b)(6) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(l) (Supp. V
1999)).
496. See, e.g., Letter of Secretary of Labor Alexis M. Herman, to Vice President Albert
Gore Jr. (Mar. 2, 2000) (certifying compliance in 1999, published on AILA Infonet).
497. As of July 2000, several Regional offices were reporting delays ofup to thirty days
to return the LCA form. See generally LAW OFFICES OF CARL SHUSTERMAN, GoVERNMENT
PROCESSING TIMES, at http://www.shusterman.com (listing processing times for INS Regional Service Centers) (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). The entire fee sharing is, in a sense,
laughable because the Department of Labor's role in adjudicating an LCA is nonexistent.
The regional offices of the Department of Labor do not make an independent evaluation of
the LCA other than confirming the form is completed and signed. No review is made of the
accuracy of the wage attestations or other substantive information collected on the form.
The original of the form is returned to the employer for re-submission to the INS.
498. Seeid.
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agency services.
In addition to incentives for good performance leading to the redirection
of user fees, Congress should consider fee penalties and rebates. Fees paid
to the agency for the processing of immigration petitions could be paid to
the special escrow accounts of the general treasury.499 If the agency failed
to adjudicate a petition within the parameters established by congressional
oversight, the agency would forfeit a percentage of the fee with the percentage growing as the adjudication languished. Of course, the agencies
should be allowed additional time to process cases where the agency can
identify a "good cause" for the delay. For example, it takes longer to prepare a written denial than to issue a standard approval notice. If a petition
is going to be denied the agency could transfer the case to a processing line
affording greater flexibility. Such a system also requires outside monitoring of the reporting. The agency should not be the sole evaluator of their
timely performance and excused delays.
At the end of 2000, Congress attempted to achieve some of these benefits by providing the INS with authorization to charge a fee for "premium
processing."500 The intention of the statutory provision was to allow special service to be given those participants requiring expedited processing in
business cases provided the participant paid a premium fee. 501 The fees are
to be collected and reallocated to improve overall INS services.502 Unfortunately, as implemented, the program does not adequately address the impact of premium processing on the overall workload and priorities of the
agency. Moreover, early critics of the program suggest that the program
creates perverse incentives where the INS will focus solely on the premium
cases in an effort to increase fees for the agency.503

3. Adjudicate On Time or Approve the Petition
For certain applications and petitions, Congress should seriously con-

499. The federal government has an electronic payment system in development The
program is www.paygo.program and is being developed by a joint partnership between the
government agencies and BancOne. The INS is one of the top priorities of the
www.paygo.program. Indirect fee payment is already in use by the Department of State for
the payment of visa fees.
500. See American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-41 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1356 (Supp. V 1999))
(di~position of moneys).
.
501. See INA§ 286(u), 8 U.S.C. § 1356(u) (Supp. V 1999) (setting fee at $1,000 in addition to "normal petition/application fee").
502. See id. (stating the fee "shall be deposited as offsetting collections in the Immigration Examinations Fee Account.").
503. See generally Endelman, supra note 122.
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sider a mechanism of authorizing a specified period for the agency to complete adjudication and after the time period is exhausted, absent special
formal tracking from the agency, the petition would be deemed approved
and corroborating documents issued. This is the approach already utilized
to grant work authorization to applicants for political asylum. The applicant must wait 180 days after filing a good faith application for asylum before the INS will issue temporary work authorization. 504 One of the side
effects of this provision has been to give the agency management target
goals for handling asylum adjudication within six months. For cases filed
after 1998 the agency has largely met this goal. When the proposal was
originally made, scholars and governmental agents argued that although
asylum applicants may find the lack of work authorization to be a hardship,
this reform was essential because far too many applicants were simply filing for asylum to obtain temporary work benefits. The faster adjudication
of asylum claims aided the bona fide claims and deterred the false
claims. 505
While perhaps inappropriate for all categories, Congress might consider
interim work authorization and lawful status for some non-immigrant petitions and the automatic approval of immigrant petitions pending longer
than 120 days. 506 The approval of the immigrant petition does not, in and
of itself, authorize the individual to immigrate. He or she must still complete the immigrant visa or adjustment of status processing. The agency
could one-step review the adjudication of the visa petition at the time of the
individual ·adjudication if necessary.
I also advocate the automatic approval of employment-based adjustment
of status applications pending longer than nine months. Potentially, this
could grant permanent resident status to thousands of people.507 The
504. See INS Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)
(2001 ). The application for asylum must be pending for 150 days, after that, the INS has
thirty days to decide to grant or deny the work authorization.
505. See generally Martin, supra note 26.
506. See INS Control of Employment of Aliens, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (1997) (stating
automatic approval or issuance of work authorization is already an approach used by INS).
For example, ifthe INS can not adjudicate a request within 120 days for extension ofnonimmigrant status or within 90 days for work authorization filed in conjunction with an application to adjust status to permanent resident, the applicant may receive an automatic grant
of work authorization for up to 240 days. See id.
507. It would undoubtedly also act as an incentive for people to file weak or even
fraudulent applications. The agency would have to combat these tendencies by first adjudicating cases within the time frame so people knew the case would actually be examined.
Second, the agency must publicize the tough, existing penalties for visa fraud that can result
in permanent bars from immigrating as well as removal from the United States. The current
statute also authorizes rescission of permanent resident status within five years of admission. The INS must establish by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that the status
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agency would know this and I can envision no better incentive for the
agency to complete their adjudication. There is already a low rate of denial
of these petitions.sos Moreover, should the grant have been inappropriate
for substantive reasons such as fraud or ineligibility, the INS can pursue rescission proceedings to revoke the permanent resident status.s09

4.

Create New Mandamus Statutes

While I am loath to rely upon the federal courts to manage the operations of these agencies, there is a role the courts can play to ensure that the
agency acts. Under current law, an aggrieved party may seek a declaratory
judgement or mandamus relief when the federal agency fails to act. 510
While a court will only order the performance of a non-discretionary or
ministerial act, litigants have found that the filing of a mandamus action
can mysteriously move the agencies to action.sit Attorneys throughout the
United States have filed mandamus actions against the Department of Labor, INS, and Department of State and many report that the usual resolution
of these actions is that the attention of the Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned
to the case moves the agency to act. 512 Mandamus does not necessarily result in an approval. However, inaction is paralyzing for the petitioners and
at least when a petition is denied, the parties can seek administrative review
or regular judicial review. If the INA is modified to contain specific time
frames for adjudicating visa petitions, then a special mandamus statute
should similarly be adopted to authorize a federal court to order compliance
with the deadline. st3 The statute should provide an opportunity for the
agency to explain why action was impossible within the mandated time
frames, or why performance was excused under the statutory provision. 514
of pennanent resident was inappropriately conferred. The INS does not have to establish
fraud or misrepresentation. See INA§ 246, 8 U.S.C. § 1256 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see
also Fulgencio v. INS, 573 F.2d. 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1978).
508. See 1997 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 62, at 17 (reporting approximately seven percent of all adjudication cases are denied).
509. See 8 U.S.C. § 1256 (stating statute of limitations is five years).
510. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
511. See id. Mandamus requires that the petitioner establish a clear and certain claim; a
nondiscretionary ministerial act; and no other available adequate remedy. See generally IRA
J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 623-24 (7th ed. 2000) (explaining
and discussing mandamus jurisdiction).
512. · Interview with Nadine Wettstein, Attorney, American Immigration Law Foundation (June 15, 2000).
513. In the past, some courts have read time frames within the INA as unenforceable.
See Robertson v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 957 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(holding ninety day time limit to adjudicate removal of conditional resident status in a marriage case is not mandatory).
514. In my view, any mandated time frames should contain opportunities for the agen-
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Attorneys fees should be available in cases where the petitioner can demonstrate that the delay was excessive and unjustified.
Some precedent exists for special mandamus or calendaring statutes.sis
They have been a part of the naturalization laws since 1952 and few abuses
have been reported. Even if the federal courts are not the right place to
handle these calendaring or mandamus type petitions, Congress should
consider creating a legislative court with the authority to order the agencies
to act. 516
Providing a federal court forum may seem excessive and expensive.
However, without the formality and strength of the independent judiciary to
force the government to act, it is hard to envision another mechanism available to provide relief in individual cases. One of the benefits of these judicial filings would be the documentation effect of knowing how many cases
were filed and how long the agency delays lasted.
5. Increase Resources to Deter and Prosecute Fraud
If I had to identify a single source of process problems, it would be the
agencies' fear of fraud. So many of the roadblocks in the immigration
system are present because far too often, the process designers focused on
the worst case scenario. There is no doubt that some people will lie to immigrate to the United States; but there will never be any fair method of ferreting out the cheat for closer scrutiny.517 The issue is how can the agencies design a process allowing flexibility to deter and detect fraud, but does
cies to exceed the time period when the agency can show fraud or other exceptional circumstances. The mandamus statute should, however, provide for an automatic re-calendaring of
any case where the government is granted an extension.
515. See INA§ 336, 8 U.S.C. § 1447 (1994) (authorizing a court to take over the examination of qualification for naturalization if INS fails to complete the case within 120 days).
516. See Legomsky, supra note 26 (discussing specialized Article I courts in immigration law); Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18
SAN DIEGO L. REV. l (1980); see also M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review-A Nice Thing?:
Article III, Separation of Powers and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1525 (1997).

517. At times, the lies or deception have been an understandable response to discriminatory or irrational line-drawing in the immigration laws. For example, the exclusion of
Chinese immigrants led to many people claiming to be the sons or daughters of Chinese
who had become U.S. citizens. Becoming a "paper" family member may have been the
only way to immigrate. See generally LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). In my own experience, business people did not defraud the government, but far too often, the immigration tail
wagged the business dog. Promotions, transfers, and significant changes in work assignments were delayed because a change would have meant a loss of immigration benefits for a
key employee. After the employee completed the immigration process, it was often the case
that she changed jobs, employers, or locations.
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not create bottlenecks at every step.
Several of the agency officials I interviewed for this Article, and others
whom I have observed over the past fifteen years repeatedly, said they wish
they had the resources to follow up on suspicious cases and to prosecute
both civilly and criminally those who commit fraud. Ideally, the threat of
audit or post approval investigation should also deter would be lawbreakers. But U.S. administrative law is filled with statutes that allow for audit,
fines, and sanctions that are rarely enforced. Interestingly, there are few
civil sanctions directly connected with the employment-based immigration
petitions described in this Article. But even where the immigration laws do
require sanctions, they are frequently unsupported politically.
Another example illustrating that process design alone is insufficient is
the employment-based fifth preference for millionaire investors.m Congress created a program with a built-in second chance to evaluate the bona
tides of the investment. Each immigrant entering in this category must refile at the end of two years of conditional permanent residence to verify
that he or she actually made the required investment and created bona fide
employment.519 While Congress attempted to build a statutory design to
deter or detect fraud, the INS and the Department of State began to perceive significant numbers of cases as completely false or carefully tailored
to meet the regulations while not actually requiring a true commitment of
funds. 520 Over time, the agency began to require more documentation concerning the source of funds, questioning the value of the investment and
whether the funds were truly at risk. Lacking sufficient resources to adjudicate the petitions to remove the condition or the new applications for this
preference, the INS simply froze the adjudications. Eventually, the INS
suspended adjudication of the immigrant petitions while the agency reexamined the statutory and regulatory requirements. For more than two
years cases sat still.521 Rather than issue new regulations, the agency issued

518. See INA§ 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(b)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (allowing for
an investment of $500,000 in certain high unemployment or rural areas); see also INS Immigration Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(i) (2001 ). In 1992, Congress also authorized a pilot
program for investments of only $300,000. See Pilot Immigration Program, Pub. L. No.
102-395, § 610, 106 Stat 1874 (1992) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153). This provision was set
to sunset on September 30, 2000.
519. See fNA § 216A, 8U.S.C.§l186b (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
520. Congress delegated adjudication of the immigrant petition to the INS. This gave
the INS responsibility for adjudicating complex con;imercial law issues surrounding the foreign investments. The statute provides little guidance about the limits on qualifying investment. The INA was not explicit about whether the investment of capital could be a passive
rather than an active investment.
521. See INS, REPoRT TO CONGRESS ON nm EB-5 INVESTOR VISA PROGRAM, available
at http://www.aila.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). This report is required by the Omnibus
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four precedent decisions discussing particularly complex financial arrangements.522 Based on the interpretative change, some people who had
entered the United States as immigrant investors now faced a possible termination of their resident status because the INS no longer recognized the
form of investment as valid. 523 While the agency maintains these administrative decisions "clarified" the existing statutory and regulatory requirements, the investors believe the agency retroactively altered the qualifications for an investment.524
After understanding the agencies' desire to prevent fraud, it seems necessary to create some ability to do post approval audits of those cases that
demonstrate a need for further inquiry. Currently, the agencies' examiners
feel incredible pressure to route out the fraudulent cases, and the problem
will likely worsen. As discussed above, the Department of Labor has begun streamlining the labor certification process. Reduction in Recruitment
is being utilized and the PERM attestation model Is expected by Spring of
2001. It is likely that the INS and the Department of State will feel an even
greater responsibility to catch the fraudulent cases because the Department
of Labor engaged in cursory review. To relieve this burden Congress
should authorize greater funding for fraud investigations. At the very least
there should be increased support to investigate fraudulent cases and
greater civil penalties for those that break the law.525
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public
Law 105-277. Audio tape: Statement of Stephen Yale-Loehr reporting on the INS adjudications at the annual immigration conference of AILA (June 16, 2000) (on file with author).
I served as a moderator and panelist on this program.
522. See In re Soffici, No. 3359 (B.I.A. 1998); see also In re Ho, No. 3362 (B.l.A.
1998); In re Hsiung, No. 3361 (Ass'n Comm'r Examinations, July 31, 1998); In re lzummi,
No. 3360 (B.l.A. 1998).
523. See Barry Newman, Green Card Blues: A Visa Program to Spur Foreign Investments Creates Grieffor Some, WALL Sr. J., Feb. 26, 1999, at Al (reporting on freeze and
numbers of investors who might face a termination of permanent resident status and even
potential deportation).
524. The legality of the agency retroactive decision making is in litigation. One district
court has upheld the new interpretation as a gap-filler rather than the adoption of new substantive rules. See R.L. Inv. Ltd. Partners v. INS, 86 F. Supp. 2d. 1014, 1016 (D. Haw.
2000). Two class actions have been filed. See Ahn v. United States, C99-3950 SBA (N.D.
Cal. filed Aug. 24, 1999) (cited in 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1350 (1999)); see also Chang
v. United States, No. CV-99-!0518-GHK (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. 2001) (cited in 78
INTERPRETER RELEASES 875 (2001)).
525. The Department of Labor has no statutory authority in the labor certification program to issue fines. If the agency believes the employer or immigrant lied on the forms or
in supporting documentation, the agency can refer the case to the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution under title 18, section 1001 of the United States Code. These prosecutions are very rare. See Interview with Harry Sheinfeld, Department of Labor (Sept. 5,
2000).
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From almost any viewpoint, the millionaire investor immigrant program
has been a failure.s 26 I have selected it here because it illustrates that a lack
of commitment to adequately staff and fund a visa program leads to costly
litigation and program failure. If Congress considers more opportunities
for post adjudication investigation, it must also ensure that initial adjudications are well supported and the agencies have adequate funds to use the
post adjudication procedures. While I hope to encourage Congress to provide the agencies with these tools, I urge caution. It would be completely
inappropriate to force participants to bear the burden of post adjudication
audit or sanction if Congress fails to provide clear standards in the substantive statute, delegates to an incompetent agency and does not require adequate agency rule making to define the proper parameters of the visa program.
CONCLUSION

This Article explored the experience of passing through the territory of
immigration adjudication. By introducing the complexity of the system, I
have tried to give some idea of the contour, some texture to the outline of
the immigration law-the map drawn by Congress. Similarly, by giving

526. This program is a good example of several of the process failures identified in the
Article but it is beyond the scope of this Article to give a complete and detailed analysis.
Even at its height, the program was nowhere near the 10,000 visas authorized per year. In
1997, the INS reported entry of only 1,361 of 10,000 fifth preference visas. See 1997 INS
YEARBOOK, supra note 62, at 18 (1999) (charting immigrants admitted through various admission categories through FYs 1988-1997). The State Department reports that in FY 1999,
only 256 visas were issued and in FY 2000, only 231 visas were issued. See Interview with
Charles Oppenheim, Chief Immigrant Visa Control and Reporting Division (July 17, 2000).
For a critique, see Beth MacDonald, The Immigrant Investor Program: Proposed Solutions
to Particular Problems, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'LBUS. 403 (2000).
It also illustrates the failure to provide clear statutory standards. Did Congress intend to
require "active" investment with participatory investors, or could an immigrant qualify on
the basis of investment of funds via equity or debt financing? One of the key issues was the
use of arrangements which appeared as equity investments, but upon more sophisticated
analysis were more similar to debt financing. The INS was poorly equipped to anticipate
some of the complex commercial investment arrangements used to qualify immigrant investors. See Memorandum from INS General Counsel David Martin to Paul Virtue, Acting
Executive Associate Commissioner, INS Office of Programs (Dec. 19, 1997), reprinted in
75 INTERPR.ETER RELEASES 332-49 (1998).
This program is another example where the interrelationship between the agencies became very important. Many of the objections to the immigrant investors came from consular officers who grew suspicious of INS approved "millionaire" petitions for very young
men and women or for people who clearly had no business experience. See Interview with
Stephen K. Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assistance,
Department of State, Visa Office (July 28, 2000) (on file with author).
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the readers of the map more information and understanding of the reality of
the U.S. immigration system, one can see the gaping chasm between map
and territory. By focusing both on the importance of process and the necessity of a system that protects the process values, integrity, efficiency,
and transparency, this Article demonstrates the great failure of the current
system-its lack of consideration of process. I trust policy analysts will
pay new attention to the role of process in any future system. Focusing on
the process elements can aid in designing new substantive provisions or reforming existing law to achieve the substantive objectives. Without the focus, pray, mark all maps, "beyond this place be dragons."527

527. Ancient cartographers warning.

